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knowledge of them. Usage with referl!nce to the particular is intelligible with the presupposition that we have some general knowledge of them. (For Advaitin's refutation of Dvaitins criticism. See Advaitasiddlzi, p. 133). XIII (131). It is pointed out that the Advaitin too has to adopt a position similar to that of the Dvaitin. The nescience which is considered to be positive must have a content. Vas that content kl)lown earlier or unknown ? If it be said that it is known, there is no possibility for usage of nescience in respect of it. We cannot be ignorant about what is known. If it be said that the content is not known earlier there is no possibility for the usage of nescience, because the cognition of nescience presupposes the knowledge of its content and locus. As against this position the Advaitin points out that all things whether as known or as unknown are contents for the witness-consciousness. The objects are cognised by witnessconsciousness in a general way prior to the vrtti·jnana and the usage "I know not the sense stated by you." If it be said and contended that though the sense is established by witness-consciousness still the desire to know the pramaJ,.la for it is sufficient reason for the usage, it is not so, says the siddhantin. For a thing that is established by witness-consciousness, the desire to make known a pramaJ,.la is fruitless. The Advaitin has to admit like the Dvaitin that what is cognised in general is restated with a desire to know the particular. There is no valid instrument of knowledge for the Advaitin to establish the positive nature of nescience. The nonestablishment of the nature of nescience leads logically to the nonestablishment of its effect. Hence the refutation of the positive nature of nescience on account of its unintelligible nature. XIV (132, 133). The seventh and the last of the Advaitin's definitions of illusoriness is, " being cognised in the same locus as its own !b~lute non-existence ". If the term " absolute noil· existence in the definition means "asat", then the definition of mithyatva applies only to asat. ~uch a position is opposed to •the Advaitin's view that the .world is neither asat nor sat. If

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