NOTES
165
IX (61-68). The Dvaitin examines the fourth alternative" not being a content of PramaiJa ". He resolves the sense of the term into two: (1) not being a content of some one prama9a or (2) not being a content of any pramal)a at all. It cannot be the first, because the Dvaitin admits that attributes like odour are not ~ontents of some prama:r;ta like the sense of hearing. Hence the defect of the establishment of the established. It cannot be the s~tcond, because of the contingency in respect of Brahman becom· ing illusory. Brahman according to Advaita is not the object of any pramaqa. Besides, it is impossible to define the universe as the subject because it is said to be not the content of any prama:Qa. In the absence of pramii.IJas we cannot have any knowledge. Hence the difficulty of defining the universe as the subject. If it be contended that the universe is known through perception which cognises the phenomenal and as such it is impossible to define the universe as the subject, no says the siddhantin. There is no prama:Qa to the effect that perception cognises only the phenomenal contents. It may be that because of the unreality of the objects that perception cognises, it is said to cognise phenomenal objects. The Dvaitin asks, "how do we know that the objects of perception are only phenomenal?" The statement that something is a pramii.Qa and yet cognises only the phenomenal contents is contra· dietary. The term prama:Qa means valid cognition. It is contradictory to state that valid cognition cognises phenomenal objects. If that which cognises phenomenal objects is pramiiiJa there is nothing to prevent us from regarding the shell-silver cognition as pramaiJa. The Dvaitin constructs an inference and draws a conclusion opposed to Advaita: "pramaiJa cognises the non-phenomenal, because it is a pramiiiJa, like the non-dual texts." One is tattvika pramaiJa and the other "is ~tattvika pramii:Qa. The argument is based on the Advaitin'se theory of threefold reality. The Dvaitin points out that such an argument is valid only aft~r the establishment of the • threefold nature of reality and not•prior to it.
