176
VADAVALi
the term " absolute nort-existence " means something other than existence i.e., being indeterminable as real or unreal, such a thing does not exist at all. Hence the non-establishment of the probandum. If it is contended that the term under discussion means " being other than real " that turns out to be unreal ; hence the adduced defect is not got over. There is no middle ground between the real and the unreal. XV (134-142). The first of the probans is taken up for criticism. The probans cognisability is resolved to mean two things: (1) the object of cognition and (2) non-self-luminosity. (See Tattt•a· pradlpiki.i, p. 34.) The first alternative again is resolved into two: (I) is the cognition of the nature of psychosis or (2) is it of the nature of consciousness? If it is the first, there is the defect of the inconstancy of the probans in respect of the Atman. The pro. bandum mithyatva is not found in the Atman and the probans cognisability is found in it. The Atman is the object of the psychosis generated by the study of Vedanta. The Advaitin further contends that in the Atman there is not that cognisability which is in the form of the fruit of cognition. There is then the discussion as to what the term, fruit, means ; is it cognisedness or empirical usage? If it is cognisedness it is not present even in objects of cognition. Cognisedness according to the Mimarhsakas is present only in the objects present, and not in the destroyed and past ones. Hence the defect of the non-establishment of the probans. There is also the defect of partial non-establishment of the probans in respect of the subject. The destroyed, future, and eternally to be inferred objects have no cognisedness, because cognisedness can only form a part of the subject ; hence the defect. If the Advaitin contends that the destroyed, future and eternally to be inferred objects have cognisedness, the Dvaitin points out that such a position is opposed to the Advaita schClOl 6f thought. In support of it, the Dvaitin quotes a passage from Citsukha who, while defining self-luminosity, points out that the definition should not include the destroyed, futtwe, and eternally to be inferred
