XXVlli
The sixth alternative, 1'nescience", is discussed in eighteen sections. The term " nescience " is resolved to mean one of three things : (1) what is beginningless and interminable, (2) that which, while being a beginningless existent, is destructible by cognition and (3) the material cause of delusion. And each of these alternatives is criticised. Along with some other inferences, the famous Vit•ara~a inference for the establishment of the positive nature of nescience (bhavarupa-avidya) is taken up for detailed criticism an~ its relative parts are examined and refuted. Counter-inferences are set forth. Then the arguments from sleep-experience (sau~up· tika-anubhava), etc., for the establishment of the positive nature of nescience are refuted. Towards the end of this topic i.e., the criticism of the " probandum ", the author of V iidiivali maintains that the Dvaitins admission of a positive nature of nescience does not militate against his criticism of the Advaitin's position, because the nescience for the Dvaitin is real (svabhiiva) and it is not a super-imposition. Besides, any definition adduced in respect of nescience is acceptable to the Dvaitin. From section 134 there is the criticism of the three probans, " cognisability ", "inertness" and "finitude", in detail. Each of these terms is resolved into alternatives and refuted. In the course of the criticism of " cognisability ".the discussion of the Advaitin's doctrine of " Self-luminosity" (svaprakaS'atvam) is takei1 up and unintelligibility is attributed to it. The great Advaita teacher Citsukha's definition. of self-luminosit): is taken up for a detailed criticism. After the c~iticism of the probans, sublation by percep· tion is urged in respect of the Advaitin's inference. Perceptions like the " pot is real " sublate the inferen(e of the Ad':aitin. The relative importance of the two PramaQas,., perception and inference, is fliscussed and the superior and.
