166
VADAVALI
X (69-70). The Dvaitin examines the fifth alternative i.e., being the content of an invalid cognition. It is acceptable to the Dvaitin. Hence the defect of the establishment of the established. S'ri Madhva is of opinion that everything in the universe is real. His test for reality is that it must have existed at some time. For a thing to be real it need not be eternal. So he regards the Advaitin's statement that " the universe is indeterminable " and the Buddhists statement that "the universe is momentary" and the atheistic Sarikhyan's statement that "the universe is a modification of Prakrti" as invalid. The .Dvaitin is opposed to all the three doctrines, Vivartavada, K~aQ.ikavada, and Paril}amavada. God, according to Dvaita Vedanta is the nimitta-karaQ.a (efficient cause) of the universe. He does not create the universe out of nothing; He is just like the potter, with this difference that He is omnicient. XI (71-88). The Dvaitin examines the sixth alternative i.e., "nescience." Is nescience the beginningless indeterminable, or the beginningless positive existent that is destroyed by the cogni· tion, or the material cause of the delusion ? All these three modes of definition are vatiated by defects. It cannot be the beginningJess indeterminable, because indeterminability as such is not yet established. The non-establishment of indeterminability leads to the defect of the non-established qualification. Besides, the definition as what is beginningless and indeterminable is overpervasive in respect of Akas'a. Akas1a is beginningless as well as indeterminable. The adduced overpervasion is refuted on the ground that Akas1a is not beginningless, because of the non-existence of beginninglessness in any entity other than Brahman. The Dvaitin points out that in that case nescience too cannot be beginningless ; hence the definition is inapplicable. The second definition is taken up for criticism i.e., "a beginningless positive entity, destroyable by cognition". This definition is inapplicable because in nescience there is the absetce of the attribute " beginninglessnes~ ". For the Advaitin no entity other than Brahman is beginningless !n the plenary sense of the te~m
