NOTES
177
objects. In order to achieve their excl.usion he used the phrase "capacity to be the object of empirical usage of immediacy." Else, because there is no cognisedness in them they too would be self-luminous. Hence it follows that there is no cognisedness in them. So the defect of partial non-establishment of the probans in the subject stands. If the term " phala " means empirical usage there is again the defect of inconclusiveness of the probans in respect of the Atman, because the Atman is an object of the empirical usage arising from psychosis. If the cognition is said to be in the form of consciousness the Dvaitin does not admit it in the object like the pot etc., which form a part of the subject. Hence the defect of partial non-establishment in respect of the subject. (For a refutation of Dvaita criticism, see Advaitasiddhi, p. 10.) XVI (143-146). The second definition of cognisability is examined in detail and criticised. It is defined as the non-existence of self-luminosity. Self-luminosity is defined as "not being an object of cognition"; its non-existence, cognisability, turns out to mean "being an object of cognition". Such a position has been already criticised. The defects urged in there holds good in this case also. Self-luminosity may be defined as that cognition which does not depend on any consciousness other than itself for the empirical usage in respect of itself. The non-existence of it would be cognisability. Then there is the defect of the inconstancy of the probans in respect of the Atman. The Cognition of the Atman as non-dual, self-luminous etc., is dependent on the psyf:hosis generated by scriptural statements like " One only without the second". Thus there is cognisability in the Atman and there is the non-existence of the probandum. Hence the inconstancy of the preba:vs. The. Advaitin contends that the probans is not inconstant in respect of the indeterminate cognit~pn of the Atman. Such an il!determinate cog~ition is not de~endent on any consciousness other 12
