202
VADAVALi
the attribute is dependent, the substrate is an object of perception and the attribute is not so. The attribute is said to inhere in the substrate. The attribute and the substrate are not referred to by synonymous terms. These facts militate against the treatment of difference as the very nature of the substrate. As against such an argument the Dvaitin points out that these difficulties are not of any consequence, because such difficulties are present in the Advaitin's concept of identity also. The concept of identity has also the abovementioned difficulties, adduced with reference to difference. Thus though jiva and Brahman as Caitanya are non-dependent, identity which is not other than jiva and Brahman is dependent on them. Caitanya is self-luminous, but not identity. Caitanya is not manifest as related to anything else; but identity is manifest as relating to Caitanya. " Identity " and "Brahman" hence have the same denotation, but they are non· synonymous terms. If it be said that the reference to identity is a verbal one, what is it that is denied ? Is Brahman denied, or is identity denied, or the relation denied, or is empirical usage denied, or the cause of empirical usage denied ? The denial of Brahman leads to the non-existence of the substrate. Vithout the substrate the concept of non-difference is unintelligible. If identity is denied difference becomes reality. A thing cannot be different as well as identical at the same time. If it be urged that such a thing is possible then let a thing be real as well as unreal. If the empirical usage is to be denied, it presupposes the denial of the object indicated by the term. If the denial is of the cause, it cannot be so. The cognition of the effect helps us to assume the cause. XLIX (471-477). In respect of the object wheEe there is nodifference still we can distinguish the non-different as~cts in it. That function is attribute~ by Madhva to the category of vis'e~a. It is a very important categQry in Dvaita metaphysics. 'l'o
