XXVil
·"the world under dispute is illusory." The example is the ·famous shell-silver. The criticism of this inference is from the point of view of formal logic. There is a statement of Madhva to the effect that all the fallacies relating to inference are .found in the "three inferences" adduced by the Advaitin to , establish the illusory nature of the universe. The proposition, " the world under dispute is illusory " -is taken up for criticism. The probandum "mithyatva" is resolved to mean seven alternatives, (1) indeterminability, (2) unreality, (3) being different from the real, (4) being the content of valid cognition, (5) being the content of invalid cognition, (6) being nescience or a product thereof and, (7) being cognised in the same locus as its own absolute non-existence. Each of these alternatives is examined in detail and all of them are found to contradict the canons of logic. It is argued that there is no middle ground between reality and unreality and hence the defect, " non-establish.ment of the probandum " viz., indeterminability. It is urged that it is contradictory to hold the view that mithyavata is "to be different from the real and unreal", because it is contradictory to hold such a view. The first alternative, "in. determinability " and the sixth alternative " nescience or its product thereof," are discussed in great detail. The concept ·of indeterminability is attempted to be established with the help of some inferences, and they are pointed out to be defect-ridden. Besides, counter-inferences are set forth to bring out the parity in respect of the falljlciousness. The two postulates _of Advaita i.e., " that whir.h is real is not sublated ", and " that which is unreal is not cognised " are -criticised ,in detail by resolving the term real to mean one .of four alternatives. In a similar manner the second p~tu late is '!)so criticised.
