164
VADAVALi
it being the counter-correlate of negation in the locus of the cognition ? It cannot be the first. The Dvaitins too have admitted that kind of sublatability for the universe. The universe which is delusively cognised as indeterminable is validly cognised by the Dvaitin as real. Hence the defect of the establishment of the established. The second alternative is resolved into two ; the negation in reference to the locus, is it at a particular place and time, or is it in all three times, and all places? In the first case there is the defect of the establishment of the established in respect of a part of the subject. In the second case there is contradiction in relation to a part of the subject. Eternal and omnipresent Akas'a and Time form a part of the subject. They can never become the counter-correlates of the nonexistence in respect of all three times and all places. Hence the contradiction. The commentator discusses in this connection whether Akas'a and Time are eternal and omnipresent. There are scriptural decla· rations to the effect that Akiis'a emerged out of Atman, and night and day are created. The scripture in these contexts refers to the elemental Akas'a and secondary Time. The Akas'a and Time referred to by the Dvaitin are not primary ones. It is called Avyakrta Aka~a and not Bhutakas'a. The Time referred to is Mahakala. They are eternal and omnipresent. They are cognised by witness-conciousness. The Dvaitin examines the term "being cognised" and resolves it into the two following alternatives. Is it being validly cognised, or delusively cognised ? The first alternative leads to the defect of undue extension. The Dvaitin points out that the term negation (ni!Jedha) can mean two things :-It may mean cognition of non-existence, or cognition of" being different from the real." It can'hot 'be the first because of the contingence of absolute unreality. It caflnot be the second for the reason thaf the Advaitin has not yet explained the term "being different from the nml". "
