174
VADAVALI
you" to mean " I knov not the sense stated by you as valid." There is the cognition of the sense stated, but not the sense as valid. The content of the statement is the non·existence of the cognition as valid. The sense of a statement can be cognised as it is and at the same time be not cognised as valid. In a polemical debate the proponent first comprehends the sense stated by the opponent and refutes it after restating it. The Advaitin maintains that the position maintained by the Dvaitin is self-contradictory. The usage" I know not (validly) the sense stated by you " is valid. This statement is a qualified cognition and its immediate content is non-existence of cognition. The content of the," that " of that cognition is some object. The Advaitin contends that the object of the second cognition is also the content of the original cognition, because it is an attribute of it. Once it becomes its content it is also urged to be valid. If that be valid there is contradiction of one's own words in the statement that what is known as valid is not so known. The Dvaitin does not admit that the content of the second cognition is to be treated as the content of the original cognition. The content of the usage is what is immediately in touch with it, and not what is remotely connected with it. The Dvaitin admits that the knowledge of the locus and the counter-correlate is necessary. He holds that it is known of the particular, first in a general way; and there is non-existence of the cognition. Such a position is unacceptable to the Advaitin, because it establishes that the content of the statement tW.der discussion is non-existence of cognition. He may contend that if the particular is cognised, it is necessary for the cognition of its non-existence, because cognition of the counter-correlate is indispensable to it. Hence there is no possibility for the statement. The Dvaitin retorts that we have at times a gentWal knowledge that there is some particular. For instance we say thut there is some particular point there. We do not know the nature of that particular, but still we refer do particulars from our general
