वादावली

by जयतीर्थः

वादावली जयतीर्थः १९४३

VADAVALI

BY
JAYATlRTHA

EDlTED WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY

P. NAGAHAJA RAO, M.A.
Department of Philosophy, Benares Hindu University

THE ADY AR LIBRARY, ADYAR
1943

पृष्ठम्:वादावली.pdf/२ The Adyar Library Series No. 40

GENERAL EDITOR :

C. SRINIVASA MURTI, B.A., B.L., M.D. & C.M., VAIDYARATNA
Director, Adyar Library

VADAVALI BY JAYATIRTHA
a criiticism from Dvaita stand-Point of the doctrine of the
illusoriness of the universe
(MlTHYATVA·KHANDANA)

पृष्ठम्:वादावली.pdf/४

DEDICATED TO
My Father and Mother
with love, veneration and gratitude

पृष्ठम्:वादावली.pdf/६

FOREWORD

THis is the first time that the Adyar Library has published a work bearing on the Dvaita School of Vedanta. It is our desire to publish in our series standard works dealing with the different aspects of Indian thought, namely, religion, philosophy, literature, arts etc. No apology is needed in having selected the Vadavali of Jayatirtha as the first work in our series bearing on the Dvaita School. It is admitted by all that Jayaurtha is the greatest exponent of Madhva's philosophy and this work tackles the most important problem on which the Advaitins and the Dvaitins differ fundamentally, namely, the reality or the illusoriness of difference in the Universe.

The edition of the work was prepared by Mr. P. Nagaraja Rao, now a member of the Department of Philosophy in the Benares Hindu University. The edition with an English translation and notes was undertaken bf him when he was a Res~arch Fellow in the Department of Indian Phitosophy in the University of Madjas; the late Mr. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, • the Head of the Department supervised his work. With

the permission of the Univ~rsity, the publication of the

Vlll

work was entrusted to the Adyar Library in the second half of 1942.

About the time the Library was able to start printing, Mr. Suryanarayana Sastri passed away suddenly after a brief illness. This very tragic event further delayed the starting of printing and it could be taken up only in February 1943. It is a great loss that Mr. Suryanarayana Sastri himself could not supervise the printing of the book. The editor, Mr. Nagaraja Rao is also far away in Benares. Thus the work of passing the proofs had to be undertaken by myself. I revised the manuscript of the translation and I took the liberty of introducing many alterations. I am also responsible for dividing the text into a large number of small sections. For any defect found in the book, a good share must fall on my own shoulders. The notes are printed practically in the form in which the manuscripts were placed in my hands; I have made only few corrections and these only when I was satisfied that they were scribal errors.

The translation is divided in this edition into a large number of main sections. The notes form a sort of running commentary on the translation and each note refers to the whole of such a section. Each such division deals with a particular main topic. The division into smaller sections is introduced to facilitate the comparison ·of the telt with the transl;tion. Further it gives an analytical view of the subject.

In preparing the edition, we have followed mainly

the text published from K~mba·konam. The Belgaum

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edition too has been consulted. At the end of each main section, the Kumbakonam edition gives the subject of that section. But in this edition the text is printed continuously without indicating such divisions. The m'ain division noted in the translation has beeh introduced only for the sake of the notes. The points dealt with in the main divisions are given in the contents, both in Sanskrit and in English.

The additional notes at the end deal with certain specific points in the text, as distinct from the running comm~ntary included in the main notes. They were first given as foot-notes. But I transferred them to the end since I felt that foot-notes coming after the text and the translation at the bottom of the page may affect the general appearance of the printed pages. Since the text and the translation have been divided into very small sections there will be no difficulty in identifying the passage to which these additional notes refer.

I prepared the index at the end of the book. It contains nearly all important words in the text. For nouns, I have not grouped the words separately for different declensional forms. But the verbs are given in their full grammatical forl1l. Sometimes in compound words, only some members are given. It is hoped that this index will enable the readers to find out a section very. easily. It will also be of, help to find out the translation of a particula) word or techinical term.

This volume in the Adyar Library Series will be a companion volume to the edition of the Vedanta~

paribhB~a recently issued ~om the Library as No. 34.

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A comprehensive exposition of the Vis'i~tadvaita Philosophy by Prof. P. N. Srinivasachari is also expected to be issued very soon from the Library. The Vadavali does not deal with all the topics found in the Vedantaparibha~a ; perhaps Jayatirtha's PramaQapaddhati would have been a better and more appropriate choice as a companion volume to the Vedantaparibha§ia. As a matter of fact, this work of Jayatirtha may also find a place in the Library Series at an early date, as soon as the present scarcity of paper is removed and printing becomes a practicable problem again. Vadavali is more a refutation of the Advaita doctrine than a presentation of the Dvaita view ; yet on this particular point, we cannot think of a better work.

In· the translation, the editor has paid as much attention to the accuracy of the rendering as to the readability of the Engligh version. English language has yet to settle down to its form in conveying Sanskritic ideas. A translator has to confine himself to the available vocabulary of English to express the ideas found in the Sanskrit original; English words have acquired a significance which will not always be indentical with the strict sense of the Sanskrit word. Until by convention and usage the words and the modes of expression in the English language fashion themselves properly for this new ptfr[fose, critics c;n always find fault with the translation by pointing out th~ unsuitability of a particular word or of a particular way

of constructing a sentenc;. The word Brahman is

Xl

retained in English without attempting to find out a corresponding English word, if there is one. But in the case of words like pramal).a (means of valid knowledge) and atman (self) the English words are selected, though the words are fairly well known to those who are familiar with Indian thought. Akas'a is another difficult word, which is translated as ether. But in many places, as in sections 220, 309, 310 etc. (where the word used is nabhas), it means the sky-vault and in other places it means mere space as in sections 344 and ~4. Sometimes the words in Sanskrit, if mechanically rendered into English will carry no sense without other words ; in such cases the additional words are given in brackets. Again a word may be clear in Sanskrit ; but it will not be quite explicit in the English version. In such cases, some explanation or the antecedent of a pronoun is given in brackets. It is true that such modes result in a sort of unevenness in the English passages; but at the present stage in the English translation of Sanskrit works of a very technical nature, intelligibility and accuracy must have preference over elegance of style.

Jayatirtha's style is very• terse, to the point, and full of meaning. His analysis is thorough; he hits hard. These are qualities which cannot be faithfully carried over to the translation also. One misses much when one passes from the• Sanskrit' original to the Englis~ version. But I must congratulate the translator in having preserved so much of the force of the

origirfal in the translatio. The fact that the late

xu

Mr. Suryanarayana Sastri had supervised the translation is sufficient guarantee for the value and accuracy of the translation. Perhaps he would have improved the present version if he had seen the proofs in the course of printing.

About Jayatirtha and his place in the Dvaita Vedanta and also in Indian philosophical literature, the translator has given a brief account in the introduction. His style is at the same time terse and lucid. His analysis of the various intricate points is very minute and at th~ same time it is very clear. The language is elegant and at the same time very forceful. For unassailable logic there are few works that can be a match to this work of Jayatirtha.

As for the doctrines, it is better that lesser people like me do not express an opinion where the great Acaryas differ. To understand the position take up by S'ankara regarding the illusory nature (mitthyatva) of the world that we experience, one has to look at the Buddhistic position. The Buddhists rely on dry logic and attempt to prove that everything positive is momentary and unreal and that s'Unya (void) is the only reality. S'ailkara •takes up their very logic to prove that our mind is incapable of cognising a negative aspect. This negation may be in point of space, in point of time or in point of the different things themselves. S'ankar~ shows {hat every such •negation, i.e., difference, is indeterminable (anirvacamya). Difference

is an object of experience and as such it is not absolutely unreal and since it is,sublated on the realisation

xiii

of Truth, it is not absolQ.tely real also. vVe determine things as either what is or what is not. Difference is neither. In this way it is indeterminable. The problem is whether difference is sublated at the time of the realisation of the Truth. Vedic passages simply state what that Truth is. The interpretation of such passages depend on the realisation of Truth. Thus intil Truth is realised, one cannot say whether difference is sublated at all. If it is not sublated, it is absolutely real. In the Advaita system, sublatability is no~ the factor which militates against the absolute reality of difference. The writers on Advaita attempt to show that the congition of difference is a psychological impossibility. Such a cognition, according to them cannot result in a valid knowledge, because cognition of one difference depends on the cognition of another difference and this latter depends on the former. Thus there cannot be a really valid cognition of difference. The great contribution of S'ankara is in establishing the positive nature of the world as against the nihilistic view of the Buddhists, taking his stand on the very platform of the Buddhists, namely, pure logic. Buddhists defined everything .i.n terms of difference ; difference from other things is the real nature of a thing, according to the Buddhists. This is what is called the apohavada. S'ankara shows that the pure positive existence is the ~nly real factor in a thing:

BuJ the doctrine of S'ankara did not continue in its , purity. The emphasis was slightly shifted. lhe

illuso•y nature of the world ~nd not the illusory nature of

XlV

difference in the world became the chief point in Advaita. But to S'ankara, the world freed from difference is the reality. Thus what was originally a doctrine of the absolutely positive nature of the Universe came to be presented as a doctrine of the illusory nature of the Uni~erse. The Dvaita school attempted to re-establish the real nature of the Universe. The difference between S'apkara and Madhva is not on the problem of "realism". S'ankara was as much a realist as Madhva. The main contention was on the problem of differences in this real world. S'ankara was a pure realist without accepting the possibility of any kind of negation as a reality in this Universe. To Madhva, realism is conditioned by possibilities of negation in point of time, space and mutual indentity, as real factors in the Universe. When we start a theory of antethesis between the two great Acaryas, we must also recognise the limitations of such an entethesis.

It is my great privilege to introduce this first publication of the Adyar Library of a work dealing with Dv:1ita philosophy, not as a rival of the Vedantaparibha~a recently published, but as presenting another view regarding the nature of .the Universe. Thus the two go as companion volumes and not as opponents in the field of Indian philosophy. I take this opportunity to express my sense of gratitude to the late Mr. Suryanarayana Sastri for all that he haS done to the students of Philosophy and to the Adyar Library in particular.. through his. contributions and I take the liberty to dedicate my, part in this work to his sacq~d memory. Mr. P. N~garaja (.

XV

Rao deserve the smcere thanks of the Adyar Library for bringing out such an excellent translation with notes of one of the most important works in Dvaita philosophy. I thank the Madras University for giving the necessary permission for issuing this book in the Adyar Library series. This book was printed in just two months and the entire credit goes to the Vasanta Press. If there are any printing mistakes, the responsibility is entirely on me. I must specially thank the Manager of the Vasanta Press for the promptness with whicq, the printing was executed, especially when the speed has not in any way prejudiced the interests of get up and general appearance.

As I was closely associated with the late Mr. Suryanarayana Sastri in various literary activities for fifteen years, I consider it a great privilege to have had this opportunity of seeing through the press this volume which was prepared under his supervision. I must confess that when I was passing the proof, I missed my colleague very much. ·whenever I had difficulties in the matter of the translation of any particular passage, I took the liberty to make the necessary revision, with the full confidence that he '~Vas closely watching my work from above and was ever guiding me in the difficult work entrusted to me. If he were alive, he would have written this Foreword and I have undertaken the task as his colleague in the University of Madras and as his close CO!Jlpanion in academic activities for a long time. In closing this Foreword I shall be failing. in my duty if I do not make i~ clear that this work would

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XVI

not have been published in such a short time but for the great interest which Dr. G. Srinivasa Murti, the Director of the Adyar Library took in the general affairs of the Library and in this book in particular. It has all along been his great desire to include a standard work on Dvaita philosophy in the Adyar Library Series; when I suggested the publication of this book, he readily agreed to it. In spite of financial difficulties and scarcity of paper, he promptly gave precedence to this work over some others that had already been started or had been accepted for publication. I record my very hearty thanks to him.

Adyar Library

C. KUNHAN RAJA

 

29th April, 1943 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

I (1) Invocatory verse to Lord Vi~QU as the agent and the creator of the absolutely real universe II (2) The Advaitin's inference refuting the absolute reality of the universe, and establishing its illusoriness is stated • Ill (3) The siddhantin resolves the probandum of the "Advaitin's inference into seven alternative IV (4-15) Hefutation of the fust alternative, in.determinability V (16·25) The concept of Atmatva (selfhood) is criticised in detail, in connection with the examination of the Advaitin's definitions of the real and the unreal . VI (26-42) Hefutation of the pramaqas urged in respect of the establishment of indeterminability : Inference ; Presumptive implication VII (43) Refutation of the second alternative, mzreality VIII (44-60) H.efutation of the third alternative, being different from the real IX (61-68) Refutation of the fourth alternative, bei1tg the content of valid cognition X (69. 70) Refutation of the fifth alternative, beittg the carttent of invalid cognitio1z XI (71-88) Refutation of the sixth alternative, being nescience or a product thereof , XII (89-130) Refutation of the pmmaQas in respect of the positive nature of nescience: In'ference; Another inference from the Vivarat,ta; Sleep-experience ; The two usages

2

2

5

8 12 12 15

17 17

21 XVlll PAGE

XIII (131) The Refutations urged are pointed out not to affect the Siddhantins position, since they are urged on the opponent's own principles XIV (132, 133) Refutation of the seventh alternative, being cognised as in tile same locus as its own absolute ttof1existence . XV (134-142) The criticism of the Advaitin's probans, cognisability XVI (143-146) Cognisability, meaning non-seJf luminosity refuted XVII (147-151) A further examination of the concept of notJ·selj-lumil~osity

XVIII (152-179) Refutation of the pramaQas in respect of cognisability : Inference ; A detailed criticism of the inference is undertaken XIX (180-187) Another definition of cognisability criticised. XX (188-200) Refutation of the probans inertuess . XXI (201-210) Refutation of the probans ji1~itude . XXII {211-218) The definition of finitude, as the substrate of reciprocal dePendence taken up for criticism . XXIII (219-224) Consideration of the relative capacities of the two pramat)as perception and inference in connection with the Advaitin's argument that the difference cognised by perception is sublated by inference XXIV (225-235) Contradi~tion by scriptural statements of the Advaitin's inference XXV (236, 237) Contradiction by smrti XXVI (238-252) Conflict with inference XXVII (253-260). The siddhantin states a counter inference to establish the reality M the universe, with the probans practical efficiency • XXVIII (261) An adjunct is urged to vitiate the Advaitin's -inferenee .

.

33

34 34

37 38

39 46 48 52

55

58

60 63 64

68 71 xix PAGE

XXIX (262-265) Non-existence of the probandum in the example is urged in respect of the Advaitin's infer71 ence XXX (266-270) Refutation of the Advaitin by the reductio ad absurdum method 72 XXXI (271-294) Refutation of the illusory nature of dream objects is taken up in connection with the discussion 74 of the hypothetical argument XXXII (295-297) The famous Tattvapradlpikii inference in order to establish illusoriness stated ~0 XXXIII (298-311) A detailed criticism of the same 81 XXXIV (312-327) The siddhantin proceeds to establish the reality of the universe on the ground of its non-sublation 85 XXXV (328-330) The reality of the difference of Brahman from the universe is taken up for discussion 89 XXXVI (331-338) Scriptural statements conflicting with it are criticised: The criticism of the s'ruti : Nel}a naniisti; One only without a second; Reality knowledge, infinitude etc. 90 XXXVII (339-344) The intelligibility of the concept of 93 difference is taken for a detailed consideration XXXVIII (345-348) Refutation of the inference establishing the illusory nature of difference . 96 XXXIX (349, 350) An adjunct is urged as vitiating the 97 inference . XL (351-381) The case against the possibility of perception apprehending difference is stated 98 XLI (382-404) The case against difference is answered in great detail .. 106 • XLII (405-412) The Siddhantin's position is summed up . 112 XLIII (4B-426) The cognition of difference by witness• 115 consciousness is explained XLIV l427-437) The function of witness-consciousness as

. XX PAGE

establishing validity in cognition is discussed at some length 120 XLV (438-456} The intrinsic nature of invalidity and the extrinsic nature of validity are established 123 XLVI (457-459) The cognition of Time by witness con· sciousness is explained 129 XLVII (460-462) The cognition of Space by witness consciousness is explained 130 XL VIII (463-470) The difference between paramiitman and other objects is stated in some detail 131 XLIX (471-477) The category of vis•e!ia and its functions discussed . 134 L {4 78-486} The siddhii.ntin defends the probans urged by him to establish the reality of the universe 136 LI (487, 488) The difference between the liberated and the Atman is urged as absolutely real 139 LII (489-527) The criticism by the Advaitin is answered . 14-2 LIII (528·530) The siddhantin concludes the work with two counter-inferences rediculing the Advaitin's position . 153 पुटाङ्कः १. अविद्यालक्षणनिरासः १-८८ . २. अविद्याप्रमाणनिरासः ८९-१३० . ३. मिथ्यात्वनिरुक्तिनिरासः १३१-१३३ ३३ ४. दृश्यत्वविकल्पनिरासः १३४-१९१ ३४ ५. दृश्यत्वहेतुनिरासः १९२-१८७ ६. जडत्वहेतुनिरासः १८८–२०० ४८ ७. परिच्छिन्नत्वहेतुनिरासः २०१–२१२ ८. मिथ्यात्वानुमानस्य प्रत्यक्षबाधः २१३-२२४ . ९. मिथ्यात्वानुमानस्य श्रुतिविरोधः २२५-२३९ १०. मिथ्यात्वानुमानस्य स्मृतिविरोधः २३६, २३७ ११. मिथ्यात्वानुमानस्यानुमानविरोधः २३८-२६० ६४ १२. मित्यात्वानुमानस्य दृष्टान्ते साध्यवैकल्यम् २६१-२६५ . ७१ १३. मिथ्यात्वहेतूनां प्रतिकूलतर्कपराहतिः २६६-२९४ ७२ १४ . अंशित्वानुमानस्य बाध: २९५-२९७ १६. अंशित्वानुमाननिरासः २९८-३११ १६. मिथ्यात्वहेतूनामप्रयोजकत्वम् ३१२-३२७ १७ . सत्यत्वहेतूनां प्रतिकूलतकोंद्रारः ३२८ -३३० . १८. “नेह नाना' इति श्रुत्यर्थ: ३३१-३३३ . ९० १९. * एकमेव' इति श्रुत्यर्थः ३३४-३३६ . २०. विश्वसत्यत्वप्रतिपादनोपसंहारः ३३७, ३३८ : २१. आपाततो भेदबाधकतया प्रतीयमानयुक्तिनिरासः ३३९-३४४ . ९३ .२२. भेदमिथ्यात्वानुमानेऽसिद्धिः ३४५-३४८ . २३. भेदमिथ्यात्वानुमानस्य सोपाधिकृत्वम् ३४९, ३५० ९७ २४. भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षाद्यग्राह्यत्वपूर्वपक्षः ३५१-३८१ २६. भेदस्य धर्मिस्वरूपत्वसमर्थनम् ३८२-४१२ २६. कालादेः साक्षिसिद्धत्वसमर्थनम् ४१३-४२६ २७ . साक्षिसमर्थनम् ४२७ -४३७ २८. प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वसमथेनम् ४३८ -४५६ २९. कालस्य साक्षिवेद्यत्वसमर्थनोपसंहारः ४५७-४६९ ३०. भेदप्रत्यक्षस्यान्योन्याश्रयाद्युद्धारः ४६० – ४६२ ३१. धर्मिप्रतियोगिभेदप्रत्ययानां यौगपद्यसमर्थनम् ४६३-४७० ३२. विशेषसमर्थनम् ४७१–४७५ ३३. प्रतीत्याक्षेपनिरासोपसंहार: ४७६, ४७७ ३४. भेदमिथ्यात्वानुमानस्य व्यभिचारादिकथनम् ४७८-९३० १६. तत्रात्मत्वप्रयुक्तं ९४. प्रथमोत्पन्नप्रदीपप्रभावत् ११६. प्रमाणागम्यत्वेन २०६. त्रिकालासत्यता २३२. प्रमाणविषयतानभ्युपगमाञ्च २३७ . अत्यन्तासत्वाभ्युपगन्तुर्वादिन २७१. किमात्मनोऽन्यः ? २७२. वोपलभ्येरन् पुटाः १०६ १२३ १२९ १३० १३१ १३४ १३६ २७३. विनष्टा २७५. करणेनोपलभ्यन्ते २९४. उत्तरोत्तरप्रपश्वारोपे ३२१. संसगनिरूपणादिति ३७९. between the attributes (in sub strates that are not different). ४२४. झटिति ४३०, गन्ध इति ४९८. निगडादिष्टान्तस्य ५०६. अन्तःकरणादेः ५१३. अभयमेव च INTI~ODUCTION

S'Ri MADHVA'S Dvaita Vedanta is the most powerful reaction against the non-dualism of S'r'i S'arikara. It is a plU{alistic system of metaphysics based on the most radically realistic epistemology with a perfect grounding in devout theism. Times Vithout number, in the course of his com• mentaries and independent tracts S'r1 Madhva maintained that the chief mission of his life was to refute the claim of the Advaitin that his system had the sanction and support of the scriptures, and to demonstrate the fact of the inerrancy of his own interpretation of scriptures, on the ground that he was the chosen prophet of Lord Vit>I)U commissioned to interpret the vedas aright and vindicate " the ways of God to man ". This task Madhva sought to achieve through all his thirtyseven works. Almost all his works are very terse and they make no meaning without the illuminating commentary of Jayatirtha. Jayatirtha (1365-1388) is the greatest among the disciples of Madhva/ He has commented on almost all the important works of Madhva. Tradition holds the view that the mission oP his life was to .reveal the gzerubhava (the thoughts of the Master). He is called the tikiiciirya (the .commentator par excellence) and not the author of tiPPatJis

•

•

'Ag£ of Jayatirtha by B. N. Krishnamurthy Sarma, New l11dia11 Antiquary, Vol. 1, No. 7. t XXIV

(minor glosses). But for the commentaries of Jayatirtha, Dvaita Vedanta might not have attained the status of a philosophical system. There are two accounts of his life, the· AtJujayatirthavijaya and Brhadjayatirtha-vijaya. Both of them are from the pen of Vyasaraya. There are no historical inscriptions or other documents relati4;lg to him. He was the son of a Mahara~tra Brahmin of an officer's rank, by name Raghunath Des'piiQQ.e, and his wife Rukmabai. They lived in a village named MangaJveQ.he about 12 miles south-east of Pandharpur. Jayatlrtha prior to his sarhnyasa was 'tailed DhoQQ.o Pant Raghunath. As a boy he was a sturdy athelete and was in the habit of riding. Early in life he was married to two wives. In his twentieth year on a summer noon, after an active hunting expedition he went to quench his thirst to the banks of the river Candrabhagii, and there bending down his head from on horse-back he drank water. On the other side of the river there was the famous sage Ak$obhyatirtha who was drawn towards the rider drinking water in a strange manner. After a short interview with the DeS'piiQde, Ak$obhya was able to give spiritual insight to him. He soon took orders under the name of J ayatirtha. Over twenty two works are attributed to him and most of them are printed. Among the commentaries, his Nyayasudha takes the first place. It is an immortal work exhibiting the several facets of Jayatirtha's genius and his ability as a dialectician. Though his works are designated by the unassuming name of " commentary ", in reality they are first rate classics. Judged.by the brilliance of his style,. and his logical acumen he ranks with the great makers of philosophical style, S'abara, S'ankara and Vacaspati. As a dialectichn he is ready for action, ready to deal blows on all sides ; sometimes • he carries the attack into thl enemy's camp and a~ other· XXV

times he retreats into a defensive position. All on a sudden he steps into the arena with a new offensive. He has complete command and mastery of all the weapons for a philosophical disputation. He makes a free use of the vita~zdti type of argument, and he has for it the sanction of Madhva. He has, to his cu~iit, two independent works Pranui~za­ Paddhati and V adcivalf. The first is the epistemological manual of Dvaita Vedanta. In it he examines the problems of theory of knowledge. The Vtidavati is a polemical tract that criticises the Advaitin's doctrine of Maya. It is in about seven hundred grant has. It is also called V adamiilti. The arguments of this book summarise the four Prakararyas of S'ri Madhva, namely Upadhikha~ujana, Miiytiviidakha~ujana, Prapmicamithyatviinumtinaklta~ujana and Tattvodyota 1• This is the earliest polemical tract of the post-Madhva period and it is the mula for the famous Nyiiyiimrta of Vyasaraya. The Central theme of V adavali is the refutation of the illusory nature of the universe maintained by the Advaitin. This is essential to the establishment of Dvaita Vedanta. The ultimate reality of the universe is a fundamental and necessary tenet in the establishment of the supermacy of Lord Vi!?QU, the abode of infinite auspicious attributes. He is referred to in the Vedanta Srttra (Chap. I, Pada 1, Sutra 2) as the creator, sustainer, etc. of this universe. And if this universe, His creation, turns out to be an illuso'ry one, it militates against His omnipotence. If the universe is illusory its creator turns out to be no better than a juggler in rags who goes out giving performances in jllagic to eke out his liveliho~d. Such a Lord cannot he the giver of mok~a, nor c'an he be an object of meditation. Hadhva is keen on establishing the reality of the 1 Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma's Reign of Realism gives a running exposition of the ten<prakarar;ms of Madhva in Engll;h XXVI

universe in order to avoid the above mentioned contingencies in respect of the Lord. The central doctrine of Advaita is the illusory nature of this universe. The term "mithya" means illusion characterised as indeterminable either as real or as unreal. The whole of Advaita dialectics rests on two gen•al postulates : (1) the absolutely real is never sublated and (2) the absolutely unreal is never cognised. The examples for the absolutdy real is Brahman and that for the absolutely unreal is the horns of a hare. In between these two categories the world of'plurality is caught. For the world of plurality there is the temporary sublation in deep sleep ; hence it is not real. The world of plurality is cognised, hence it is not unreal. It cannot be real and unreal at the same time because it violates the law of contradiction. It is this indeterminable natme of the universe in terms of the real and the unreal that is connoted by the term " Maya." It is not non-existence. It has practical efficiency, why, it alone has practical efficiency. Maya has for its jurisdiction everything excepting Brahman and absolute non-existence. The doctrine of Maya has been subjected to a great deal of criticism by the realist. V iidiivali is one such attempt. Post-S'ankara Advaita dialecticians have attempted to establish the illusory nature of the universe through the employment of various pramal)as like perception, inference, scripture, experience etc. The author of the Viiddvali states the Advaitin's pramal)as in respect of the establishment of the illusory nature of the universe and refutes them in detail. ,The first half of the book is a criticism or the three famous inferences of the Advaitin to establish the illusory nature of the univettse. The infe(ences have three distinct probans, namely cognisability, · inertness, and finitude and thQ probandum with the subject is XXVil

·"the world under dispute is illusory." The example is the ·famous shell-silver. The criticism of this inference is from the point of view of formal logic. There is a statement of Madhva to the effect that all the fallacies relating to inference are .found in the "three inferences" adduced by the Advaitin to , establish the illusory nature of the universe. The proposition, " the world under dispute is illusory " -is taken up for criticism. The probandum "mithyatva" is resolved to mean seven alternatives, (1) indeterminability, (2) unreality, (3) being different from the real, (4) being the content of valid cognition, (5) being the content of invalid cognition, (6) being nescience or a product thereof and, (7) being cognised in the same locus as its own absolute non-existence. Each of these alternatives is examined in detail and all of them are found to contradict the canons of logic. It is argued that there is no middle ground between reality and unreality and hence the defect, " non-establish.ment of the probandum " viz., indeterminability. It is urged that it is contradictory to hold the view that mithyavata is "to be different from the real and unreal", because it is contradictory to hold such a view. The first alternative, "in. determinability " and the sixth alternative " nescience or its product thereof," are discussed in great detail. The concept ·of indeterminability is attempted to be established with the help of some inferences, and they are pointed out to be defect-ridden. Besides, counter-inferences are set forth to bring out the parity in respect of the falljlciousness. The two postulates _of Advaita i.e., " that whir.h is real is not sublated ", and " that which is unreal is not cognised " are -criticised ,in detail by resolving the term real to mean one .of four alternatives. In a similar manner the second p~tu­ late is '!)so criticised. XXVlli

The sixth alternative, 1'nescience", is discussed in eighteen sections. The term " nescience " is resolved to mean one of three things : (1) what is beginningless and interminable, (2) that which, while being a beginningless existent, is destructible by cognition and (3) the material cause of delusion. And each of these alternatives is criticised. Along with some other inferences, the famous Vit•ara~a inference for the establishment of the positive nature of nescience (bhavarupa-avidya) is taken up for detailed criticism an~ its relative parts are examined and refuted. Counter-inferences are set forth. Then the arguments from sleep-experience (sau~up· tika-anubhava), etc., for the establishment of the positive nature of nescience are refuted. Towards the end of this topic i.e., the criticism of the " probandum ", the author of V iidiivali maintains that the Dvaitins admission of a positive nature of nescience does not militate against his criticism of the Advaitin's position, because the nescience for the Dvaitin is real (svabhiiva) and it is not a super-imposition. Besides, any definition adduced in respect of nescience is acceptable to the Dvaitin. From section 134 there is the criticism of the three probans, " cognisability ", "inertness" and "finitude", in detail. Each of these terms is resolved into alternatives and refuted. In the course of the criticism of " cognisability ".the discussion of the Advaitin's doctrine of " Self-luminosity" (svaprakaS'atvam) is takei1 up and unintelligibility is attributed to it. The great Advaita teacher Citsukha's definition. of self-luminosit): is taken up for a detailed criticism. After the c~iticism of the probans, sublation by percep· tion is urged in respect of the Advaitin's inference. Perceptions like the " pot is real " sublate the inferen(e of the Ad':aitin. The relative importance of the two PramaQas,., perception and inference, is fliscussed and the superior and. XXIX

the primary validity of perception over inference is sought to be established. In this connection, the author makes a significant remark. " If it be contended that inference itself be the sublator of perception, when perception is not sublated by another perception of equal strength, what then alas ! is the talk of the wretch inference which lives at the feet of perception being the sublator of that ? " The conflict of the Advaitin's inference with scriptural statements like " the world is real . . . ", etc., is stated. In this connection the Advaitin's contention i.e., that the scriptural statements which have for their import the reality of the universe are restated in order to be refuted by other scriptural statements that refute the reality of the universe, is dismissed as being untenable. Further, the Dvaitin contends that there is no need for restating a view that is not valid merely for the sake of denunciation. Besides, the conflict with the scriptural statements and the conflict with the statements of sm:rtis are also pointed out. Contradiction of the Advaitin's inferences by other inferences such as " the world under disputes is real, because it is validly cognised like Brahman etc." is pointed out. The adjunct do$agamyat'Vam is urged as vitiating the inference of the Advaitin. The example in the Advaitin's inference, ' shell-silver ', is urged to be devoid of the probandum, mithyatva. There is an interesting discllssion about the epistemo· logical status of the shell-silver cognition. A counter-inference (tarka) is urged against the Advaitin's inference resulting in the acceptance of two real worlds (section 266 ff.). The validity and the tenabilhy of the countet~-inference' in rebutting the Advaitin'! inference, is discussed at some length. • From section 295, another famous inference of the Advaitin is takeq_ up for criticism. It is called the " arhS'itva anumaX:a ".

' XXX

'Being a whole' is the probans of the famous inference. It· is criticised and refuted by pointing out defects like sublation,establishment of the established, etc. After this, it is pointed out that the probans of the Advaitin has no probative value, because it is of no service in the establishment of the probandum. Some of the famous S'rutis cited by the Advaitins. in their favour such as " Nel;la nanasti ", "ekamevadvitiyam" etc. are criticised and they are interpreted as not going against the reality of the universe. • So far, the Dvaitin established the reality of the universe as against the contention that it is illusory. He now proceeds to establish the reality of the five-fold differetzces that are eternal. They are : (1) the difference between the Lord and soul, (2) between the Lord and Matter, (3) between soul· and soul, (4) between soul and matter and, (5) between matter and matter. So, before establishing all these differences at once, he takes up the criticism of the Advaita position, " that the souls are not ultimately different from Brahman." The Advaita argument is set forth in the form of an inference, and is refuted by the Dvaitin. Similar inferences of the Advaitin attempting to establish the illusory nature of difference are refuted at great length. The various pramaQas that are adduced for the establishment of the illusory nature of difference such as perception, inference, etc. are refuted in great detail. As a pluralist Jayatirtha feels the need to establish the intelligibility of the concept of difference as against the Advaita dialectics arrayed against it. All the arguments of the monist to demostrate the obstacles in the way of a really valid definition of the concept of difference are set forth in extenso and refuted. From section 312..to the end of the book, the chief topic is the dialectics of difference. Difference according to S'ri Madhava is not cognised by ~~self but xxxi only in relation to its terms. It is not an attribute of both the relata ; it is an attribute of one and it is signalised by theother. Difference is not an attribute different from the substrate. It is the svariipa of the substrate itself. All the objections against treating difference as the svariipa of the Dharmin (substrate) are answered at great length. Though difference is said to be of the very nature of the substrate, it is distinguishable by the assumption of the category vis'e~a. The category viS'e!;a helps us to distinguish such of those attributes from the substrate, that are non-different from the substrate. ViS'e$a is self-differentiating. It needs no external help. This category is discussed briefly in this connection. The witness-consciousness is responsible for the simultaneous cognition of the substrate and its attribute, difference, which is of its very nature. A discussion about the capacities of Sak~in and his power to apprehend the validity in cogntion, Time, Akas•a, etc. is taken up closely. A few section are devoted te the establishment of tht> intrinsic nature of validity and the extrinsic nature of invalidity. Rival views are sought to be refuted. The book ends with two counter· inferences pillorying the Advaitin's doctrine of the illusory nature of the universe. There is a unity of purpose running through the entire book i.e., the refutation of the Advaitin's conception of illusoriness of the universe. Several other.issues are brought into the ambit of discussion, which have no intimate connection with the refutation of the illusory nature of the universe, the central theme of the book. It is the most compact, short and illuminating polemical 'tract of Dvaita Ver,lanta. Tw~ printed editions of this book are available. (1) The Kumbakonam edition with the com~entary of S'ri Raghavendra published by T. R. •Krishnnamachariar. (2) The Belgaum edition with t~ree xxxu commentaries from Sri Raghavendra, S'rinivasatirtha and Ubbarjiacar. A faithful rendering of the text into English is attempted here, to enable students of Vedanta to have an idea of the dialectics of Dvaita Vedanta. These arguments have been met by Advaitins in several works of note: the Bhedadhikkara of Nrsimba.S'ramin, the Ad-vaitamukura of Rangaraja, and the Ad-vaitasidhi of Madhusudana SaraS'vati. A consideration of these refutations will have to be reserved for another time and plaee. Btnares Hindtt Uni-versity 15th April1943

P.

NAGARAJA RAO

. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This volume was prepared by me while I was a Research Fellow of the Madras University in 1938 and 1939 under the able guidance and supervision of the late lamented Mr. Suryanarayana Sastri, Head of the Department of Indian Philosophy in the University of Madras. My acknowledgments are due to the University of Madras for having given me the facility for the preparation of the work and for the permission to publish it, and also to Dr. G. Srinivasa Murti, Hon. Director of the Adyar Library, for having kindly consented to publish the work in the Adyar Library Series. My special thanks are due to Dr. G. Kunhan Raja, Head of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Madras for having seen the book through the press and for having written his kind Foreword. I am deeply indebted to my revered teachers Kowligi Yedhunathachar and Y~llatur Narasimhachar for having .taught me the several texts of Dvaita Vedanta.

P. N.

R~ श्रीमद्धनुमद्भीममध्वान्तर्गतरामकृष्णवेदव्यासात्मकलक्ष्मीहयश्रीवाय नमः नमोऽगणितकल्याणगुणपूर्णाय विष्णवे । सत्याशेषजगज्जन्मपूर्वक मुरद्विषे ॥ १ ॥ २. ननु कथं सत्यता जगतोऽङ्गीकाराधिकारिणी? विमतं मिथ्या दृश्यत्वात् , जडत्वात्, परिच्छिन्नत्वात्, शुक्तिरजतवत् इत्यनुमान विरोधात्—इतेि । 1. (0beisance to Lord Vismu, flled with infinite auspicious attributes, the agent,of creation and the rest (sustentation etc.) of the entire (absolutely) real universe, and the destroyer of (the demon) Mura. 2. Now, how can the (absolute) reality of the universe be worthy of acceptance, imasmuch as there is conflict, of it with the inference 'what is under dispute ३. मैवम्; मिथ्यात्वानिरुक्तः । तत् किमनिर्वचनीयत्वं वा ? असत्वं वा ? सद्विविक्तत्वं वा ? प्रमाणाविषयत्वं वा ? अप्रमाणविषयत्वं वा ? अविद्यातत्कार्ययोरन्यतरत्वं वा ? स्वात्यन्ताभावसमानाधिकरणतया प्रतीयमा नत्व का ? वादावली ४. नाद्यः; विकल्पासहत्वात् । तथाहि-अनिर्वचनीयत्वं किं निर्वचनविरहो वा ? निर्वाच्यविरहो वा (the world) is illusory, because it is cognisable, because it is imert and because it is finite, like the shell-silver ? 3. (The siddhāntin replies) It is not so, for, the illusoriness (referred to) is undefined. (The siddhāntin) examines each in detail) (1) Is it (.८., illus0rimess) in determinability, (2) or unreality, (3) or difference from the rea1, (4) or 10t being the content of valid cogni tion, (5) or being th७ content of invalid cognition, (6) or being either mescience or a product thereof, (7) (or being cognised as in apposition with its own 4. (The siddhāntin replies that not one of the alternatives is tenable)• Not the first, since it cannot stand analysis. It is thus; is 'being indeterminable ', e५uivalent to not having determination, or not having that which is determinable? ५. ६. द्वितीये सत्वविरहो वा ? असत्वविरहो वा ? नाद्यः; अस तोऽनिर्वाच्यतापातात् । नोत्तरः; ब्रह्मणोऽनिर्वाच्यतापातात् । नाद्य: ; स्वाभ्युपगतव्यवहारविषयत्वविरोधात् । ७. अथ सदसद्वैलक्षण्यमनिर्वाच्यत्वं इति मतम्, तदास्मा भिर्जगतः सदसपतानभ्युपगमात् सिद्धसाधनता । ८. अथ प्रत्येकमुभयवैलक्षण्यं विवक्षितम्, तथाप्यसद्ब्रह्मवैलक्ष ण्याभ्युपगमेन प्रस्तुतदोषानिस्तारः । 5. It cam10ot be the first, because it is opposed t0 what is admitted by (the Advaitin) himself, 18., being the object of empirical usage. 6. If it is thc sec011d, then is it 1ack of re५lity, or lack of unreality ? Not the first, because of the con tinge1ce of ir1determinability of the unreal. Not the latter because of the contingence of the indeterminability of Brahman. 7. If (the Advaitin) opines that indeterminability is to be different from the real and the unreal, si71ce we do not admit of the universe the character of the real-and-the-unreal, there is (the defect of) the estab " 8. If what is intended be the difference from each of the two individually, even then because of (the siddhartin') 20dmission of the difference (of the universe) from the 1real and Brahman, the alleged defect s not got over. ९. १०. वादावली • एतेन सदसत्वानधिकरणत्वमनिर्वचनीयत्वमित्यपास्तम् । इति चेन्न ; तादृशवस्तुनोऽसिद्धत्वेनाप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वात् । प्रत्येकं सदसत्वाभ्यां विचारपदवीं न यत् । गाहते तदनिर्वाच्यमाहुर्वेदान्तवेदिनः । ११. असत्वविरहे सत्वस्य, सत्त्वविरहेऽसत्वस्य नियतत्वेनोभय विरहितत्वं व्याहतमेव । ननु निषेधसमुच्चयस्य तात्विकत्वानभ्युपगमान्न व्याघातः । 9. (The siddhantil adds) By this (refutation, the above interpretation of) indeterminability as 10t being the substrate of reality and unreality (also) stands refuted. 10. (The Advaitin maintains)

• That which is not able to be introduced]

into an inguiry either as real, or as unreal, this the 1ear1ed Wedānti1s call indeterminable . If this be said, 10 ; since no such entity is established, there is (the defect of) non-established gualification. 11. Since reality is invariable where there is 10 unreality, and unreality where there is no reality, to be devoid of both is certainly self-contradictory. 12. (The Advaitin answers) Now because of the 101-acceptance of the reality of a combination १f 1egations, there is 10 contradiction. १३. तत्तत्प्रतियोगिदुर्निरूपतामात्रप्रकटनाय तत्तद्विलक्षणताभि लापादिति चेन्न ; तथा सति तस्यानिर्वचनीयतापातात् । १४ . यथा खलु सत्वासत्वे भवन्मते दुर्निरूपत्वान्न जगतो विद्येते, तथानिर्वचनीयताया अपि दुर्निरूपत्वेन तदभावो भ्रवः स्यात् । १५. असत्त्वविरहे सत्वम् इत्यादिव्यास्यसिद्धेर्न व्याहृतिरिति चेन्न; आत्मादौ व्याप्तिसम्भवात् । १६. तत्रात्मतत्त्वप्रयुक्तं सत्वमिति चेत्--किं तदात्मत्वम् ? 13 . It is t() explain only the imdeterminable 1ature of the respective counter-correlates, that the differences from each ॥re stated (of the universe)'. If this be said, 10) (says the siddhantin). For in that case there is the contingence of that (difference fror7 the real and the unrea]) becoming imdeterminable. 14 . ]ust as in your school, reality a10d unreality, because of thc difficulty of determination, do 10t exist for the universe, even so imdeterminability t०० being difficult (of determination, the non-existence of that (in the universe) would be certain. 15. If it be said that there is no contradiction, because of the 101-establishment of pervasions like there is reality where there is no unreality ' (the siddhantin replies) 10, for pervasion is possible in the case of the self (Atman) etc. 16. If it be said (by the Advaitin) that reality there is due to selfhood (tmatva), then what is that घटादिव्यावृत्ता आत्मवृत्तिजतिर्वा ? किं वा सत्त्वं ? उताबाध्यत्वम् ? ज्ञानत्वं वा ? ज्ञानाधारत्वं वा ? स्वप्रकाशत्वं वा ? आत्मपदवाच्यत्वं वा ? तलक्ष्थत्वं वा ? १७ . नाद्यः; आत्मन एकत्वेन तत्र जातेरयोगात् । कल्पितात्म भेदसद्भावात्रैवमिति चेन्न ; कल्पितात्मनां पक्षनिक्षिप्ततया तस्यानुपाधित्वात् । १८. न द्वितीयः ; साध्याविशिष्टत्वात् । १९. न तृतीय: ; असति व्यभिचारात् । तस्यापि बाध्यत्वे नासत्वस्यास्ति बाधकै इत्यात्मवचनविरोधात् । selfhood ? (1) Is it a generality excluded from1 pot etc., and present in the self, (2) or reality, (3) or usublatability, (4) or to be the 17ature of knowledge, (5) or to be the substrate of knowledge, (6) (or to be self-luminou5, (7) (or to be the express sense of the term self (Atman) (8) or to be its secondary sense ? 17. Not the first, as, the self being one, there is no possibility of a generality (jati) in it. If it be said that because of the existence of assumptive differe1ces of the self it is not thus (the impossibility of generality), 10 (says the siddhantin) ; for, imasmuch as the assummp tive self is included in the subject (of the syllogism), it cannot be a17 adjunct. 18, Not the second, because of the 101-difference (of the probams) from the probandum 19. Not tle third, because of the inconstancy (of the probams) in respect of the unreal. If that be also sublatable, there is contradicti011 of one's own words

• there is no sublater for the unreal.' वादावली

२०. न चतुर्थथे; ; पशैकदेशाव्यावृतेः । २१. न पञ्चमः ; आत्मन्यभावात् । तद्वतस्तस्य पक्षनिक्षेपात् । २२. न षष्ठः; स्वप्रकाशताया उपर्यपाकार्यत्वात् । २३. न सप्तम: ; अत्मन्यभावात् । नान्त्य: ; पक्षाव्यावृत्तं । २४. न च वाच्यम्-आत्मादौ न विकल्पोऽवकल्पते, तस्य तवापि सिद्धत्वादिति । अस्माभिरुक्तप्रकारान्यतरस्वीकारेऽपि त्वन्मते दोष ग्रासानिस्तारात् । 20. N९ (?t the fourth, because it is not absent from a part of the subject. 21. Not the fth, because it is non-ex1stent in the self ; for this (self) which possesses that (knowledge) gcts included in the subject. 22 . Not the sixth, since self-luminosity is to be refuted later 23. Not the severth, because it is 101-existent in the self (in as much as for the Advaitin, the self is 10t the express sense of any word, 10t even of Atma1). ject, (as there even non-self may be the secondary ser?se of Atman) 24. Nor should it bo said, that it is not proper to analyse (the term) Atman (self) etc., because that is established for you (the Dwaitins) also. Though we (the Dvaitins) admit a7y one of the stated alternatives, .for you, the taint of defect (in accepting any of these) is imessapable. वादावली २५ . तस्मादसत्वविरहे सत्वमित्यादिव्याप्तिसिद्धेरुभयविरहित्वं व्याहतमेवेति सिद्धम् । २६. केिश्व न सदसद्विलक्षणत्वे मानम् । २७. विवादपदं सदसद्विलक्षणमिति प्रतिज्ञायां पक्षस्याप्रसिद्ध विशेषणत्वप्रसङ्गात् । २८. सत्त्वासत्वे एकवस्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगिनी, धर्मत्वात् रूपरसवत् इत्यनुमाने वस्तुशब्दस्य सच्छब्दपर्यायत्वात् सत्वं सन्निष्ठा त्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगीति व्याघातः । 25. Therefore, through the establishment of per vasions like * where there is 10 unreality, there is reat ity', it is established that absence of both is certainly self-contradictory. ] 26. (The siddhantiI points out that there is no authority in respect of indeterminability). Again in respect of the difference from the real and the unrea] there is no authority. 27. In the proposition ' what is under dispute is different from the real and the unreal' (if inference be suggested as the authority) there is the countingerce of non-established qualification in respect of the subject. 28. In the inference * reality and unreality are located in a single entity, because they are attributes, 1ike६ colour and taste,' because the term entity (vastu) is synonymous with the w31d reality (sat), there is the वादावली २९. प्रमेयत्वाभिधेयत्वादावनैकान्तिकश्च । ३०, अविरुद्धत्वमुपाधिश्च । ३१. किञ्च धटत्वाघटत्वे एकधर्मनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगिनी धर्मत्वात्, रूपरसवत् इत्याभाससमानयोगक्षेमश्च । ३२. सचेन्न बाध्येत; असचेन्न प्रतीयेत इत्यर्थापतिरेवानिर्वचनीये प्रमांuमिति चेन्न ; ३३. सचेन्न बाध्येत इत्यत्र किमिदं सत् विवक्षितम् ? किं सता युक्तम् ? अथाबाध्यम् ? उत ब्रह्मस्वरूपम् ? cor tradictio7- reality is the counter-correlate of the absolute 101-existence located i] reality.' 29. And there is the incconstancy (of the proba15) im1'respect of knowability and mameability . 30. And (further) being non-contradictory is an adjunct (in the example cited) 31. [3esidles, there is parity of welfare in respect of failaciousness with (the following inference) : Potness and 107-potness are the counter-correlates of the absolute non-existence 10cated in one substrate, because they are attributes 1jke colour and taste. 32 . “ If it be rea! it could not be sublated; if it be unreal it could not be cognised ; if it be said, that such a presumptive implication is the authority for the imdeterminable, no (answers the siddhantin) 33 . 11 the (statement) “if it be real, it could 10t be subl2ted1', what is it that is intended by this (terrm) •real ? (1) is it what possesses reality (2) or the .17 sublatable, (3) or the nature of Brahman ? ३४ . नाद्य: ; सत्तायुतकस्य प्रपञ्चस्य भवन्मते बाध्यतया यत् सत् तत् अबाध्यमिति व्यास्थसिद्धेः । ३५. न द्वितीय: ; यदबाध्यं तदबाध्यमिति साध्याविशिष्टत्वात् । ३६. न तृतिय: ; सिद्धसाधनत्वात् । ३७ . असचेन्न प्रतीयेत इत्यत्रासतोऽसत्त्वेन प्रतीतिर्निषिध्यते सत्वेन वा । ३८. आद्ये असद्वयवहारलोपप्रसङ्गः । द्वितीये भ्रान्तिव्यवहार लोपप्रसङ्ग । वादावली 34. Not the first ; as the universe possessing reality is according to your school (Advaita) sublatable, there is 101-establishment of the pervasion “ what is real

• }

35. Not the second, because of the morm-difference (of th0e subject) from the proba11dum (resulting from ) the statement) “ that which is not sublatalble is 10t of the established (it is established for the Dwaitin, that the 1ature of Brahman is unsublatable) 37 . If it be unreal, it could not be cognised . In this (statement) is it that the cognition of the u1real as unreal is denied, (or (the cognition of the unreal) as real. 38. In the first case, there is the contingence of the failure of empirical usage (!.e., verbal designation) 11 respect of the 1rea1. In the second case there is the contingence of the failure of empirical usage in respect of delusion . वादावली ३९. प्रकृतादन्यात्मना प्रतीतेरेव भ्रान्तित्वात् । तत्र चान्या कारस्यासतः सत्वेन प्रतिभासाङ्गीकारात् तस्यानिर्वचनीयत्वं ब्रम इतेि चेन्न । ४०. तदपि किं प्रकृतेनैच रूपेण प्रतीयते भ्रान्तावन्याकारेण वा ? आद्ये भ्रान्तिव्यवहारलोपप्रसङ्गः । ४१. द्वितीयेऽसतस्सत्वेन प्रतीतिरनिवार्या । अथ तस्याप्य निर्वचनीयत्वं मन्यसे. तनवस्था । ४२, 39, तथा च निर्णयदर्शनं दुश्शकं प्रसज्येत । For it is only the cognition (of ar object) as there there is accepted the appearance as real of what the indeterminability of that (delusion ) ' If this be said, no (says the siddhantin) 40. In that declusive cognition, is that (i1detcr Iminability) to cognised as having its own nature or tingence of failure of the empirical usage in respect of delusion). 41. In the second case, there is 10 getting over the cognition of the unreal as real sidered indeterminable, then there would be infmite 42. Thus there is the contingence of the impossi bility of * sighting ascertainment (in respect of ir1 determinability). ४३ . न द्वितीय: ; अपदर्शनत्वात् । ४४. न तृतीय: ; विचारागोचरत्वात् । तथाहि-कासौ सद्विविक्तता नाम ? ४५. किं परजातिविरहः ? अब्रह्मत्वं वा ? असत्वं वा ; अबा ध्येतरत्वं वा ? ४६ . नाद्यः; तेनापि जगति जातेरनिराकरणात् । ४७. न द्वितीयः; सिद्धसाधनत्वात् । ४८. न तृतीय:; अपसिद्धान्तात् । [] 43. Not the second, becaue it is opposed to their sch001 0f thought. []] 44 . Not the third, because it is beyond the sphere of iाguiry. It is thus :- What is this which is called “ being different from the real' ? 45. Is it to lack the summum genus, or to be 11०t-Brahman, or to be unreal, or to be other than the 46. Not the first, because by him (who advocates illuscoriness) to has not been rejected (the presence of) ge1crality in the universe. 47, Not the second, because of (the defect of) the establishment of the established. (The statement that the universe is not Brahman is accepted by the Dvaitin). 48. Not the third, because it is opposed to their वादावली ४९. चतुर्थोऽपि ब्रह्मतरत्वाभ्युपगमेन सिद्धसाधनत्वात् । ५०. अबाध्येतरत्वं नाम बाध्यत्वमिति चेन्न; बाध्यत्वानिरूपणात् । ५१. तत्किमन्यथाज्ञातस्य सम्यग्ज्ञातत्वं ? प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ निषेध प्रतियोगित्वं वा । ५२. नाद्य: ; सिद्धसाधनत्वात् । अस्माभिरपि सर्वमनिर्वचनीय मित्याद्यन्यथाज्ञातस्य जगतो यथावज्ज्ञातताभ्युपगमात् । ५३. द्वितीये किमेकदेशकालप्रतिपन्नस्य कालान्तरादौ निषेध प्रतियोगित्वम् ? उत त्रिकालखिलदेशनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वम् 49. Since in the fourth t(0, because of the ac ceptance of the difference (of the universe) frorm Brah ma1, there is (the defect) of the establishment of the established, (it is not so) 50. If it be said that * to be other than unsublat able is what is called sublatability, no (says the sid dhantin), because sublatability is unexplained. 51. Does that (sublatability) consist in an object otherwise (i.e. errorneously) cognised being validly cog 1ised, or in being the counter-correlate of negation in the locus of cognition (pratipan10padhi) ? 52. Not the first, because of (the defect) of the establishment of the established; for in respect of the universe knowr (to you) otherwise (i.e. errormeously) in the form1 “ everything is imdeterminable' and so on, (valid) knowledge as it is is admitted even by us . 53. In the second (alternative), is it to be the counter-correlate of the negation at some other time etc., ip respect of what has been cognised at some १४ ५४ . वादावली नाद्यः ; अंशे सिद्धसाधनत्वात् । ५. रीत्यन्तरेणानित्यत्वादेरेवोक्तत्वात् । ५६. न द्वितीय: ; नित्यसर्वगतयोः कालाकाशयोस्तादृशबाध प्रतिज्ञाने व्याघातात् । ५७ . का चेयं प्रतिपन्नता नाम ? प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नता ? भ्रान्ति प्रतिपन्नता वा ? ५८. नाद्य: ; प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नस्य त्रिकालाखिलदेशनिषेधप्रति योगितासाधनेऽतिप्रसङ्गात् । particular place and ti710e, or is it t() be the counter correlate of the negation in respect of a]] three times and all places ? 54 , Not the frst, because of (the defect) of the establishment of the established in respect of a part (of the subject). 55. For, it is only 101-eternality etc. that is stated in another mode (as sublatability). 56. Not the second, because there is contradiction in premising that kind of sublatability in respect of the eternal and omnipresent ether (Akāsa) and time. 57. What is this which is called “ being cognis ed'? Is it to be validly cognised or delusively cognised ? 58. Not the first, because in the case of the validly cognised, there is undue extensi011 in establisbing that it is the counter-correlate of the negation in respect of a] three times, and all places. ५९. द्वितीये वक्तव्यम्-कोऽयं निषेधः? अभाववेदनम्, सद्वि विक्तत्ववेदनं वा ? ६०. निरूपणात् । ६२ . ६१. न चतुर्थः; विचारागोचरत्वात् । तथाहि-प्रमाणाविषयत्वं नाम यत्किञ्चित्प्रमाणाविषयत्वं वा ? प्रमाणमात्राविषयत्वं वा ? नाद्यः; अत्यन्तासत्वापातात् । न द्वितीयः ; तस्यैवाद्याप्य त्रादावली नाद्य: ; गन्धादेः श्रोत्राद्यविषयतासिध्या सिद्धसाधनत्वात् । 59. In the second case, it has to be said, “ what is this negatiox1 ?' Is it cognition of non-existence, or cognition of being other than rea1 ? 60. Not the first, because of the contingence of absolute unreality . Not the second, because that itself (being other than the real) is still unexplained (0 61. Not the fourth, because it is beyond the sphere of inguiry. It is thus. The term3 * not being the object of a means of valid' knowledge', does it mean “ not being the object of some 01e mea11s of valid knowledge or “ not being the object of means of valid knowledge in general ' ? 62. Not the first, because of (the defect) of the establishment of the established through the establish 1anent (of the fact) of odour etc. being not the object of the s01se of hearing etc. " [X ६३. न द्वितीयः ; ब्रह्मणोऽपि मिथ्यात्वापातात् । ६४. प्रमाणाविषयत्वे प्रपञ्चस्य तत्पक्षीकरणायोगाच । ६५. अतत्वावेदकप्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धतया पक्षीकरणमुपपन्नमिति चेन्न ; प्रत्यक्षादेरतत्वावेदकत्वे मानाभावात् । ६. विषयस्यासत्वादेव तत्सिद्धिरिति चेत्--तदेव कुतः ? ६७ . किञ्चातत्वाचेदकं प्रमाणं चेति व्याघातः । ६८. अतत्त्वावेदकं प्रमाणं चेत्-शुक्तिरजतज्ञानमपि प्रमाणं [32 63. वादावली Not the seco11d, because 64. A1d (it is also 50) because, if the universe be 10t an object of any means of valid knowledge, there is the impossibility of making that (universe) the subject (in a sy]logisाm) 65. If it be said that it is intelligible to make that the subject as established by perception, etc., which make known the non-real, no (says the siddhanti7), because there is no authority (to the effect) that perception, etc., of the contingence 6. (If the Advaitin conternds) that it (the cog॥i- tion of non-real objects by perceptio7) is established eve1 because of the unreality of the content, whence is this (the unreality of the objects) itself (known) ? 67. Further, there is contradiction in (the state ment) that (perception) makes known the non-real and is (yet) a means of valid knowledge. 68. If that which makes known the non-reall be a means of valid knowledge, then, why should not the वादावली किं न स्यात् ? अतत्त्वावेदकत्वाविशेषात् । प्रमाणं चेत्-नातत्वावेदकम्, अद्वैतवाक्यवत् । ६९. न पञ्चमः ; सर्वमनिर्वचनीयम्, क्षणिकम्, ब्रह्माकार्यम् , इत्याद्यप्रमाणविषयताभ्युपगमेन सिद्धसाधनत्वात् । ७०. भ्रमप्रतीतत्वं विवक्षितमिति चेत्--तथा सति तस्यासत्वेन सिद्धान्तविरोधः । ७१. न षष्ठः: केयमविद्या नाम ? अनाद्यनिर्वाच्या वा ? अना दिभावरूपत्वे सति विज्ञानविलाप्या वा ? भ्रमोपादानं वा ? cognition of shell-silver too be a valid knowledge, since there is 10 distinction in respect of making known the 107-real. If it is a means of valid knowledge , it 69. Not the fth, because when there is admitted (the univcrs() being the object of what is not a maca 15 of valid knowledge, e.g. “ all things are indeterminable, 17०mentary, not produced by Brahmar? ' etc., there is (the defect of) the establishment of the established 70. If it be said that what is intended is being delusively cognised, in that case that (content of the delusive cognition) being unreal, there is opposition to (your) doctrine. X 71. Not the sixth. What is this which is called pe science ? Is it what is be erminable, ७२ . नाद्य: ; अनिर्वाच्यासिध्याप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वात् । आका शादौ लक्षणस्यातिव्यासेश्च । ७३. ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्यानादित्वानभ्युपगमात्रैवमिति चेत्–एवं तर्हि लक्षणस्यासम्भवः । वादावली ७४. न द्वितीय: ; अनादित्वस्थासम्भवित्वात् । अनादिभाव रूपस्य विज्ञानविलापनासम्भवाञ्च, ब्रह्मवत् । ७५. भावाभावविलक्षणाविद्याया अभावविलक्षणतामात्रेण भाव त्वोपचारादात्मवदनादिभावत्वेनानिवत्र्यत्वानुमानानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्न । or is it that which, while in form 1 beginningless existent, is destructible by cognition , or is it the matte ria] cause of delusion ? 72 . Not the first, because of the (defect of) 101 established gualification resulting from the 1()m-estab 1ishment of indeterminability, also because the defmi tion is over-pervasive in respect of ether (lkतsa) etc . 73 . If it be said that because of the non-acceptance of beginninglessmess (in respect of) objects different from Brahman, it is not so, (i.e., there is no over-pervasion), in that case there is inapplicability of the definition. 74. Not the second, because of the impossibility of beginninglessmess, also because, for what in form is a beginningless existent, destruction by cognition is not possible, like Brahman . . 75. “There is unintelligibility of the inference of non-destructibility (by cognition) on the ground of , being a beginningless entity, like the self, for the वादावली ७६. अभावविलक्षणतामात्रेणाप्यनादेरनिवत्र्यत्वानुमानसम्भवात् । ७७. न चात्मत्वादिरुपाधिः, अत्यन्तासति व्यभिचारात् । ७८. न तृतीय:, भ्रमशब्देनार्थो ज्ञानं वा ? ७९ . नाद्य: ; पदार्थस्यासत्वेन तदुपादानताया असम्भवात् । ८०. न द्वितीय: ; अन्तःकरणेऽतिव्याप्तः । भ्रमस्थाविद्योपादान कताभावेनासम्भवित्वाच Inon-existe1t, through the 170ere figurative reference as from १९ If this be said, it is 16t s0. 76. (The Siddhanti? replies.) Eve1 through the the non-existent possibility of the inference of non-destructibility (by cognition) for what is beginningless. 77. Nor is self-h00d, etc., an adjunct (imiting the pervasion), because there is inconstancy (of the proba1s) in respect of the absolutely 107-existent. 78. Not the third. By the word delusion (what is it that is meant)- the content (or the cognition ? 79. Not the first ; because, the content (of the delusive cognition) being unreal, being its material cause is not possible 80. Not the second, because of over-pervasion in respect of internal organ, and because there is inap plicability (of the definition), since delusion has not 1esciene for its material cause. , the २० वादावली ८१. तदनुपादानत्वे सत्यत्वं स्यादिति चेत्-स्यादेव । ८२. तथा सति प्रमाणज्ञानवदेव विषयापहारलक्षणबाधस्याप्य प्रसङ्ग इति चेन्न । ८३ . तव व्याप्स्यसिद्धेः । तत्त्वावेदकस्यापि त्वयाविद्यकत्वाभ्युप गमात् । ८४ . एतावन्तं कालं रजतमभात् इत्यनुभवविरोधाच । ८५. अनिर्वचनीयस्यापि भ्रमस्याभावविलक्षणतया तथात्वेनानु सन्धानोपपतिरिति चेन्न । 81. If it be said that, if it (nescience) were not 1material cause, there would be reality (of the delusive content), (thc siddhantin replies), “ that certainly would be so ) 82. “If it (the delusion-content) be s0 (real), there is 10 contingence of sublation t0 consisting in pri vati01 of the content (of the delusive cognition) even 2s in the case of valid cognition.' If this be said, 10 (says the siddhantin) 83. For there is non-establishment of your (Ad vaitin's) pervasion, (the pervasion is between the reality of the object and the reality of the cognition) because of your admission that even what makes known the rea1 is of the nature of mescience. 84. And (it is s०) because there is conflict with this experien1ce -“ for “this much time the silver was 85. If it be said that, since even the indetermi7 able delusion is different from tion-existence, there is वादावली ८६ . स्वरूपसत एवासीदिति प्रतिसन्धानात् । ८७. एतावन्तं कालमिहादशे मुखमासीत्, स्फटिकश्च लोहेित आसीत् इत्याद्यनुसन्धानात्रैवमिति चेत् । ८८. एतावन्तं कालं मुखमद्राक्षम् इत्येवानुसन्धानेनानुसन्धा नान्तरे विवादात् । ८९. अविद्यायां चैवंविधायां किं प्रमाणम् ? ९०. देवदत्तप्रमा तत्स्थप्रमाप्रागभावातिरेकिणोऽनादेध्वैसिका ; प्रमात्वात् ; अविगीतप्रमा यथा इत्यनुमानं मानमिति चेन्न । 89. intelligibility of the recollection in that form, it is not $() (says the siddhanti7). is recollection in the form “it did exist' only in the case of what is real in its own । nature. 87. “ For this much time, my face was here in the mirror, and the crystal was red.' Because of such recollections, it is 10t so (as stated above). If it be said thus (10). 8. For the recollection is only in the form 'for this much time I saw (my) face'; therefore there is dispute as to any other recollection. २१ X What is the authority with reference to the 90. ,(The Advaitin cites inference as the authority for the p0sitive nature of 1escience). If it be said that the inference , “ Devadtta's valid cognition is the वादावली ९१. घटोऽयम् एतद्धटप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तानादेर्निवर्तकः; घट त्वात् ; वटान्तरवत् इत्याभाससमानयोगक्षेमत्वात् । ९२. एतेन–विगीतो भ्रमः एतज्जनकाबाध्यातिरिक्तोपादानकः; विभ्रमत्वात् ; सम्प्रतिपन्नवत् इति च निरस्तम् । अनादित्वप्रमानिवत्त्व योर्विरोधाच । ९३. देवदत्तप्रमा देवदत्तगतैतत्प्रमाप्रागभावातिरिक्तानादेर्निवर्तिका न भवति ; प्रमात्वात् ; सम्प्रतिपन्नवत् इति सप्रतिपक्षता च । destroyer of that which (1) is other than the prior non existence of valid cognition located in that (Devadatta) and (2) is beginningless, because it is a valid cognition, 1ike undisputed valid cognition: ', is the authority, no (says the siddhantin) 91 falaciousness with (th1e following inference) ; * This p0t is the destroyer of what is different from the prior it is a p0t, like another pot.' 92. And by this is (the inference) retuted : 'The delusion under dispute has for material cause some thing other than that. which produces it and is un sublatable, because it is a delusion, like the admitted (delusion ).' And (it is s0) because there is conflict between beginninglessness and destruction by valid cognition. 93. There is the (following) counter-probarns , “ Devadatta's valid cognition is 10t the destroyer of that which (1) is other than the prior 10n-existence of वादावली ९४. अथ प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तस्वविषयावरणस्व निवत्र्यस्वदेशगतवस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकम् ; अप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वात् ; अन्धकारे प्रथमोत्पन्नप्रदीपप्रभावात् इत्यनुमानं मानमस्तु । ९५. अत्र च प्रमाणज्ञानं वस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकमित्युक्त स्वप्रागभावेन सिद्धसाधनता । तन्निवृत्त्यर्थं स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तति पदम् । ९६. तथापि स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तस्वजनकसामग्रया सिद्धसाध नम् । तन्निवृत्त्यर्थं स्वविषयावरणेति पदम् । this valid cognition located in that (Devadatta) and (2) is beginningless, because it is a valid cognition, like the admitted (c५७gnition).' 94. Th(e1, let this inference be the authority : ' Valid cognitio1 has as amtecedent some other entity which is (1) other tha11 its own prior non-exist ence, (2) the obscurrer of its owrn content, (3) rem10vable by itself a11d (4) present in its own loctus, because it is the manifestor of an (0bject that was not manifested, 1ike the light of a jamp as it frst comes into existence 95. And here, if it be said that valid cognition has some other entity as antepedent there would be (the defect of) the establishment of the established, having regard to prior non-existence In order to remove it, there are the words * other than its own prior 101-existence. 96. . Even then (after defining valid cognition as that which has as antecedent some other entity other than its own prior non-existence) there is (the defect २४ ९७. पदम् । ९८. पदमिति तथाप्यदृष्टेन अर्थान्तरनिवृत्तये सिद्धसाधनम् । तन्निवृत्त्यर्थं स्वनिवत्येति ९. नानेनानुमानेन त्वदभिमताज्ञानसिद्धिः । जडेऽज्ञानानभ्यु पगमेनान्त:करणवृत्तिलक्षणप्रमाणज्ञानानां तथाविधवस्तुपूर्वकत्वाभावेऽपि हेतो स्तत्र सद्भावादनैकान्तिकत्वात् । [[ आत्माश्रिताज्ञानसिद्धये च स्वदेशेति of) the establishment of the established in respect of the causal aggregate which is other than the prior 101 existence of (the valid cognition) itself a11d which produces it (valid cognition). In order to remove it there are the words 97. Ever thus there is (the defect of) the estab 1ishment of the established in respect of ar! unk10WI] potency (ad1sta). III order to remove that, there are the words, “ removable by itself.' 98. The words “ (present in) its locus are used in order to avoid the establishment of a10ther (101 intended) object (e.g. I10n-cognisedness -ajiātat) and to establish 1escience which has the self (Atman) for its 99. There is no establishment of the 1escience desired by you (the Advaitin) by such an inference (valid cognition, etc.). . For, because of'non-acceptance of 1escience in respect of imert objects, for the valid cognitions which are of the nature of modifications of the (inert) internal organ, there is not the artecedence वाढ़ावली १००. व्यर्थञ्च स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तति विशेषणम् । स्वनिवत्र्य विशेषणेनैव तद्वयावृत्तेः । १०१. न हेि भावः स्वप्रागभावनिवर्तकः ; अपि तु भावोत्पत्तिरेव तत्प्रागभावनिवर्तिका । भावाभावयोस्सहावस्थानविरोधात् । अतः स्वनिवत्र्य विशेषणेनैव स्वप्रागभावव्यावृत्तेव्यैर्थ स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तति विशेषणम् । १०२. किञ्च सत्यतथाविधवस्तुपूर्वकत्वे साध्ये सिद्धसाधनम् । अनिर्वचनीयतथाविधवस्तुपूर्वकत्वे साध्ये साध्यविकलो दृष्टान्तः । of ar entity of the said description ; yet since there is presence of the probams there, there is (the defect of) inconclusiveness (of the probams) 100. And the attribute * other than its own prior 101-existence ' is purposeless, for, that exclusion is secured even by the gualification * removable by itself.' 101. The positive entity is 10t what destroys its own prior m01-existence. On the contrary corming into existence of the positive entity is alor:e what destroys the prior 107-existence, since there is contradiction in And thus, since the attribute * removable by itself secures of itself the exclusion of its prior non-existence, the attribute * (other than its own prior 101-existence is purposeless. 102. Besides, if the probandum be * being preceded by a real entity of that kind ', there would be (the defect of) the establishment of the established. If the pro bandlumn be *being preceded by an indeterminable entity of that kind ', the example would lack the probanduा। १०३. १०४. प्रामाणिकाप्रामाणिकयोः साधारणधर्मस्याप्यप्रामाणिकत्वात् । अनिर्वचनीयस्य केनापि प्रमाणेनाप्रमितत्वात् । न हि शशविषाणगोविषाण योर्वेिषाणत्वसामान्यमस्ति । १०६. अविशेषितथाविधवस्तुपूर्वकत्वे साध्येऽप्रसिद्धविशेषणता । वादावली १०५ . ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकपापस्य सिद्धतया सिद्धसाधनत्वं च । ज्ञान निवत्र्यत्वात्तस्यापि । काप्यायकत्व वा ? ज्ञानत्व वा । किञ्च किमिदं प्रकाशकत्वं नाम ? ज्ञापकत्वं वा ? ज्ञाप 103 . If the probandum be “being preceded by an entity of that kind which (at the same time) is 10t particularised (as real or indeterminable)' there is (the defect) of 101-established qualification. 104 . For, an attribute common t() both what is cognised as valid and what is cognised as invalid, is itself invalidly cogised (and) what is imdeterminable is 10t validly cognised by any means of valid knowledge whatever. There is indeed 10 attribute, horm1ess, com1707 to the hors of a bare and the h101s of 105. Besides, through the establishment of dermerit. which obstructs cognition, there is (the defect of) the establishment of the established; for that t0० is remov able by cognition 106. Further, what is this which is called * being a manifestor'? Is it being the instrument of cpgTition १०८. १०७. नाद्य: ; चक्षुरादौ व्यभिचारात् । दृष्टान्तस्य साधनविकल त्वाच । ज्ञाने ज्ञानकरणत्वाभावेनासिद्धेश्च । १०९. वादावली न द्वितीय: ; असिद्धेः । अञ्जनादौ व्यभिचाराच । न तृतीय: ; साधनविकलत्वाद्दृष्टान्तस्य । २७ ११०. न किञ्चिदवेदिषमिति परामर्शसिद्धस्सौषुप्तिकानुभवोऽस्तु प्रमाणमिति चेन्न ; तस्य ज्ञानाभावविषयतयोपपत्तेः । or being accessory to the instrume1t of cognition, or being cognition ? 107. Not the first, because there is inconsta1cy (of the proba1s) in respect of the sense of sight etc ., also because the example is devoid of the probams, and ( proba1s) since in the case of cognition, there is no instrumentality to cognition. 108. Not the second, because of the non-establish ment (of the probams,) and because there is also incon sta11cy (of the probams) in respect of collyrium (afijapa) etc. 109. Not the third, since the example is devoid of the probams. 110. If it be said that there may be this means of valid knowledge, namely, the experience relating to sleep established by recollection (in the form) * I did Inot know anything', In० (says the siddhantin) ; for that (experience) is intelligible as having for content the non-existence of recognition. । वादावली १११ . नन्वभावप्रतीतेर्धर्मिप्रतियोगिबोधपराधीनतया तदभावे तस्या नुभवितुमयोग्यत्वमिति चेन्न; साक्षिणा धर्मिप्रतियोगिग्रहणोपपत्तेः । ११२ . यत्तु कश्धिदाह-नाज्ञानं ज्ञानाभावः, अभावमानागम्य त्वात् सम्प्रतिपन्नवत् । ११३. अभावो ह्यभावस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य वा विषयः । अज्ञानञ्च न मानगम्यम् , माननिवत्र्यत्वात् , सम्प्रतिपन्नवदिति । ११४ . तदसत्; अज्ञानस्य मानगम्यत्वे तत्साधनायानुमानकश्चना योगात् । एतन्मानगम्यत्वेन मानागम्यमिति व्याघातः । 11. * Now, the cognition of non-existence being dependent on the knowledge of the substrate and of the counter-correlate, in the absence of that (knowledge of the substrate and counter-correlate) that (non-exister1ce) is not capable of being experienced 10 ; for the apprehension of both the substrate a11d the counter-correlate by the witness (self) is intelligible 112. Some say “ 1escience is not the non-exist ence of cognition, because it is not cognised by the means of valid knowledge, negation (5.e., anupalabdhi which makes knowr1 10on-existence), like what is ad mmitted, 113. Non-existence (in the probams) indeed is the content either of negation or of perception. And Imescience is npt cognised by any means of valid know1 edge, because it is destroyed by a valid'knowledge, like what is admitted. 114. This is not sound (says the siddhantin); fo, if mescience be not cognised by any means of valid २९ ११५ . फलव्याप्यताभावेऽपि वृतिव्याप्यतामात्रेण तत्रानुमान प्रवृत्तिरिति न युक्तम् । अज्ञानस्थ वृतिव्याप्यतानङ्गीकारात् । ११६. न च प्रमाणनिवत्र्यत्वस्थ प्रमाणगम्यत्वेन व्याप्तिरस्ति प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रमाणनिवत्र्यस्य संस्कारस्य मानगम्यत्वात् । ११७ . न च त्वदुक्तमर्थ न जानामीत्यादिव्यवहारोऽत्यन्तसुसे ज्ञायमाने चाज्ञायमाने सम्भाव्यमानोऽज्ञानं गमयतीति युक्तम् । knowledge, the application of inference to establish it would be uाreasonable. Being cognised by this means of valid knowledge, (to say) that it is not cognised by any means of valid knowledge is contradiction (in terms) 115. * Though there is 101-existence of being pervaded by the fruit (of cognition i.e., the reflection of consciousness in the cognition), even because of being pervaded by the psychosis, there is application of the inference'; this does not stand to reason (says the siddhantin), because the pervasion of mescience by psy chosis is not admitted. 116. Nor is there pervasion of “ removability through a means of valid knowledge' by “ non-cogni sability through a means of valid knowledge', because the impressions that are removed by the means of valid knowledge, recognition, are cognised by a means of valid knowledge . 117. , Nor does it stand to reason that mescience is made known by such empirical usage as “ I know .not the object mentioned by, you ' which is possible, वादावली ११८. किमत्र सर्वानुवादेन व्यवहारः ? किं वा सामान्यतः ? ११९. नाद्य: ; तादृशव्यवहारस्यैवाभावात् । भावे वा त्वदुक्तं न प्रमाणतो जानामीत्येवंपरत्वोपपत्तेः । प्रतिवादिवाक्यादधिगतार्थस्यानुवाद पुरस्सरं प्रमाणाभावेन निरसनदर्शनात् । १२०. न च त्वदुत्ते प्रमाणज्ञानं मम नास्तीत्यस्य विशिष्टविषय ज्ञानस्य प्रमाणत्वात्तद्विशेषणतयार्थस्यापि प्रमाणेनाधिगमात्स्ववचनव्याघात इति युक्तम् । whether there is absolute sleep (where there is ignora1ce of the self) or cognition (of the self (or of the object) (or [101-c0811t101, 118. Here, is there the empiricul usage through restatement of every (particular) or in a general way ? pirical usage at all ; or if there were, it would be in telligible as having for purport “I know not through a means of valid knowledge the object mentioned by you ; for (the proponent) is seem to restate it after comprehending the meaning from the opponent's sen teraces, and subseguently to refute it, as not having a a 1ea11s of valid knowledge. 120. Nor does it stand to reason (to urge) that because the cognition of the gualified (object * I have 10 valid cognitioi in respet of what is metitioned by you ?’ is valid, the content too, being its qualification, is known by a means of valid knowledge, and that hence theौe is contradiction in ope's own words. १२ १. एतत्प्रमाणज्ञानस्य प्रमाणाभावविषयत्वेऽपि तदर्थस्याने तद्विषयत्वात् । अन्यथा भ्रमो ममासीदित्यादिप्रमाणज्ञानस्यापि विशिष्टभ्रम विषयतया भ्रमविषयस्यापि प्रामाणिकतापातात् । १२२. न द्वितीय: ; सामान्यानुवादेन विशेषव्यवहारोपपत्तेः । १२३. विशेषस्याप्यधिगमानधिगमयोंनेवं व्यवहार इति चेत् ; अस्ति कश्चिद्विशेष इति सामान्यतो ज्ञातत्वात् । १२४. किञ्च भावरूपाविद्याभ्युपगमेऽपि किं पूर्वमथों ज्ञातो न वा ? सर्वथापि प्रश्नायोगः । 121. For though वादावली this valid cognition to has for ledge, the object of this (latter) is not the content of that (former ). Otherwise the valid cognition [ ex perienced a delusion ' having for its content a delusion about what is gualified, there is the contingent (of the content ()f the delusion to becoming valid. 122. Not the second; for through reference in general terms (to what was said), there is intelligibility for the empirical usage (of ignorance) in respect of the particular. 123. If it be said that eve1 in respect of the particular, there would not be such empirical usage, whether cognised or uncognised, it is 19t so (says the siddhantin) ; for, it is known in a general way, “ there is some particular . 124. Further, even if there is acceptance of mesci er1ce with a positive ature, is the content (of mescience) वादावली १२५ . अस्माकं तुं सवै वस्तु ज्ञाततयाज्ञाततया वा साक्षिचैतन्य विषय एवेति प्रमाणज्ञानोदयात्प्रागज्ञातत्वविशेषितोऽर्थस्साक्षिसिद्धोऽनुवाद गोचरो भवति च प्रश्नाई इति चेन्न । १२६. साक्षिसिद्धतयापि सिद्धेऽर्थे व्यवहारायोगात् । १२७ . साक्षिणा ज्ञातेऽपि प्रमाणबुभुत्सया व्यवहार इति चेन्न ; साक्षिसिद्धत्वे प्रमाणबुभुत्साया निष्फलत्वात् । case can there b8 ।। पuestion (about it) 125. * For us, (the Advaitins) all the objects whether as cognised or as mot cognised are the contents of witness-consciousness ; hence the content qualified by non-cognisedness prior to the rise of valid cognition is established by the witness-consciousness, is capable of being referred to and becomes capable of being 9uestioned about.' If this, be said, 10 (replies the siddhāntin), 126. For in respect of a content, which is estab 1ished eve1 25 established by the witness-consciousness, there cannot be the empirical usage (of ignorance) . 127 witness-consciousाmess, there is the empirical usage be ledge, no; for in the case of that which is stablished by witness-consciousness the desire to know the meaps of alid knowledge is fruites. बादावली १२८ . तथा च त्वयापि सामान्यतस्सिद्धोऽर्थो विशेषज्ञानायानूद्यते इति वक्तव्यम् । १२९ . वयमपि समान्यतः साक्षिसिद्धस्य विशेषप्रमाणबुभुत्सया व्यवहारं ब्रूमः । १३०. तस्मान्नाविद्या निरूपणगोचरतामाचरतीति कुतस्तत्कार्यम् ? कुतस्तरां चाविद्यातत्कार्ययोरन्यतरत्वस्य साध्यता सिध्यतीति । १३१ . न च भावरूपाज्ञाननिराकरणे सिद्धान्तविरोधः, परन्यायेन परनिराकरणात् । 128. And thus you (Advaitins) too 11ust say that for the sake of the knowledge of the particular, what is established in general is referred to 129. We (Dwaitins) t00 do say that the empirical usage (of ignorance) is because of the desire to know the means of valid knowledge for the particular in res pect of that which is established in general by the 130 the sphere of being demonstrated ; hence how can it have any product ? And still more, how can there be established the character of being the probarIdum either for mescience (or for its product ? XIII 131. N०1" by the refutation of mescience of a posi tive mature is there thc defect * being opposed to one's frmal position,' because there is refutation of the opponent (above) on the opponent's own principles: ३४ १३२. न सप्तमः ; अत्यन्ताभावपदेनासत्वाभिप्रायेऽपसिद्धान्तः । तदतिरिक्तस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात् । १३३ . भाववैलक्षण्यमितेि चेत्-तर्हि तत एवासत्त्वापत्या नोक्तदोषनिवृत्तिः । तस्मान्न मिथ्यात्वनिरुक्तिः । १३४ . नापि दृश्यत्वस्य । तथाहि-किमिदं दृश्यत्वम् ? दृग्विषय त्वम् ? अप्रकाशत्वं वा ? १३५. आद्ये किं दृवृत्तिरूपा चिदूपा वा ? X 132 . Not the seve1th ; if the word * absolute 101 existence' is intended to mean unreality, then there is (the defect of) “ opposition to one's own school of thought' '; oिr, what is other than that is non-established. 133. If it is said that it (absolute 101-existence) is *being different from the existent', then because of the contingence of 11areality even from this, there is no remova1 of the said defect (the refutation of the indetermi1ability of illusoriness). Therefore there is X 134. Nor of cognisability (is there a definition) too. It is thus : what is this cognisability ? Is it being the content of cognition, or 101-self-luminosity ? 135. In the first case, is the cognition of the form of psychosis, or of the form of consciousness? १३६ . नाद्यः; आत्मन्यनैकान्त्यात् । तस्यापि वेदान्तजनितवृति विषयत्वात् । १३७ . वृत्तिजनितफलासम्बन्धान्नानैकान्त्यमिति चेत्-फलं ज्ञात ता व्यवहारो वा । १३८ . आद्ये घटादावपि तदभावादसिद्धिः । अतीतानागत नित्यानुमेयेषु ज्ञातताभावाद्भागासिद्धिश्च । १३९ . तथाहि---अवेद्यत्वे सत्यपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वं स्वप्रकाश त्वमिति तलक्षणमभिदधता चित्सुखेनापरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यताविशेषणकृत्या 136. Not the first, because of i1conclusiveness (of the proba15) in respect of the self (Atman); for that (self) t00 is the content of the psych05is arising from1 (the study of) VedImta. 137. If it be said that, because of the 101-related mess to the fruit arising from psychoses, there is no in conclusiveness (of the probams), the1 is the fruit cog Imised11ess or empirical usage ? 138. In the first case, because of its (probams) 101-existence even in pot, etc. there is the 10n-establish ment (of the probams). Because of the 101-existence of cognisedness in (objects that are) past, future and eter mally to be inferred there is also partial non-establish Iment (of the probams in the subject). 139. 1t 18 thus. (Citsukha, who states its definition self-lumin0sity is capacity to be the object of er? pirical usage of immediacy, while not being the object of cognition ', while explaining the function of the वादावली भिधानप्रस्तावेऽभिहितम्--न चाविद्यात्वमित्येतावदेवास्तु तलक्षणमिति वाच्यम् । तथा सत्यतीतानागतनित्थानुमेयेषु चातिव्यातेः । फलव्याप्यता लक्षणवेद्यत्वस्य तत्राभावादिति । १४०. द्वितीये पुनरनैकान्त्यमेव । आत्मनोऽपि वृत्तिजन्य व्यवहारविषयत्वात् । १४१. चिद्वपदृग्विषयत्वं तु घटादाबस्माभिर्नाङ्गीक्रियते इति भागप्रसिद्धिः । १४२. स्वप्रकाशत्वञ्च निर्वक्तव्यं यदभावो दृश्यत्वम् । अवेद्य qualification “ capacity to be the object of empirical usage of i71mediacy ' says thus : * it should 10t be said: let ' Inot being the object of cognition ' alone be the definition ; for if so there is over-perwasion in respect of (objects that are) past, future and eternally to be inferred; for ' being the object of cognition ', consisting in being pervaded by the fruit, does not exist in these 140. In the second case again, there is certainly inconclusiveness (of the probams), because the self (Atman) t०० is the content of empirical usage generated by psychoses. 141. As for being the object of cognition of the rnature of consciousness, since that is not admitted by us in the case of pot et, there is partia' 101-establish Iment (of the probams). 142. And that self-luminosity whose non-existence is cognisability has to be defined. If that is said to be त्वमिति चेत् - तर्हि वेद्यत्वं दृश्यत्वमित्युक्तं स्यात् । तथा च प्रागुक्त विकल्पदोषापात १४३. स्वव्यवहारे स्वातिरिक्तसंविदनपेक्षत्वं स्वप्रकाशत्वम् ; तद भावो दृश्यत्वमिति चेत्–तह्यत्मनोऽप्यद्वितीयध्यवहारे संविदन्तरापेक्षा सद्भावाद्वयभिचारः । १४४. निर्विकल्पकस्य व्यवहारे संविदन्तरानपेक्ष आत्मेति चेत् तर्हि घटोऽपि तथैवेत्यसिद्धिः ।

• not being an object of cognition ', then it turns out

to be saying “ cognisability is being a7 0bject of cogni tion.' And thus there is the contingence of the defects from the analysis made earlier. 1ess 143. Non-dependence or any consciousness other than itself for empirical usage in respect of itself is self-lumi70sity ; its 10n-existence is cognisability.' [ this be said, then there is inconstancy (of the proba175) in respect of the self which is dependent on a conscious other tha12 X 11tself 17 respect of emp1710ca. 1888e as 144. If it be said that in the self there is the 10rn-dependence on any consciousness other than itself in respect of imdeterminate empirical usage, then, be ause the (probans) pot is certainly like that, there is non-establishment of the prcbams. ३८ १४५. स नास्त्येव । १४६. विवादात् । धटे निर्विकल्पकव्यवहार एव नास्तीति चेत्-आत्मन्यपि सुषुप्तावस्तीति चेन्न ; तस्यापि १४७. अवेद्यत्वे सत्यपरोक्षव्यवहारविषयत्वं स्वप्रकाशत्वमिति चेन्न; व्याहतत्वेनासम्भवित्वात् । १४८ . कथञ्चिदव्याहतत्वेऽपि विशेषणाभावेन, उत विशेष्याभावेन, अथोभथाभावेन दृश्यत्वं निर्वक्तव्यम् । [[ निर्विकल्पकत्वे 145, [f it be urged that there is [10 imdeterminate usage at all in respect of the pot, (then), it does not exist ever1 in the case ()f the self. 146, 1f it be said that it is present in deep sleep, 10 (we reply) since the indeterminate mature of that too is under dispute. 147. If it be said that self-luminosity is “ to be an object of empirical usage as directly cognised, while not being an object of cognition ', no, since (the defini tion), being contradictory, is inapplicable . 148. Even if somehow or other it be (considered) 101-contradictory, (then to0) cognisability has to be defined through the non-existence of the qualiffcation, or through the non-existence of the gualified, (.e., sub strate) or through the 101-4xistence of both. १४९. तत्राद्येऽवेद्यत्वाभावो वेद्यत्वमेव हेतुरस्तु । किं विशेष्येण ! तस्य चोत्तं दूषणम् । १५० . द्वितीये स्वरूपासिद्धि । १५१. तृतीये व्यर्थविशेषणत्वम्, विशेष्यासिद्धिश्चेति । १५२. किञ्च दृश्यत्वं प्रमाणतो वा भ्रान्त्या वा ? नोभयमपि अन्यतरासिद्धेः । १५३ . ननु सामान्यतः प्रयुक्तस्य हेतोर्विशेषविकल्पैर्निराकरणे सर्वानुमानाभावप्रसङ्गः । 149. Of these, in the first case, let (the पृualiff cation) “being the object of cognition ,' itself be the probarns as 10n-existence of 10t being an object of c09 [nition. What (is the use) of the gualifed (.., sub strate) ? And of this (procedure) the defect has already 150. In the second casc, there is the non-estab 1ishment of the existence (of the probams in respect of part or whole of the subject). 151. [1 the third case, the qualification is futile; further, the gualified (substrate) is non-established. X III 152. Again, is the cognisability through a means of valid knowledge, or through delusion. It is not both (of them), because of non-establishment of one or the (0ther. 153. Now if the probams adduced in general is refuted , through the analysis of the particular (forms) वादावली १५४ . तथाहि-धूमादूमध्वजसाधने किमेतद्देशकालसंलस्रो धूमी हेतुः; किं वा अनेतद्देशकालसंलम इति विकल्प्य, आद्ये साधनशून्यं निदर्शनम्, द्वितीयेऽसिद्धिरिति दूषणसम्भवादिति । १५५. मैवम्; तत्र धूममात्रस्य पर्वतेऽसिाधकत्वेनादूषणत्वाभ्यु पगमात् । १५६. तर्हि किं वक्रो धूमो हेतुरिति विकल्पेन दूषणप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्न; तस्य सामान्यस्यैव हेतुत्वात् । there is the c011ti1ge11ce of the non-existence of all inferences (as such) 154. It is as follows : smoke-bammered (fre) from smoke, is it the smoke that is related to this place and time, that is the pro bans or the st70ke that is related 10t to the present place and time ? Through such analysis, there is the continger1ce of defect (in the inference) as , in the first case, there is the non-existence of the probams in the example, and in the second case, there is 101-establish ment (of the probars in respect of the subject) 155. It is 10t 50 (says the siddhatin); for since in establishing the fire in the mountain, there is the acceptance of 101-defectiveness (of the inference). 156. If it be said that in that case, through an analysis in the form “ is the probarns the curved smoke (or the straight one) ? ' there is the contingerce of the defect, not so (says the siddhantir) ; because it is only that (smoke) in general which is the probans . वादावली १५७ . न चास्तु तथा प्रकृतेऽपीतिं वाच्यम् । प्रमाणभ्रान्ति दृश्ययोः दृश्यत्वसामान्याभावात् । न हि जलनभोनलिनयोर्नलिनत्वसामान्य मस्ति । ४१ १५८. तर्हि कथं भ्रान्तिदृश्यत्वमित्युच्यते इति चेन्न; यथा नभो नलिनमित्युच्यते तथैवेत्यवेहि । १६०. १५९. दृश्यत्वस्य सन्मात्रवृत्तित्वाद्विरुद्धता च । न च शुक्तिरजतं दृश्यमिति वाच्यम् । तत्र शुक्तिकाया एव दृश्यत्वात् । ननु रजतसंविदः कथं शुक्तिका विषययो विरोधादिति चेन्न । 157. Nor may it be said * let it be likewise in the present c01text to0 ', because, there is 10t the general ity of cognisability in the validly and the delusively cognised. There is indeed no generality * 10tus11e55 in the water-lotus 21d the sky-lotus 158. If it be asked how there is the verbal usage “ delusive cognisability , ' no (says the siddhāntin). Just as there is the verbal usage (in respect of) sky-lotus, know it to be even s0 (here) 159. Besides, there is the defect * being the con tradictory (probams)' because cognisability is present (only in the real. Nor may it be said that shell-silver is cognisable, because there cognisabiliy belongs to 160. .* How can shell be the content of the silver cognition since this is contradictory ? ' 1f this be said, 10 (says ,the siddhantin). • वादावली १६१ . रजतसंविदं इति कोऽर्थः ? किं रजतविषयाया इति ? रजतत्वोलेखिसंविद इति वा ? १६२. नाद्यः ; अनभ्युपगमात् । द्वितीये को विरोधः ? स्वविषय शुक्तिकामेवान्याकारेण गृह्यातीत्यस्याविरुद्धत्वात् । १६३. ननु तर्हपि रजतेऽस्ति कथञ्चिद्दृश्यतेति चेन्न ; तस्य दृश्यत्वाभासत्वात् । तादृशस्य पक्षेऽनन्वयात् । १६४. किञ्च रजतस्य फलव्याप्यतया वृत्तिव्याप्यतया वा दृश्य त्वम् ? नोभयमपि, अध्यस्ततयैव तत्सिध्यभ्युपगमात् । न च तत्प्रतीता बुपायान्तरं वास्ति, सन्निकर्षाभावात् । आत्मनोऽपि दृश्यत्वादनैकान्तिकता च । 161. What is the meaning “ of silver cogni tion '? Is it of (the cognition) which has silver for its content' or, is it * of the cognition which comprehends 162. Not the first, because it is not accepted. In the second case, what is the contradiction1 ? For, its ७wn content, namely, shell itself it cognises in a different 163. Now, if it be contended that even then there is somehow cognisability in silver, 1० (says the siddhantin), since that is a mere semblance of cognisability and since that kind (of cognisability) is not related to the subject 164. Again, is the cognisability of the silver as pervaded by the fruit, or by the psychosis ? Not even both, since its establishment is admitted to be only as, super-imposed. Nor is there any other means for the cognition of that, since there is no (sense), contact. वादावली ४३ १६५. नात्मा दृश्यते इति चेन्न ; व्याहतेः । न ह्यज्ञाते धर्मिणि धर्मविधानं तन्निषेधो वा युज्यते । १६६. आत्मा दृश्यः, वस्तुत्वात्, घटवत् । अयं घटः एतद्धटात्मा न्यान्यदृश्यान्यः, प्रमेयत्वात्, घटवदिति च तस्य दृश्यत्वसिद्धेः । १६७ . किञ्च दृश्यत्वाभावे तदविद्यानिवृत्त्यभावेन मोक्षाभावप्रसङ्ग । १६८ . न च त्वत्पक्षे ब्रह्मज्ञानं नाम यत्किञ्चित्स्यात्, षष्ठत्यर्थस्य विषयतानतिरेकात् । There is also 101-conclusiveness (of the probar1s), be cause the self too is cognisable. 165. If it be said that the self is not cognised, not 50 (says the siddhantin) because of self-contradic tion. IIndeed in respect of a non-cognised substrate, it does not sta11d to reason either to predicate an attribute or megate it. 166. For, its cognisability is established thus :

• The self is cognisable, because it is a thing, like

the pot .' And, “ This pot is different from that cog Iाisable (*४., self) which is different from that (world) which is other than the said pot and the self ; because it is an object of knowledge, like the pot.' 167. Further, since in the mon-existence of cog misability (in respect of the self) there is non-existence of the destruction of mescience in respect of that, there is the contingence of the non-exstence of release. 168. • Nor in your system can there be something called Brahmat1-knowledge (which is other than know ledge with the self as the content), since the meaning ४४ १६९. यद्धि श्रुतंमयेन ज्ञानेन तत्वमभिधाय चिन्तामयीमवस्था मवलम्बमानस्यान्तःकरणपरिणामवृत्तिरूपं ज्ञानमुपजायते ; तेन भवेदविद्या निवृत्तिरिति चेन्न । १७०. तथाभ्युपगमे परमात्मनोऽपि दृश्यतया व्यभिचारानिस्तारात् । १७१ . आत्मनोऽपि वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वेऽपि फलव्याप्यताया अभावान्न दृश्यत्वमिति चेन्न ; दत्तोत्तरत्वात् । १७२. विषयत्वाभावेऽप्यात्माकारज्ञानमात्मज्ञानम् । तेन भवेद विद्यानिवृत्तिरिति चेन्न । of the genitive is not other than * being the content (of cognition).' 169 . * For him who through the knowledge gained by hearing (the scripture) understands reality and 2tails to the state of meditation, there arises cognition the form of a modification of the internal organ ; through that (cognition) there may be removal of nescience.' If this be said, no (says the siddhanti1) . 170. For, if it be so accepted there is no getting over the (defect of) inconstancy (of the probains), be cause of the supreme self (Parammatman) t७0 being cognisable. 171. Because for the self too, though there is pervadedness by psychosis there is the non-existence of pervadedness by the fruit (of cognition), there is no cognisability ; if this,be said, no (says the siddhantin), since the answer has been (already) given. . 172. * Though there is 101-existence of content 1ess, the knowledge haring the form of the self is १७३. विचारागोचरत्वात् । तथाहि-आत्माकारमिति कोऽर्थ आत्माकार एवाकारो यस्येति वा ? आत्माकार इवाकारो यस्येति वा ? आत्मा आकारो यस्येति वा ? वादावली १७४ . नाद्य: ; ज्ञानज्ञेययोरेकाकारतानुपलम्भात् । १७५. एकैव सत्ता ज्ञानज्ञेययोराकारोऽस्तीति चेन्न ; अनुगतसत्ताया अनङ्गीकारात् । १७६ . सत्तथैकाकारत्वे च वेदान्तवाक्यजनितज्ञानमात्माकारमेव (0) ४५ ) self-knowledge ; by that there 17ay be removal of 1escience.' If this be said, 70 (says the siddhāntin) . 173. Because it is beyond (the comprehension of) i10uiry. It is as follows ; what is thc meaning (of the term) ' having the form of the self ? [5 it * whose form is the same as the form of the self ? ' 0) r is it. (C) is it * which has the self for its form.' 174. Not the first, because the cognition and the cognised are not perceived to have one (and the same) 175. If it be said that one (and the same) reality is the form for both cognition and cognised, 10 (says the siddhantin) because a uniform reality (satta) is 10t accepted. 176. And 'if there be one (and the same) form through (the same) reality (satta), why should the know 1egge resulting from the Vedantic statements have the form of the self at a11 ? Why should it 10t have the ४६ कुतः ? धटाकारमपि किं न स्यात् । न च परेणात्मनि सत्ता नामाकारोऽङ्गी क्रियते, निराकारताङ्गीकारात् । १७७. न द्वितीयः; अत्यन्तसादृश्यस्यानुपलम्भात् । किञ्चित्सा दृश्यस्य प्रागिवातिप्रसञ्जकत्वात् । १७८. तृतीयेऽपि पक्षे नात्मा साक्षाज्ज्ञानस्याकारः सम्भवति, आधाराधेयभावस्यासम्भवात् । १७९. अतः परिशेषाद्विषयतया व्यावर्तकत्वेन चात्मज्ञानस्याकार इवेति वक्तव्यम् । तदेव च विषयत्वमिति यत्किञ्चिदेतत् । १८०. ननु भवेदिदं यदि दृग्विषयत्वं दृश्यत्वम् ; स्वप्रतिबद्ध form of a pot also ? Nor do the others (Advaitins) 2dmit a form called reality (satta) in the self, because 177. Not the second, because complete similarity is [10t cognised, while some kind of similarity wil! result in undue extension as in the prior case. 178. III the third alternative t0, the self ca1 0t directly become the form of the cognition, because of the impossibility of the relation of the container and the contained (as between cognition and the self) 179. Therefore. by elimination, it should be said that as the content and as what excludes, the self is the form, as it were, of cognition ; and since this itself is contentness, this (objection) is a trifle. xx 180, “ Now, if cognisability is to be the object of cognition there would bg this (group of defects). The व्यवहारे स्वातिरिक्तसंविदपेक्षानियतिर्दश्यत्वम् । कथमेतादृशी दृश्यता कथितदूषणगणग्रस्ता स्यात् : १८१ . मैवम् ; अतिरिक्तपदेन पारमार्थिकभेदवत्वं वा आविद्यक भेदवत्वं वा ? १८२ . नाद्यः; तवासिद्धेः । न द्वितीय: ; ममासिद्धेः । १८३ . सामान्यतः प्रयोग इति च प्रागेव परास्तम् । संविदपेक्षा नियतत्वमात्रस्य हेतुत्वोपपत्तेव्यैर्थविशेषणत्वञ्च । १८४. न चास्ति रजतेऽपि ज्ञानापेक्षा व्यवहाराय तस्याध्यस्तत यैव सिध्यभ्युपगमादित्यवादिष्म । invariable dependence on a cognition other than itself in respect of the empirical usage related to some thing, is cognisability . Ilow can cognisability of this kind be tainted by the group of defects adduced'? 181. Not s७ (says the siddhanti1). By the words other than ' (what is it that is meant)- having reall differe1ce, or having the difference resulting from 182. Not the first, because it is 10t established for you (the Advaitin). Not the second, because it is not established for me (the Dwaitin) 183. And that the usage is (in respect of difference) in general, this has (already) been refuted. And the invariability of dependence on a cognition being itself intelligible as the proba1s, the gualification (other than itself) is futile. 184. And even in respect of silver there is no dependence on (another) cognition for the sake "of ४८ १८५ . अत्यन्तासत्यनैकान्त्यञ्च । १८६ . न च तदपि मिथ्येति वाच्यम् । तथा सति रजतादेर सद्विलक्षणत्वप्रतिपादनप्रथासवैयथ्यांपातात् । १८७. न च बाध्यत्वमसतो युज्यते, अप्रतीत्यङ्गीकारात् । नापि तस्यानिवेचनीयत्वम् , तस्य प्रमाणाभावादिति । १८८ . न च जडत्वहेतुरपि निगदितदूषणगणलङ्कने जङ्कालः । तथाहि--किमिदं जडत्वं नाम ? ज्ञानानाधारत्वं वा ? अनात्मत्वं वा ? अज्ञानरूपत्वं वा ? अस्वप्रकाशत्वं वा ? empirical usage, since its establishment is admitted only as superimposed (merely pher1071ernal, thus reguiring neither a psychosis of manas mor intelligence as reffected in that psychosis) : this we have said. 185. There is also non-conclusiveness (of the pro bams) in respect of the absolutely unreal 186 . Nor ca17 it be said that that too is illusory ; for, in that case there is the contir tirge11ce of futility of the effort to predicate the difference fro1in the unreal in respect of silver, etc. 187. Nor does sublatability stand to reason in the case of the unreal, since its 101-cognition is accepted. Nor can there be indeterminability for it, because there is no authority for it (..., indeterminability) 188. The probains “inertness to has not the legs (strong enough) to jump over the adduced group of defects. It is as follows : : what is the meaning of this वादावली ४९ १८९ . नाद्यः; विशिष्टात्मनि पक्षनिक्षिक्षेऽसिद्धत्वात् । असदात्म नोर्विपक्षभूतयोश्च वर्तमानत्वात् । १९० . न द्वितीयः, अनात्मत्वपदेन–आत्मातिरिक्तत्वं वा आत्म त्वानाधारत्वं वा विवक्षितम् ? १९१. नाद्य ; तवासिद्धेः । न हि त्वत्पक्षे परमात्मनो जगदति रिक्तमस्ति । १९२. परमार्थतस्तदभावेऽप्यनाद्यविद्याविलसितो भेदोऽस्तीति वेत्। --तस्माकमसिद्धो हेतुः । असति व्यभिचारश्च । that is called inertmess ? Is it (1) not being a.substrate of cognition, (2) or not being the self (non-self-hood) or (3) being the form of mescience, (4) or 10t being self. 189. Not the first, because there is (partial) non establishment (of the probams in the subject), in respect of the qualifed self included in the subject, (and) because it (the probams) is present in the absolutely unreal and the self which form the negative instances. 190. Not the second. What is it that is intended by the term “ not being the self (Anatmaइ)' ? (1) Is it being other than the self or (2), not being a substrate of self-hood (Atmatva) 191. Not the first, because it is not established for you (the Advaitin). Indeed according to your (the Advaitin's) school there is no world as other than the supreme self (Parammatman) 192. “ Though there is the 101-existence of that (difference) as (absolutely) real, there is the difference ५० वादावली १९३. न द्वितीयः; आत्मत्वस्य प्रागुक्तप्रकारान्तर्भावेि साध्या विशिष्टतासिध्यनैकान्त्यान्यतमापातात् । १९४. एतेन यत् त्वयात्मत्वमभिप्रेतम्, तदेवास्त्वस्माकमिति परेि हृतम् । अस्माकमुक्तप्रकारान्यतमसङ्ग्रहसम्भवात् । १९५ . न तृतीय: ; वृत्तिज्ञानभागेऽसिद्धत्वात् । आत्मनो ज्ञान स्वरूपता न निर्वाह्यतामारोहति । तथाहि---तज्ज्ञानं सविषयं निर्विषयं वा ? as manifested by beginningless rescience ; if this be said, the probans is not established for us (the Davaitins) (since 1escience-produced-difference is not admitted by us). And there is the inconstancy (of the probams) in respect of the (absolutely) urreal (since you admit the unreal to be illusory) 193. Not the second ; for if self-hood be brought under the alternatives stated already, there is the contingence of one of (the three defects), non-distinc tion from probardum , Inon-establishtment (of the pro barns), and non-conclusiveness (of the probams) 194. By this, (the argument) “ the self-h0d under stood by you (Dwaitins), 1et that be the same for us (Advaitins) ' is also refuted, because for us (the Dwaitins) it is possible to adopt any one of the alterm2 tives stated. . 195. Not the third, for there is 10n-establishment (of the probar1s) in respect of that part (of the subject) which is cognitive psych0sis. The position that the self is 6f the mature of knowedge does not come up to the वादावली १९६. आद्ये स्वविषयं परविषयं वा? नाद्य; ; स्ववृत्तिविरोधात् । न द्वितीयः; मोक्षे ज्ञानाभावप्रसङ्गात् । नोत्तरः; ज्ञानत्वस्यैवाभाव प्रसङ्गात् । १९७ . निर्विषयज्ञानरूपत्वे चास्तु प्रपञ्चेऽपि तादृशज्ञानरूपत्व मित्यसिद्धिप्रसङ्गः । १९८ . न चतुर्थ: ; स्वकर्मकसंविद्वषतामन्तरेण स्वप्रकाशान्तर स्योत्तरत्र वारयिष्यमाणत्वात् । स्वकर्मकप्रकाशत्वस्यात्मन्यपि तवाभावादिति । (level of) being tenable. It is as follows ; has that knowledge a content 0r has it no content ? 196. In the first case, has it itself as content (or ar1 other as content ? Not the first, because of c0Introdiction) of functioning in respect of itself. Not the second, because of the conti॥gence of the non-existence of kr10wledge in release. Not the latter (not having a content), because of the contingence of the non-exist ence of the very nature of knowledge. 197. And if it is to be of the form of conter॥tless cognition, let there be such a form for cognition in the world to० ; thus there is the contingence of the non-establishment (of the probarns, imertness) 198. Not the fourth. For, (the definition of) any other self-luminosity as distinct from * that form of cognition which has itself for object' will be refuted latter on, while according to you! (the Advaitin) the Iminosity which has itself for object is non-existent ५२ १९९, भवात् । २०. एतेनाचेतनंत्वं 199, २०१. परिच्छिन्नहेतुरपि न साध्यसाधकतामध्यास्ते । तथा हि-- परिच्छिन्नत्वं नाम देशतः परिच्छिन्नत्वं वा ? कालतो वा ? अन्योन्या भावाधिकरणत्वं वा ? अस्माभिज्ञतृत्वानाधारत्वस्य जडत्वेनाभिलापान्नास्मत्प्रति जडत्वमिति निरस्तम् । उक्तपक्षाबहेि २०२. नाद्य:; कालाकाशादिभागेऽसिद्धेः । By this (the view) that imertness is non sertience is also refute, because t does not fal outside the alternatives already me1tioned. 200. Nor can there be the adoption (of a position) similar to ours (by the Advaitins) since * not being the substrate of knowership ' is called inertness by us (and that is not acceptable to the Advaitin). x 201. The probams * finitude to can not stand as what can establish the probandum. It is as follows : what is it that is meant by the term 'finitude' ? Is it ६patial finitude or temporal finitude, or being the 8ubstrate of reciprocal non-existence ? "" 202. Not the first, for there is partial non establishment (of the probams) in respect of time (i.e., वादावली २०३. अत एव न द्वितीय: ; ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तं सकलमपि देश कालाभ्यां परिच्छिन्नमिति चेन्न ; व्याघातात् । २०४. तथाहि-देशतः परिच्छिन्नत्वं नाम कचिन्निष्ठाभावप्रतेि योगिता । तथा च सर्वस्याभावं प्रतिजानता किञ्चिदधिष्ठानमभ्युपेयम् । अभावस्याधिष्ठानबोधाधीनबोधत्वात् । तथा च कथ न व्याघात ? २०५. सकलमपि ब्रह्मण्यध्यस्तम् । अतस्तत्र नास्तीति निषेधा न्नाधिष्ठानाभ्युपगत्या व्याघात इति चेन्न ; परिच्छिन्नता नाम बाध्यतेत्यर्थ स्यात् । तथात्वे साध्याविशिष्टतयैव दुष्टतापत्तिः । 203 If it be said that everything other than Brahman has spatial ar1d temporal finitude , 70, because of con 2004 . It is as follows : to be finite in space is to be the counter-correlate of the (absolute) 101-existence 10cated in some place. 41d thus by him who pre7ises the mor1-existence of everything, some substrate has to be accepted ; for, of the non-existence the cognition is dependent on the cognition of the substrate ; and 2005. If 1t be said that everything (in the world) is superimposed on Brahrman, and that therefore there is no contradiction because of the acceptance of the substrate through the denial in the form , there it is not,' ००, (says the siddhantin). (For) the meaning would be that what is called finitude is sublatability ; if that would be so, there is the contingence of the ५४ २०६. कालपरिच्छेदे चानित्यता सादिता त्रिकालसत्यता वाभि प्रेता भवेत् । तथा च कालस्यैतादृशपरिच्छेदायोगेनागतः स एव दुरात्मा व्याघातः । २०७. कुतश्चाकाशादेः कालपरिच्छेदाध्यवसायः ? जडत्वहेतुनेति चेन्न; तस्यापाकृतत्वात्, घटादौ कार्यताप्रयुक्तत्वाञ्च परिच्छिन्नत्वस्य । २०८. यज्जडं तत्कार्यमिति चेन्न ; अविद्यायां व्यभिचारात् । तस्याश्च कार्यत्वेऽनादित्वपरिभाषा परिलुप्येत । तत्कारणस्याभावश्च । defect, ever because of 101-distinction from the pr0 206. And by temporal finitude might be intended being non-eterTal or ' having a beginning' or * 10t being real in all three times (the past, future and the present) ; and thus, because of the impossibility of such a fmitude in respect of time, that same contradic tion of vile nature has come (again) 207. By what (authority) do we determine term poral finitude in respect of ether ? If it be said (that it is) by the probams, inertness, it is not s0 (says the siddhāntin) because it has been refuted, also because the initude in the case of pot, etc., is brought about by (the adjunct) “ being an effect '. 208. If it be said that whatever is imert is an effect, it is not so (says the siddhantin), because of inconstancy in respect of mescience. 'And if that be an effect, there would be the failure of the technical exposition in respect of that (rescience) as beginning 1ess; and there is non-existence of a cause for it. २०९. पञ्चमप्रकारं मोक्षमाचक्षाणस्य जडत्वहेतोर्मोक्षे नित्थतया भ्युपगते व्यभिचारः । २१०. तस्य च कालपरिच्छिन्नत्वे पुनरावृतिप्रसङ्गः । न हि सहस्राक्षोऽपि क्षयं क्षेतुं क्षम इत्युन्मत्तवादश्च स्यात् । २११. न तृतीय : ; *नेति नेति ? इत्यादिना ब्रह्मण्यपि जगद न्योन्याभावाधिकरणतायाः श्रुतत्वात् । सोऽपि भेदोऽविद्याविलसित इति चेन्न । २१२. तत्किमिदानीं परमार्थभेदभिन्नत्वं हेतुः ? तथा सतेि पक्षे तदसिद्धिः स्यात्, विरुद्धता च स्यादिति । सन् घट इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षेण बाधितविषयत्वात् कालात्ययापदिष्टश्च । 209. There is the inconstancy of the probarns imertmess ', if accepted as eternal, in respect of release , for him who speaks of release as of a fifth form 210. And if that (release moka) has temporal fr1itude, there is the contingence of the retur7 (to the world 0f sarisara). Not even the thousand eyed (Indra) has the capacity to ar1ul destruction ; hence (your position) would be the raving of a 1umatic. 211. Not the third. Scriptural statements lik०

• 10t this ' “ not this declare that Brahman is the sub

strate of the reciprocal non-existence of the world. If that difference too be declared a product of mescience, (it is) not so (says the siddhantin) 212. Then is here * beithg different because ol [eal difference' the probams ? In that case there would be the non-establishment of that in the subject and २१३. ननु केयं सत्यला या प्रत्यक्षगोचरा ? किं सत्त्वं वा ? विधिगम्यत्वं वा ? अर्थक्रियाकारित्वं चा ? प्रातिभासिकेतरत्वं वा ? असत्वा तिरिक्तत्वं वा ? अबाध्यत्वं वा ? २१४ . श्राद्यपंञ्चकान्यतमाभ्युपगमेनास्माकं प्रत्यक्षाविरोधः, तस्या स्माभिरनिराकरणात् । २१५ . न षष्ठ: ; प्रत्यक्षस्योत्तरकालीनबाधाभावग्राहितायोगांत् । तस्मात्सद्भन्धर्वनगरमित्यादिवदयं प्रत्यक्षेण सत्वग्रहणप्रवाद इति । there w0uld also be contradiction. And since by per ceptions like , “the pot is real ' there is sublation of the content (of the inference), (the probans) becomes adduced after the lapse of the (proper) time (ई.६., be c0ाmes sublated) 213. Now, what is this “ being real ' which is the sphere of perception ? (1) Is it reality or (2) being made known by an affrmation or (3) producing suc cessful activity (in respect of the object) or (4) being other than merely apparent (or (5) being other than 101-reality or (6) non-sublatability ? 214. On the acceptance of any one of the first five (alternatives) there is not for us (Advaitins) con fict with perception, because that (kind of reality) is 10t rejected by us (Advaitins). 215. Not the sixth, because it is not possible for perception to apprehend the non-existence of sub lation subsequently. Therefore, this conteption that reality is apprehended by perception is like (the asser tion) “ the city of Gandhawas is real. वादावली २१६. मैवम्; अबाध्यतायाः प्रत्यक्षग्राह्यत्वात् । न च तस्यो तरकालीनबाधाभावाग्राहकत्वमिति वाच्यम् । तदानीमबाध्यताग्रहणेनैव is २१७ . तत्कालीनाबाध्यता गन्धर्वनगरेऽपि गृह्यते इति चेत् ; सत्यम्; तथाप्यस्ति विशेषः । प्रामाण्यं हि ज्ञानस्योत्सर्गतो ऽपवादाद प्रामाण्यमिति विद्वत्सम्मतिः । २१८. तथा च तत्र बाधकादप्रामाण्यमुपस्थाप्यते। प्रकृते तु तादृशबाधकादर्शनात् त्रिकालाबाध्यतैव निरपवादा सिध्यतीति । ५ 216. (If the Advaitins advance this argument) it not s० (says the siddhantin)since non-sublation is it (perception) does not apprehend non-existence of sulblation subseguently ; for this is established even by the apprehension of non-sublatedness at that time. 217. “ Non-sublatedness at that time is appre hended even of the city of Gandharvas ; if this be said, true. Even then there is a difference. * Validity of cognition is, indeed, the general rule ; in validity is because of defect ; ' this is what is accepted by the 1ear1ed. 218. And thus, there, invalidity is brought in through some sublater; in the,case in 9uestion, since that kind of sublation is not seem, it is only non-sub latability in all three times that is established, free { ५८ वादावली २१९. अस्त्वनुमानंमेव बाधकं प्रत्यक्षस्येति चेन्न ; प्रत्यक्षविरोधेन प्राप्तमरणावस्थस्य प्रत्यक्षविरोधाक्षमत्वात् । अन्यथा दहनशैत्यानुमानमपि तदुष्णतावगाहिप्रत्यक्षबाधकत्वेन प्रमाणं प्रसज्येत । यदा च प्रत्यक्षं सम बलप्रत्यक्षान्तरेण न बाध्यते, हन्त ! तदा का वार्ता तत्पादोपजीविनो वरा कस्य तर्कस्य तद्वाधकत्वे । २२०. नभोमलिनतामाकलयत्प्रत्यक्षममूतनुमानेन बाधितं दृष्टमिति चेन्न ; तत्राप्याप्तवाक्यादिनैव बाधाभ्युपगमेनासम्प्रतिपत्तेः । 219. If it be said, “ Let inference itself be the sub later of perception,' 10 ; for, (the inference) reduced to the death-state by the contradiction with perception, is incapable of contradicting the perception. Otherwise valid as the sublater of the perception comprehending heat (in fre). And when perception is not sublated by another perception of eual strength, what them, alas! is the talk about the wretch, namely, reasoning which 1ives at the feet of that (perception), being the sublater of that ? 220. If it be said that the perception that appre hends the sky as sullied (by smoke etc.,) is seem to be sub lated by the inference of its being incorporeal, 10 (says the siddhāntin) ; for, even there, since the acceptance of the sublation is solely due to the testimony,of reliable persor15, etc., there is no adrmission (of sublation by inference) ५९ २२१. यदा च पुनः स्वयमेवानुमितेि, तदापि बलवत्प्रत्यक्षगृही तव्याप्तिकादेव तस्मादध्यवसायः । २२२ . प्रत्यक्षत्वाद्भन्धर्वनगरप्रत्यक्षवद्विप्रतिपन्नमपि प्रत्यक्ष श्रान्तं किं न स्थादिति चेन्न । तर्हि वाक्यत्वाज्जरद्ववादिवाक्यवत्सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्यमप्रमाणं किं न स्यात् ? २२३. किञ्च प्रत्यक्षशब्देन प्रत्यक्षाभासविवक्षायां पक्षे तदभावः । २२४ . प्रमाणाभिप्राये दृष्टान्ते ऽनन्वयः । ज्ञानत्वमात्रस्य हेतुत्वे सत्यज्ञानादिवचनजन्यज्ञाने व्यभिचारः । 221. And again (even when there is inference by 01e's own self, ther t00 there is 29certainment from that (inference) only as p0sse35ing a pervasion appre hended by a perception which is strong (as compared with the inference). 222. If it be asked, ' why should not then the perception which is under dispute also be delusive, because it is a perception 1ike the perception of the city of the Gandharvas ? 10. Then why should not statements like * existence, knowledge, etc.', be invalid , because they are statements, like the statements about the aged ox ? 223. Further if by the term perception be intended the semblance of perception, it is non-existent in the subject.* 224 . . If a means of valid knowledge be intended, it is not related to the example. If * merely being knowledge ' be the probams, there is the inconstancy वादावली २२५. विश्धं सत्यमित्याद्यागमविरोधश्च । व्यावहारिकं सत्त्वम त्रोच्यते इति चेन्न ; निर्बीजत्वात्कल्पनायाः । २२६. व्यर्थ च प्रपञ्चे व्यावहारिकसत्यत्वप्रतिपादनम् । न हि कश्चिलौकिको वैदिको वा व्यावहारिकसत्यतां प्रपञ्चे नाभ्युपैति । २२७. तस्माद्वादिप्रसिद्धमिथ्यात्वनिषेधेन पारमार्थिकसत्कमेव प्रति पाद्यते, * अप्रासे शास्रमर्थवत्' इति न्यायात् । २२८. “ नेह नाना ' इत्यादिश्रतिनिषेध्यसमर्पकतयानुवदति (of the probams) in respect of the knowledge giver1 rise t० by statements like "existence, knowledge, etc.' X 225. Besides, there is contradiction with scriptur al statements like the world is real', etc. If it be said that phenome1al reality (al01e) is predicated here, m0 (says the siddhantin), because the assumption is 226. And it is futile to predicate phenomenal reality with reference to the world. Nobody, whether worldly (wise) or (learned) in the vedas, fails to accept the phenomenal reality of the world. 227. Therefore there is predicated only moumemal reality through the refutation of illus0rimess well-known to the opponent (the Advaitin), because of the principle that scripture is purportful with reference to what is not established (otherwise ) 228. If it be said that the statement of the reality of the universe is a repetition (of what is otherwise विश्वसत्यतावाक्यमिति चेन्न ; तथा सति विश्धं सत्यमित्यादिवचनविधान सिद्धयथै “नेह नाना' इत्यनुवाद इति प्रसङ्गात् । २२९. किञ्च * असदेवेदमग्र आसीत्' इत्यादिवाक्यनिषेध्य समर्पकतया सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्यं ब्रह्मणः सत्यतामनुवदतीति चातिप्रसङ्गः । २३०. विश्वमिथ्यात्वब्रह्मसत्यत्वे श्रुतिमन्तरा न सिद्धयत इति कथमनुवाद इति चेन्न ; दृश्यत्वादिहेतुना मिथ्यात्वसाधनात् । भ्रमानुप पत्याधिष्ठानतया ब्रह्मणोऽपि सत्यत्वकल्पनात् । established) in order to make known what is negated by

• the scriptural statements like there are no differents

whatsoever here' no (says the siddhārmtin) ; for, in that case, there is the contingence that in order to secure the there are 10 differents whatsoever here' is a repetition. 229. Further, there is the undue extension, that in order to make known what is negated by sentences 1ike this was only non-existence at the beginning' the text “ reality, knowledge, etc ' is a restatement of Brah11am's reality. 230, “ When the illu50rimess of the universe and the reality of Brahman cannot be established by (any means) other than scripture how can there be a restate tment (of them) ?' If this be asked, no (says the siddhan tin), because b४ probams like cognisability, there is esta blishment of illus0rimess, and because, through the un intelligibility of delusion (otherwise), there is the assump २३१. किञ्च विश्धसत्यत्वानुवाद इति वदता विश्वस्य प्रामाणिकता भ्युपेयते ? न वा ? २३२. नाव: ; तत्प्रमाणाविरोधात् । निषेध्यस्य स्वेन प्रमाणा विषयतानभ्युपगमाञ्च । २३३. न द्वितीयः ; असिद्धस्यानुवादायोगात् । लोकसिद्धानुवाद इति चेन्न ; लोके च प्रमाणसिद्धमनूद्यते ? भ्रान्त्या वा २३४ . नाद्यः, दत्तोत्तरत्वात्; नोत्तरः, तथैव लोकस्य भ्रान्ति सिद्धब्रह्मसद्भावो निषिद्धयते इति प्रसङ्गात् । 231. Further, by him who says that there is repetition of th५ : reality of the world, is the world admitted as an object of valid cognition or not ? 232 . Not the first, because of conflict with that authority (for statements like * There are no differents etc.), arrd because of the fact that that which is [1egated is 10t admitted (by you Advaitin) to be by its own nature the content of valid cognition. 233. Not the second, because restatement of that which is 10t established is impossible. If it be said that there is restatement of what is established iाः ordinary experience, th७ (says the siddhantin). Is it the ordinary experience or delusively ? 234. Not the first, because of the reply having been already given. , Not the latter, because in the 5ame way there is the contingence of the refutation of Brahman-reality delusively cognised in the case of the world २३५ . तस्माद्यद्वदन्तीत्यादिवचनं परिहारे विशेषयुतिं च विनानु वादायोगात् । व्यावहारिकसत्यत्वस्य च वतुमप्रयोजकत्वात् । पारमार्थिक मेव सत्यत्वं जगत्युदितमित्यस्ति श्रुतिविरोधः । २३६. * असत्यमप्रतिष्ठ ते जगदाहुरनीश्वरम्' इति निरवकाश स्मृतिविरोधश्च । २३७ . न चात्रासत्यशब्दोऽत्यन्तासत्यपर : ; अत्यन्तासत्वाभ्युप गन्तुर्वादिन एवाभावादाहुरित्यस्यायोगादिति । 235. Therefore, there is no possibility of repeti tiveness in the absence of a statement like 'what they say and a special argument for the refutation ; and there is no ground for predicating phenomenal reality (alone). For these reasons, it is absolute reality that is declared of the world; hence there is the conflict with scripture (for the Advaitin's inference). xx 236. Besides there is the conflict (for the Advai tin's position) with the code (smrti) devoid of rorm (for ambigivuity) namely, * They; say that the universe is non-real, has no substrate, 21d has no Lord. (What is there that does not spring frorm1 11tual union ? Lust is the cause of a1)' 237. And here the word * 10t-rea] has not for purport absolute urreality ; for, because of the non existence of army disputant who accepts absolute un reality, (the term) “ they sठy ' would not be possible . { ६४ २३८. विप्रतिपन्न सत्यं प्रमाणादृष्टत्वात्, ब्रह्मवत्, इत्यनुमान विरोधश्च । २३९ . न च साध्यानिरूक्तिः; अबाध्यतायाः साध्यत्वात् । तस्याश्च ब्रह्मणि सिद्धत्वान्नाप्रसिद्धविशेषणता । २४०. ननु किमिदं अतात्विकप्रमाणष्टत्वं वा ? वादावली प्रमाणदृष्टत्वम् ? x २४१. नाद्य ; अस्माकमसिद्धेः । प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणानां तत्त्वा वेदकतानभ्युपगमात् । तात्विकप्रमाणदृष्टत्वम् ? ]] 238. And there is conflict with the (following) inference : "The thing under dispute is real, because it is cognised through a means of valid knowledge, like 239. Nor is the proba11dium undefined, since being non-sublatable (itself) is the probandium. And because of the establishment of that (non-sublatability) in the case of Brahmar1, there is not (the defect of) non-estab lished qualification. 240. Now, what is this being cognised through a 178arms of valid knowledge ? Is it being cognised through a real means of valid krnowledge, or being cognised through a non-real means of valid knowledge ? 241. Not the first, because it is. mot established for us (the Advaitins, since means of valid knowledge 1ike perception, etc. are not admitted as making knowT1 reality ६५ २४२. नोत्तरः; तवासिद्धेः । साधनविकलत्वं च दृष्टान्तस्येति । २४३. मैक्म्; प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणानामतत्वावेदकत्वे मानाभावात् । प्रत्यक्षादिकं तत्त्वावेदकं प्रमाणत्वात्, सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्यवत् । अन्यथा प्रमाणमेच न स्यात् । प्रपञ्चस्तत्वावेदकप्रमाणदृष्ट: ; सम्प्रतिपन्नभ्रान्त पदार्थेतरत्वात् ; ब्रह्मवत् । २४४. आत्मत्वमुपाधिरिति चेन्न ; अबाध्यत्वादेरात्मत्वस्य पक्षे सम्भवात् । अन्यथात्मत्वस्याप्यभावस्थाद्रह्मणि । 242. Not the latter, because it is not established for you (the Dwaitins). A11d the example t00 is devoid 243 . Not so (says the siddhantim) ; for, there is no authority in respect of mears of valid knowledge like perception 17aking known (only) the non-real. Percep tion, etc. make known the real, because of being a 1means of valid knowledge, like (the tcxt) ' reality, knowledge , (etc.' Otherwise there would 10t at all be (for those) the character of being means of valid kr10wledge. The universe is cognised through a means of valid knowledge which makes known the real, because it is other than the admitted objects of delusive cognition1, 1ike Brahmarी. 2-44. If self-hood be said to be the adjunct (present in the example, and not in the subject), 10 (says the 5iddhantin), because self-hood consisting of non-sub 1atability, , etc., is possible in the subject ; otherwise in ६६ २४५. किश्च तत्त्वावेदकत्वादिविशेषानवधूय प्रमाणमात्रदृष्टत्वं हेतु किं न स्यात् ? न ह्यस्य विपक्षे वृत्तिः । वृतिव्याप्यताया आत्मन्य भ्युपगमान्न तत्र साधनावृत्तिः । वादावली २४६. तथापि प्रामाणिकत्वातिरिक्तं सत्यत्वं नास्तीति साध्या विशिष्टतेति चेन्न ; स्वपरासंमतेः । २४७. न सत्यत्वाभ्युपगमात् । तावत्स्वरीत्येदमुक्तम् । प्रमाणाविषयस्यापि ब्रह्मण 245 . [3esides, why should not the probarns be

• being cognised through a means of valid knowledge,

in general, ormitting attributes like * which 12akes known the real '? This proba1s is indeed 10t present in the negative i1stance. Since pervasion by (cognition) psych0sis is accepted in respect of the self, there is not the non-existence of the probams in that (positive instance) 246, 1f it be said that even thus, since there is no reality other than being an object of a means of valid krnowledge, there is (the defect of) non-distinction (of the probarns) from the probandum, no (says the Dvaitin) since this is not accepted by yourselves (Advaitins) or by others (IDvaitins). 247. Now this is not stated according to your (Advaitin's) own point of view ; for reality is admitted of Brahman though (it is) not the object of a means.०f valil knowledge. २४८. त्वातिरिक्तस्य वृत्ययोगात् । वादावली ६७ नाप्यस्मद्रीत्या, ब्रह्मण इव प्रपञ्चस्यास्माभि: प्रामाणिक सत्यत्वस्याभ्युपगमात् । अन्यथा शशविषाणवत् प्रमाण २४९ . तथापि ब्रह्मणः प्रामाणिकत्वाभावात्साधनविकलो दृष्टान्त इति चेन्न ; असाधारणस्य दूषणत्वाभावपक्षे केवलव्यतिरेकित्वोपपत्ते । ब्रह्मणश्धाप्रामाणिकत्वे शशविषाणवदसत्वप्रसङ्गः । २५०. स्वतः सिद्धत्वान्नेति चेन्न; स्वत इति स्वेनेति वा प्रमाणेन विनेति वा । 248. Nor is it according to our (ID)vaitins') point (0f view ; for, of the world as of Brahman, there is admitted reality other than “ being an object of a means of valid knowledge '. (Otherwise like the horms of a haure there would be no functioning of a means of valid 249. If it be said that even thus, the example is devoid of probarns, since Brahman is not an object of a means of valid knowledge, [70 (says the siddhāntin) ; for (or the view that * uncommon ' (proba1s) is n७ de fect at all, there is intelligibility for the barely negative (pervasion ). And if Brahman be not the object of a means of valid knowledge, there is the contingence of unreality (for it), as for the horms of a har९. 250. If it be said that it is not so, because of being established by itself, no (says the siddhantin) The term * by itself ', does it mean, ' by oneself or ' without a means of valid kmथwledge ? ६८ २५१ . नाद्य: ; अनभ्युपगमात् । न हि स्वस्मिन्स्वस्य कारक ताभ्युपगम्यते । अन्यथा शशविषाणस्याप्येवं सिद्धिः स्यात् । २५२. न द्वितीयः, प्रमाणाभावे सत्वं न स्यादित्यस्य प्रमाणेन विना सिद्धयतीत्यस्यानुत्तरत्वात् सिद्धयुपायान्तरस्यानुपन्यस्तत्वात् । स्वतः सिद्धत्वं नाम स्वप्रकाशत्वमिति चेन्न ; दत्तोत्तरत्वात् । २५३. अर्थक्रियाकारित्वाच्च सत्यत्वसाधनं संभवति । स्वामरंभा संभोगादौ व्यभिचार इति चेन्न ; पक्षसमत्वात् । न हि पक्षे पक्षसदृशे वा व्यभिचार । 251 . Not the first, because it is not accepted (011eself in respect of oncsself ; otherwise there could be 252. N0t the second ; for, (to the statement )

• there is no reality in the absence of a meas of valid

knowledge,' it is no answer (to say) that it is established without a mea1s of valid knowledge , since 10 (other [f it be said that

• self-establishment.' means * self-luminosity ', 10

(says the siddhāntin), since it has already bee1 answered. X 253. There is also the possibility of establishment of reality because of producing successful activity (in! respect of the object). If it be said that there is the inconstancy (of the probams) in respect of cases like the enjoyment of Rambha (a celestial darmsel).in dreat7s, 10 (says the siddhantin), because that (dream वादावली ६९ २५४. रज्जुभुजङ्गादौ व्यभिचार इतेि चेन्न; तज्ज्ञानस्यैव भय कम्पादिजनकत्वात् । २५. ननु ज्ञानमात्रमेव भयकम्पादिजनकम् , अर्थविशेषितं वा ? आद्ये सकलज्ञानानां भयकम्पादिजनकत्वप्रसङ्गः । २५६. द्वितीये सर्पस्यापि तजनकत्वभायातमिति चेन्न; सर्पतया ज्ञातरजोरेव विशेषणत्वेन व्यभिचाराभावात्, सपजन्यत्वाच्च । experience) is on a par with the subject. There is indeed no inconstancy of the proba15 in the subject or in what is on a par with the subject . 254. If it be said that there is the inconstancy (of the proba1s) in respect of rope-smake, etc. (which produce fear), 10 (says the siddhantin), because its cogाition by itself produces fear, trem1bling, etc. (and that cognitio1 is 10t illusory) 255. Now, is it the cognition by itself that gives rise to fear, trembling, etc., or is it as speciffed by the content ? In the first case, there is the contingence of all cognitions giving rise to fear, trembling, etc. 256. * In ] the second case, for the smake t00 there results the production of that.' If this be said, 70 (says the siddhantin), because, “ the (real) rope that is cognised as the smake,'-this alone being the specifica and because they (fear etc.) are generated not by the smake (but only by smake-cognition) ५८ २५७. आत्मन्यथैक्रियाकारित्वं नास्तीति चेन्न ; तस्य निखिल प्रपञ्चकारणत्वेन श्रुतिशतसमधिगतत्वात् । सोऽपि पक्षनिक्षिप्तश्चेत् माहा यानिकपक्षपातः स्यात् । २५८. तदतिरिक्तात्माभ्युपगमात्रैवमिति चेन्न ; तदतिरिक्तस्याप्ये तद्विशेषण्णवत्तया पक्षनिक्षेपात् । २५९. किञ्च विशिष्टस्याप्यात्मनोऽर्थक्रियाभ्युपगमादात्मांशस्य सा कथ न स्यात् ? २६०. यावहारिकत्वञ्च विश्वसत्यतायां प्रमाणम् ; अभिज्ञाभि बदनादीनामपि शुक्तिमात्रविषयत्वात् । वादावली 257. If it be said that in the self th0ere is 10) productio11 of successful activity (in respect of the object), m० (5ays siddhantin) ; for, it (the self) as the the hundred scriptural statements . Iई that (causal self) to० be (said to be) included in the subject, then there would be partiality in favour of Mahayama (Buddhism) 258. If it be said that it is not s0 because of the acceptance of a self other that that (ualified self), 10 (says the siddhantin) ; for, since even what is other than that has this attribute (*४. being other than the (uali fied self), it is included in the subject. 259. Besides, because of the acceptance of success ful activity in respect of even the qualified self, how car1 it be said not to be present in the self-part (of the 260. And, being an object of empirical usage is authority for (the establishment of) the reality in ७१ २६१. दोषगम्यत्वमुपाधिश्च । न च दृश्यत्वादिना प्रपञ्चेऽपि तत्साद्वयम् । मिथ्यात्वसाधने इवात्रापि दोषप्रसक्तः ॥ २६२. अनिर्वचनीयत्वाविद्यातत्कार्ययोरन्यतरत्वस्य मिथ्यात्वाभि प्राये निदर्शनस्य साध्यविकलत्वं च । २६३ . ननु कादाचित्कत्वहेतुना सकारणकत्वानुमाने कारणस्य सदसदूपत्वासंभवादविद्याकार्यत्वमेव पर्यवस्यतीति चेन्न । respect of the universe; for, ever in respect of cognition, verbal designation, etc. the shell alone is the conte1t. 261. A1d, ' being the content of a cognition generated by defect ' is the adjunct. Nor can that (adjunct) be established in respect of the universe t0 by (the proba1s) cognisability, etc. ; for, there is the Contingence of the defect here too, as in the establish 262. And if illusoriness means imdeterminability or either being mescience or being a product there0f, there is (the defect of) the non-existence of the pro bandum in the example. 263 , 'Now, in inferring possession of a cause through the probarns, 'being occasional,' since it is not possible for the cause to be 'of the form of real a11d 11eal, there remains only production by mescience ; ' if this be said, 10 (says the७siddhantin). ७२ २६४. केयं कादाचित्कता नाम ? कदाचित्प्रतीतता वा ? कदा चिदुत्पन्नता वा ? २६५. नाद्य:; याप्त्यभावात् । नोत्तरः; हेतोरसिद्धत्वात् । तस्मान्न त्रिविधोऽप्ययं प्रयोगो युक्तिपथमवतरतीति । २६६. किञ्च-यदि जगद्भांतिकल्पितं स्यात्, तर्हि कल्प्य मानजगत्सदृशसत्याधिष्ठानप्रधानपूर्वकमङ्गीकार्य प्रसज्येत । २६७. न च सत्यजगद्वयाङ्गीकारो युक्तः पिण्याकयाचनार्थ गतस्य खारीतैलप्रदानप्रतिज्ञावदधिकापातात् । 264. What is it that is called “ being occasio1al? !s it being cognised (on some occasion or is it being produced or some occasio7 ? 255. Not the first, since thcere is no pervasion . Not the latter, because the probarns is not established. Fer1ce, this syllogism does not i7 ary orre of these XXX 266. Further, if the uriverse be delusively posited tle: there would be the contingence of having to admit the anteceder1ce of a substrate and achetype that are real and similar to the universe (s०) posited. mot sta1d to reason, because of the conti?gence of excess, as in the case of him who went to beg for oil calke and was promised a measure of oil. वादावली ७३ २६८. तो नेदं जगद्भांतिकल्पितमिति तर्कपराहतं दृश्यत्वानु मनम् २६९. किश्च कल्पनाया आरोप्यसदृशाधिष्ठानप्रधानपूर्वकत्वं व्या पकम् । तचात्र नास्ति । सत्यजगद्वयाङ्गीकारादस्यैव जगतः सत्यत्वाङ्गी कारस्य लघुत्वात् । अतो व्याप्यकल्पनापि नास्तीति प्रमाणविरोधः । २७०. तथा च प्रयोग :–प्रपञ्चो न भ्रान्तिकल्पितः, निरधिष्ठा नत्वान्निष्प्रधानत्वादात्मवद्वयतिरेकेण वा रजतवत् । विपक्षे त्वारोप्यसदृशा धिष्ठानप्रधानभूतसत्यजगद्वयाङ्गीरप्रसङ्गो बाधकः । 268 . Therefore, the universe is not posited as delusive, (and) hence the inference through cognisabil ity, etc., (as probarns) is refuted by counter-arguments 269. Further, for assumptiveness, there is a per vadler, tr४., being preceded by a substrate and archetype that are similar to the super-imposed. And they (the substrate and the archetype) do not exist here (in the subject). For, it is more consistent with parssimony to admit the reality of this universe than to admit t५0 real universes. Therefore ever the pervaded 52. as sumptiveness does not exist ; hence, there is confict with the means of valid knowledge. 270. And there is the sy]]ogism thus : * The universe is not delusively posited, because it has 1either a substrate mor an archetype, like the self; or negatively like the silver (cognised in the'shell-silver delusion).' (On the contrary view, there is the sublater in the form of the contingence of the admission of two reali

• ५७४

२७१. ननु यदुक्तम्—यद्भान्तिकल्पितं तत्साधिष्ठानमिति तन्न : स्वामपदार्थे व्यभिचारात् । तथाहि-स्वामास्तावत् पदार्था भ्रान्तिकल्पिताः । सत्यत्वे हि तेऽनादिनित्या उतोत्पत्तिविनाशवन्तः । २७२ . मुपलभ्यन्त । वादावली आद्ये प्रागूध्वै चोपलभ्येरन् । द्वितीये किं न बोधानन्तर २७३ . तदैवोत्पद्य विनष्ठा इति चेन्न; असंभावितत्वात् । केिश्चैव मुपादानानि निमित्तानि चोपलब्धव्यानि । universes, that are substrate and archetype a11d similar to what is super-imp0sed. X] are 271 . Now, what has bee५१ said, that which is -delusively p0sited has a substrate, that is not (true) , because there is the inconstancy (of the probars) in respect of the dream-object . It is as follows : 10w, (all) the objects (cognised) in dream are delusively p0sited. 11deed, if they be real, they are either begin 1ingless and eternal or they are created and destroyed. 272. In the first case, they should be cognised both earlier arाd later. In the second case, why is it that they are not cognised after walking ? 273. If it be said that they are born and destroyed ther alone (in the dream), m० (says' the Advaitin), because of impossibility. Further in thi way the rmaterial and the efficient causes (of the dream-objects) ७५ २७४. अपि चैतानन्तः पश्यति बहिर्वा ? ” नाद्यः, अल्पप्रदेशे महतां दर्शनासंभवात् । नोत्तरः ; पार्श्वस्थानामप्युपलम्भप्रसङ्गात् । २७५. केन चैते करणेनोपलभ्यन्ते । न तावद्वाहेन्द्रियैः, तेषां तदोपरतत्वात् । नापि मनसा ; तस्य वहिरस्वातन्त्र्यात् । २७६. किश्च काश्यां सुप्तो मधुरां पश्यति ; तथा हेमन्ते सुप्तो वसन्तम् । न च तत्र तयोः सम्भवः । तस्माद्भ्रान्तिकल्पिताः । २७७. न चैवात्र किञ्चिदधिष्ठानमस्ति, आत्मनो भेदेनोपलम्भात् । न ह्यहं गज इतेि तदा प्रतीतिरस्तीति । 274 . Further, those objects (in dreams), are they cognised inside (the body) or outside ? Not the first, because it is impossible to cognise huge objects in a small place. Not the latter, because of the contimge1ce of cognition even by the people by one's side 275. And by what instrument are these (dream objects) cognised? Now, it is not by the outer sense organs, because at that time they are (१ll) at rest. Nor is it by the mind (manas) because it has no independent power (of cognitio7) outside (the body) 276. Further, one asleep in Benares (Kās') per ceives Madura (in his dream). Likewise (01me who sleeps in autum?? (experiences) spring. And of these, there is no possibility at that (time or) place. Therefore they are delusively posited 277. Nor is there any substrate here; for the self is cognised as different (from the objects of the dream) ndeed the cognition is, then, not in the from 'I am1 ar। elephant २१७८ . एतदप्यविमर्शसुन्दरम्, तेषां सत्यत्वात् । तेन निरधिष्ठान त्वेऽपि न विरोधः । २७९. ननु सत्यत्वे बाधकमुक्तम् । मैवम् ; उत्पत्तिविनाशाङ्गी. कारात् । २८०. न च प्रागृध्र्वमुपलम्भप्रसङ्गः, विद्युदादिवत्तात्कालिकत्व सम्भवात् । २८१. तर्छुपादानाद्युपलब्धिः स्यादिति चेन्न ; वासनोपादानक त्वात् । वासनानां चातीन्द्रियत्वादनुपलब्धिर्युज्यते । निमित्तादिकं त्वदृष्ट श्वरादिकमिति । 278. This too has charm (only) for the unreflective, because those (objects seen in dreams) are re21, (5ays the siddhantim). Hence, there is 10thing contradictory (to our argument) even if they do not have a substrate. 279 , Now, the Sublater has been set forth in (re garding them as) real. It is not so (says the siddhantin), because of the acceptance of production and destruction (for the dream1-objects) 280. Nor is there the contingence of the cognition: of (dream-objects) before (and) after; for insta17taneous Imess is possible, as for 1ightning, etc. 281. If it be said that there should in that case be the cognition of the material cause, etc., no (says siddhantir); for, impressions are the nthaterial cause And impressions being supersensible, their $1ot being cognised stands to reason. The efficient cause, ets. are tne unsen (potency), God, etc. वादावली

२८२. अतीन्द्रियकार्यस्यापि व्यणुकवंदुपलम्भः सम्भवति । अत एवान्तर्मनस उपलब्धिर्युज्यते २८३. निरधिष्ठानत्वमसिद्धम् , आत्मनोऽधिष्ठानत्वादिति चेन्न ; आत्मनोऽधिष्ठानत्वासंभवात् । २८४ . नात्मा जगदारोपाधिष्ठानम् ; अविषयत्वात् ; तद्विरुद्धतया प्रतीयमानत्वात् ; यथा पर्वतो न सर्षपारोपाधिष्ठानम् । २८५ . प्रपञ्वो वा नात्मन्यध्यस्तः, तद्विरुद्धतया प्रतीयमानत्वात् ; यथा सर्षपो न पर्वतेऽध्यस्तः । 282. Cognition is possible of the product of ever what is supersensible , as (in the case of) the Triad Hence t00, cognition by the mind within (the b0dy) 283. If it be said that (the proba11s) * the non existence of substrate' is not established, since the self is the substrate, no (5ays the siddhānti1), because the self cannot possibly be the substrate. 284. The self is not the substrate of the super imposition of the world, because it is not a content (of cognition), since it is cognised as the opposite of that (i.e., content), like the mountain not being the substrate of the super-imposition ) of the mustard 285. No is the universe superimposed on the self, because it is cognised as the opposite of that (i.e., self) just as the mustard seed is not superimposed on ५८ वादावली २८६. विरुद्धाकारंप्रतीतावध्यासाङ्गीकारे तस्य कदाप्यनिवृत्ति प्रसङ्गः । २८७. केिश्व यदि जगदात्मन्यारोपितं स्यात्तदात्मनो भिन्नत्वेन न दृश्येत । यद्यत्रारोपितं तत्ततो भिन्नत्वेन न प्रतीयते । यथा शुक्तिकाया मारोपितं रजतं न शुक्तिकाया भिन्नत्वेन प्रतीयते भ्रान्तौ । दृश्यते चेद मिदानीं जगदात्मनो भिन्नत्वेन । तस्मान्न तत्रारोपितमिति । २८८. किञ्च ब्रह्मणि प्रपञ्चस्यारोपितत्वं वदन्नन्यत्र प्रपञ्चस्य सत्तामङ्गीकरोति न वा ? २८९. आद्ये, परस्य मिथ्यात्वप्रतिज्ञाहानिः । न चेत्कस्य कुत्रा रोपः । न हि शशविषाणं कचिदारोप्यते । 286. If the superimposition be admitted (evel) where there is cognition of an opposite form, there is the continger1ce of its (illusio1) being 101-rem()vable at any time (says the siddhantin). 287 . Further, if the universe be superimposed on the self, then it would not be cognised as different from the self. Where one is super-imposed on another, that (former) is not cognised as different from that (latter), just as the si]ver superimposed on the shel] is not cognised as different from the shell, in delusion And this universe is now cognised as different from the self. Hence it is not superimposed thcre01. 288. Besides, in saying that the universe is super imposed o7 Brahman, do they admit the reality of the universe elsewhere, or do they 16ot ? 289. In the first case, there is the abandomment of the premised illusorin६४ss of the latter (universe) वादावली २९०. नास्माभिरन्यत्र सत प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मण्यारोपोऽभिधीयते येन सर्वमिथ्यात्वप्रतिज्ञाहानिरापद्येत । किन्त्वनिर्वचनीयरूपः कश्चिदनात्मा कारोऽयं प्रपञ्चो ब्रह्मण्यारोपित इत्यङ्गीक्रियते इति चेन्न । २९१ . अनात्माकारः प्रपञ्च इति कोऽर्थः ? किमात्मनोऽन्य ? उतात्मविरुद्धः ? उतात्माभावो वा ? २९२. नाद्यद्वितीयौ ; कचित्प्रपञ्चस्य सत्यतापातात् । न तृतीयः आत्मन्यात्माभावारोपस्य काप्यदृष्टत्वात् । न हि कश्चिदहमहं न भवामीति भ्रान्तो दृश्यते । f there is 10) (such reality of the universe elsewhere), of what is the super-imposition a17d where ? There is indeed no super-imposition somewhere of the horms of the hare. 290. By us (Advaitiइns) is not declared the super-imposition of a universe, which is real elsewhere, cor Brathrman, in which case, there would result the abandor1ment of the premised illus०rimess of every thing. It is on the other hatnd admitted that the universe, which is something indeterminable by nature and of the form of the mot-self is superimposed on Brahman.' If this be said, no (says the siddhantium) . 291 . What is the meaning of (the expression) tha11 the self, or opposed to the self, or the 1011 exister1ce of the self ? 292. . It is not the first arld the second because of the contingence of the reality of the universe in 5001e place. Not the third, because the super-imposition ८ ८ २९३. विमत अंत्मा आत्माभावारोपाधिष्ठानं न भवतेि ; आत्म त्वाद्देवदत्तवत् । २९४. ननु निष्प्रधानत्वमसिद्धम्; पूर्वपूर्वप्रपञ्चस्योत्तरोत्तरमञ्चारोपे प्रधानत्वादिति चेन्न ; असत्वात् । एवमनेकानुमानप्रतिहतत्वान्न दृश्यत्वानुमानं समञ्जसमिति सिद्धम् । २९५ . अस्य पटस्यावयवित्वादिनैतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगि त्वसाधनमप्यत्यन्ताभावस्य निष्प्रतियोगिकत्वेन बाधितम् । on-existence of the self in the self is nowher cognised. Indeed, no one is found to have the delu sion * I am not myself 293. The self u11der dispute cannot beco11e the substrate of the super-imposition of the 101-existence of the self, because it is the self, like Devadatta. 294. Now, if it be said that (the probams) * 10t having an archetype ' is not established, because each prior universe is the archetype for every subseguent super-imposition of the universe, no (says the siddhan titl), because of unreality. Since in this way the inference with (the probarns) “ cognisability' is refuted by many an inference it is established that it (the inference) is not sound. 295. Even the establishment of this cloth being the counter-correlate of the absolute 101-existence present in these threads through its being what has वादावली ८१ २९६. एततन्तुषु नास्तीति साधने सिद्धसाधनम् ; कार्यकारण यारभन्दन्नाधारराधयिभावाभावात् । २९७ . एतत्तन्तुकायै न भवतीति साधनेऽकार्यत्वस्यान्यकार्यत्वस्य वा सिद्धयार्थान्तरत्वम् । आकाशादिषु चैवंप्रयोगाभावेन सर्वजगन्मिथ्या त्वासिद्धिश्च । २९८. किञ्च किमत्र पटस्यासत्वमापाद्यते ? संसर्गनिषेधो वा क्रियते ? नाद्य: ; त्वद्दर्शनविरोधात् । the parts ( i.e., the whole) etc ., is sublated by absolute 101-existence not havir1 a counter-correlatc. 296. In establishing that it (the cloth) does not exist in these threads, there is (the defect of) the establishment of the established; for, there being mor: difference of cause a11d effect, there is the 101-existe1ce 297 . In inferring “this is not the effect of threads' there is something else (proved) by establishing mon producedness, or production by something else. And ether, etc., there is the 101-establishment of illusor mess in respect of the entire universe. 298. Besides, here is there adduced the uाreality of the cloth or is there denied the relation (of the cloth to the threads)? Not the first, because it is opposed to your (Advaitir1's) school of th७ught. २९९. सत्त्वमात्रं निषिध्यते, नासत्त्वमापाद्यते इति चेन्न ; तन्निषेधे तद्वौव्यात् । सत्त्वनिषेधे चैतत्तन्तुनिष्ठपदवैयथ्र्यम् । ३००. न च सिद्धसाधनतापरिहारार्थ विशेषणमिति वक्तव्यम् । एतत्पटात्यन्ताभावस्यास्माकमसिद्धेः । एतेन दृष्टान्तोऽपि साध्यविकलतया प्रत्युक्तो वेदितव्यः । ३०१. ननु पटान्तरस्यात्यन्ताभावो न चेत्, पटः किं न स्यात् ? किमत्र पटसंसर्गः स्यात्पटो वा ? ३०२ . आद्ये व्यास्यसिद्धिः । द्वितीये सिद्धसाधनम् । 299. If it be said that reality alone is dermied, but that 17reality is not adduced, it is not so (says the siddhāntin) ; for, when that (reality) is denied there is stability for that (unreality). And if reality be demied, there would be th0 futility of the words * present in 300 . Nor may it be said that the attribute is (used) to remove (the defect of) the establishment of the establish(ed ; for th1c absolute morn-existence of this cloth is not established for us (the Dvaitins). By this, the example to० is to be understood to have been refuted as dcvoid of the probandum 3011 . Now, (asks the objector) if (७f another cloth there is no absolute non-existence (in these threads), then why should not that other cloth exist (there)? Here, (asks the siddhantin), would there be the relatio1 ship with the cloth, or the cloth (itself) ?० 302 . In the first case, there is 10 establishment of the pervasion. In the second case, there is (the defest.of) the establishment of the established

• . ३० ०३ .

नाप्युतरः; तन्तुपटसंसर्गाभावस्य सिद्धत्वात् । वादावली ३० ४. अथायं पट एतत्तन्तुजन्यो न भवतीति प्रतिज्ञावाक्यार्थः स्यात् तर्हि तस्यांशित्वमपि न स्यादिति हेतोरसिद्धिः स्यात् । 303. ३०५ . न तत्त्वतस्तदप्यस्तीति चेन्न ; अतात्विकावयवित्वस्या स्माकमसिद्धेः । इह तन्तुषु पट इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षविरुद्धं चैतत् । ३०६. नन्विह नभसि नीलिमेति प्रत्यक्षाभिमतप्रत्ययबाधेना रूपित्वानुमानप्रवृत्तिवदत्रानुमानप्रवृत्युपपत्तिः किं न स्यादिति चेन्न । Not the ८३ latter too (.८, demial (of relation) threads and the cloth is established. 304 . If, then, th0 meaning of the premised state Iment is “ this cloth is not produced (out of those threads ', in that case, it would 10t even be (the probams) * what has the parts ; so there would be the non-establishment of the probams . 305. If it be said that in reality that t00 is 10t there, no (says the siddhantin) ; for *being what has the parts and non-real' is 102 established for us (D)vaiti1s). AInd this is in conflict with such percep tions as * here in the threads there is cloth 306. Now if it be asked, * 1ike the fp1ctioning of the inference (७f colourlessness sublating what is co7 sidered the perceptual cognitioth of blueness here i71 the sky, here t0 why should not the functioning of inference be intelligible ?' 106 (says siddhanti9). - ८४ ३०७. तथा सति दहनशैत्यानुमानादेरप्यप्रतिबद्धप्रसरेण बाधपरि भाषापरिमोषापातात् । ३०८. उभयवादिसम्प्रतिपन्नप्रामाण्यं प्रत्यक्षादौ जाग्रति बाधः सुखं प्रसरेदिति चेत्-तत्किं प्रकृते प्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्यानभ्युपगमे कारणम् ? ३०९. अनुमानविरोध इति चेत्समं दहनशैत्यानुमानेऽपि । न च प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानबाधितत्वे दृष्टान्तं पश्यामः । नभोनीलिमप्रतीतिभ्रमताप्याग माद्यवगम्यैव, अनुमानस्याप्रसरात् । ३१०. तथाहि महत्वान्नभसो रूपं निषिध्यते, अगन्धवत्वाद्वा, स्पशेरहितत्वाद्वा । न त्रयमपि ; तत एवाशब्दत्वप्रसङ्गात् । 307 . [f वादावली s७, when even inferences like (the orme) there will result the doing away with the momenclature 308. If it be said that sublation carा function easily while there remains a.wake perception, etc., whose valid ity is accepted by both the disputants, then, in the present case, what is the cause for not accepting the validity of perception ? 309 . If it be said that it is the conflict with in ference, it is the same even in the i।ference of the coldness of fre. (A11d we know of 10 example, where perception is sublated by inference. Even the delu siveness of the cognition of the blue colour in the sky is known o11ly through scripture, since inference does ot function here. 310. It is thus : is the blue colour of the sky denied because it is gross (malhatvāt), or because it ३११ , अथ तत्रागमविरोधः, तरूपित्वमपि तस्यागमसिद्धमेव, नानुमानादिति । तस्मात्कालातीततादोषं कचित्स्वीकुर्वतात्रापि समानन्याय तया सा चाभ्युपेयैव । ३१२. किञ्च जगतो मिथ्यात्वाभावे न बाधकं पश्यामः । सत्यत्वे कथं प्रकाशेत । न तावत्स्वत :, जडत्वात् । नापि परतः, प्रकाशान्तरेण सम्बन्धाभावात् । असम्बद्धस्य प्रकाशनेऽतिप्रसङ्गात् । is devoid (f sme]], or because it is devoid of touch ? Not any one of the three, since even from this (proba1s) there is the contigence of demying (the guality of) $0und (in respect of the ether) 311. If (therm) there is contradiction (for the in ference that establishes the fact that sky is not. the abode of sound) by scripture, then its colourlessness t00 certain]y results from socripture, not from inference And th1erefore by (him1) who accepts the defect (of adducing (the probams) 1after the apse of the (proper) time (.8. Sublation), in some place, that (defect) must Imecessarily be accepted here too (in the present case) by parity of reasoning. 312. Besides, we (the Dwaitins) do not know of any sublater in (accepting) the non-existence of the i!!uscoriness of •the universe. If real, b0)yw cam it be Imanifest ? • Not by its ow I self, because it is imert ; nor by another, because there is no1-existence of relation with another manifestor. If what is non-relate८-(to a ८६ " ३१३. असत्वे तु चित्प्रकाशारोपेितस्याधिष्ठानाध्यस्तत्वसम्बन्धेन प्रकाशोपपत्तिरितेि चेन्न ; विचारागोचरत्वात् । ३ १४ . तथाहि-कथं प्रकाशेतेति कोऽर्थः ? कथं प्रकाशः स्या दिति वा ? कथं प्रकाशाश्रय इति वा ? कथं प्रकाशविषय इति वा ? ३१५ . न प्रथमद्वितीयौ ; अनभ्युपगमात् । तृतीयेऽपि किं प्रकाश शब्देन चैतन्यं विवक्षितम् ? वृत्तिर्वा ? ३१६. नाद्य ; चैतन्याविषयत्वेऽपि बाधकाभावात् ; वृत्तिविषय वादावली Imanifestor) should manifest, then there would be (the defect of) undue extension 313 . “ If, however, it is (regarded as) unreal (illusory) its manifestation is intelligible by the relation of substrate and super-imposition thereon for (the universe) which is superimposed on the self-luminous consciousness ;' if this be said, 10 (says the sid dhāntin); for it is beyond the sphere of (comprehension by) inguiry. 314. 1t is as follows : what is the meaning of

• how ca11 it be manifest  ? Is it (1) * how does it

become manifest '? (2) * or how is it the substrate of manifestation1 ? or (3) * how is it the content of

• *

315. Not the first and the second, because they are not accepted. In the third too, is * consciousness,' or psychosis the meaning intended by the word

• manifestation? ? ? •

316. Not the first ; for, though not the content of वादावली त्वेनैव व्यवहारोपपत्तेः । चैतन्यस्यापि स्वाभाविकं भविष्यतीति को दोषः ? ३१७ . असङ्गश्रुतिस्तु परमेश्वरस्य पापादिसम्बन्धाभाववादिनी । ३१८. न द्वितीयः, करणसामर्थेन विषयविषयिभावोपपत्तेः । ३१९. किञ्च अध्यस्तत्वेन प्रकाशने जीवेऽध्यासपक्षे सर्वदा प्रकाशः स्यात् । ब्रह्मण्यध्यासे न कदाचित् । ३२०. बहुजीवपक्षेऽपि जीवेऽध्यासे सर्वदा सर्वेषां प्रपञ्चः प्रकाशेत । ब्रह्माधिष्ठानत्वे तु न कस्यापि कदापि । being the content of the psych0sis, the empirical usage (of immediacy) is intelligible. (Again) what is the defect in (regarding) consciousness too as (manifesting what is) naturally (related to it, not 011y what is super imposed thereon) ? 317 . On the other hand, as for the scriptural statement of non-relation (of the Purus), that is to be t:{ken as declaring the 1101-existence of relatedless of sir, etc. t() the supreme 1Lord . 318. Not the second, because by thc efficiency of the instru 1ent there is intelligibility (secured) for the subject-object relation (between the psychosis and the world) 319. Besides, if the manifestation by super-i17 position be 011 the view that the super-imposition is in the individual self (Jiva), there would be manifestation at all times. (On the view of super-imposition on [Brahma1, never (would there be manifestation) 320. Even on the view of a plurality of individual selves, if the super-imposition be on the individual self, ( ८८ वादावली ३२१. तथापि सत्यत्वे दृश्यत्वं न युज्यते दृग्दृश्ययोः संसर्गनिरूप णादिति चेन्न । ३२२ . संयोगासम्भवे समवायवदन्यस्यापि तयोरसम्भवे कल्प्य त्वात्, विषयविषयिभावस्य सम्भवात् । ३२३ . न च तदनिरूपणम् । ज्ञानजन्यफलाधारत्वलक्षणं तत्त प्रतीतियोग्यत्वं विषयत्वमस्त्विति चेत्त–तत्फलं ज्ञातता व्यवहारो वा ? ३२४. नाद्य: ; अतीतादौ तदसैभवेनाविषयत्वापत्तेः । न द्वितीयः गगनादावभावादिति । the world would be manifest to a]] at a11 times ; if the substrate, however, be Brahman, to 10 ote 21d at 10 time (would it be manifest) 321. If it be said that even the1, if (the 1 1 verse is) real, cognisability (as probarns) would not be appropriate, since To relation is dermor:strated as be tween cognition and the cognised, no (says the sid 322. For, just as inherence (is assumed) where conjunction is impossible, there may be assurmed eve1 another relation, wher1 these two are not possible (and) hence the subject-७bject relation is possible. 323 Nor is it undemonstrated. To be respec tively fit for different cognitions, as being the substrate of the fruit generated by (those) cognitions, let this be (the definition of) being the content of cognition ;' if this be said, is the fruit cognisedness or empirical usage ? 324. Not the first ; for this being impossible in past १jects, etc., there is the contingence of their being ३२५. मैवम्; अतीतादौ ज्ञातताभ्युपगमे विरोधाभावात् ; अन्यथा तद्वयवहारायोगात् । ३२६. अतीतादावनुगतविषयत्वं नास्तीति चेत्, प्रतिनियत भेवास्तु । ८९ ३२ ७ . व्यवहारोऽपि तत्तद्योग्यमेव ज्ञानजन्यफलं किं न स्यात् ? तस्मान्नानुमानं विश्वमिथ्यात्वे मानम् । ३२८. ननु सत्यत्वे प्रपञ्चो ब्रह्मणो भिन्नः ? अभिन्नः ? भिन्ना भिन्न: ? भिन्नाभिन्नविलक्षणो वा ? . 110t the content of cognition. Not the second, because it is not fou11d in respect of sky, etc. ({which cannot be taken up, rejected, etc.) 325 . Not so (says the siddhārtin) ; for, in the acceptance of cognisedness in respect of past (objects, etc., there is no conflict ; because, otherwise there is impossibility of empirical usage in respect of them 326. If it be said that in respect of past. objects, etc., th0ere is no common contentness (visayatvan ), (then) let it be different for each (class of objects), (says XXX 327. Why should there not be empirical usage also as cognitio1-generated fruit suited to respective capacities ? Therefore inference is not an authority in respect of the illus0riness of the universe. 328 . * Now, if the universe is rel, is it different from Brahman, or non-different (from Braj टता), or ३२९ . आछे भेदपंरम्परयानवस्था । द्वितीयेऽपसिद्धान्तः । तृतीये व्याघातः । चतुर्थेऽनिर्वाच्यता—इति चेन्न ; भेदस्य स्वरूपत्वेनानवस्थाया अभावात् । ३३०. किचैवं सति ब्रह्मण्यपि प्रपश्चाद्विन्नमभित्रं वेत्यादिदोषा समा एक । ३३१. *नेह नाना ? इत्यागमोऽस्तु विश्वमिथ्यात्वे मानमिति चेन्न ; तस्य ब्रह्मणि नानात्वनिषेधपरत्वात् । different and non-different, or other than differe1t. १1d 329 . * In the first case, through the chair1 of differ ences, there is infinite regress . In the second case, there is opposition to) (one's ow7 doctrine . In the third case, there is contradiction. In the fourth case, there is imdeterminability.' If this be said, 10 (says the siddhā11tirा). For, difference being the very mature: (of the thing) there is non-existence of infrite regress . 330. Further, in this case, there is certainly parity of such defects, even (in guestions) as to whether xxx ] 331. If it be said * Let scriptural statements like

• Here there is no manifoldimess (Nelha mana )', etc., be

the authority in respect of the illusoriः ess of the uni verse,' 10, (says the siddhantiा) ; for, that (scriptural statement) has for purport the denial of manifoldings ३३२. न ब्रह्मणि नानात्वं प्रसक्तं यन्निषेध्यते इति चेत् ; हन्त ! तथा सति त्वयाप्येकमेवाद्वितीथमित्यादेः स्वगतनानात्वनिषेधपरत्वमभ्युपगतं ३३३. नानाशब्दस्य भावप्रत्ययान्ताभावान्नेति चेन्न ; *मुक्तोप पृप्यव्यपदेशात् ?' इत्यादौ भावप्रत्ययाभावेऽपि तदर्थदर्शनात् । ३३४ . तर्हि * एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' इत्यागमोऽस्तु मानभत्रेति चेन्न ; अद्वितीयपदस्य सजातीयवस्त्वन्तरनिषेधपरत्वात् । 332 . * Im IBrah॥matm there is 10 contingence of Imanifoldness, which could be deried.' 1f this be said, a1as ! (says the siddhanti) in that case, how can it be २ccepted by you (Advaitin) that the demi2.1 of the 17anifoldness present in (Brahman) itself is the purport of such (texts) as * (FBrah11a11 is) (one only without a second ? A11d (it is 50) because there is the con tingence of non-commencement of the discussion of the impartite (sense), (since according to the Advaitin there is no c011 timgetuce of difference in Brahm1am) ॐSS (mānā) there is the 107-existence of the termination (implying the sense) of an abstract nouा7, it is not so, 10 (says the siddhantir1); for, ever in the absence of a suffix conveying the sense of an abstract mourn, in the aph0 rism1. 'Because of the teaching of being the object that is attained by the released sclves (Muktopas!pyavya padesat)' there is seen that selse (of an abstract moun) • 334. Then, if it be said that revealed statements (agarma) 1ike “ one only without a second,';"can be ३३५ . एकत्वविशेषणेनैव सजातीयस्य निषिद्धत्वात्रैवमिति चेन्न; तस्यैकत्वसंख्याविधानपरत्वात् । ३३६. एका संख्यैकोऽभाव इत्यादिप्रयोगासम्भवो नास्मान् प्रति प्रौढिमावहति । ३३७ . अनन्तपदं च देशकालान्तवत्वाभावपरम् ; तत्रैव व्युत्पन्न त्वात् । ३३८. अन्तशब्दस्य देशतः कालतो वस्तुतः परिच्छिन्ने व्युत्पन्न the authority here (in respect of the illus0riness of the universe), no (says the siddhantin), because, the expressior। “ without a scc011d ' has for Purport the der1ial (of another entity of the same class. 335. If it be said that it is not so, since the de1ial (of another) of the same class is secutred eve1 by the attribute , one (only), 10 (says the siddhantin); for it (the word, orne) has got for purport the affirmat tion of unity in 1umber. 336. The Impossibility of usages like “ the num ber is 0 1e', 101-existence is one', does not convey 21y challe1ge to us (since unlike Logicia11s- Tarkikas - we do not hold that gualities, inhere1ce, etc., ca1) have 10 gualities and that substance alone can have पृualities like number). 337. And the word unlimited (ana11ta) has for purport (only) the non-existence of limitation in space and time ; for that alon& is its etymological sigificance. 338. “ Since the word, limit (anta) has for its etymol७४ al significance, 'what is limited in space or त्वात्तस्य नञ्समासे त्रिविधस्याप्यन्तस्य निषेधकत्वोपपत्तौ पृथग्व्युत्पत्तिन पेक्षितेति चेन्न; अन्तशब्दस्योक्तत्रयेऽव्युत्पन्नत्वादिति । तस्मात्सत्यभेद चेतनाचेतनात्मनो विश्वस्य हरिः कर्तेति निराबाधमवस्थितम् । ३३९ . ननु कथं भेदसत्यता युक्तिमती ? * विमता आत्मानः परमात्मनः परमार्थतो न भिद्यन्ते ; आत्मत्वात्, परमात्मवत् ?' इत्यनुमानेन विरोधादिति चेन्न ; आत्मत्वस्य प्रागेव निरस्तत्वात् । it1 tim) , (or " by (a110ther) object, whc1 there is a com pou11d (formed) with the negative particle, (therewith) it is intelligible that there is derial of eve1 all the three limitations ; hoence there is 1७ necessity for a separate etymology (for the word unlimited)'. If this be said, 10) (says the siddhantin); for, the word unlimited has 10 etymological significance is respect of all the said three (senses), (but only in respect of the first two). Therefore, it is established without any obstruc tion that of the tworld of real (ferences, of the form of the ser1tients and the 701-scrtients, 1ari is the creator. 339. Now, how d0cs the 'reality of difference stand to 1easorm, since (that difference) is in confict with the inference “ the selves (Atmans) under dispute are not in reality different from the supreme self (Parammatma1) because of self-hood (Atmatva) like the supreme elf (ParamātIman) '?* If this be asked, no (says the siddhāratin), because (the probans) self-hood has been already refuted. ९४ ३४०. विमतं तात्विकस्वान्तर्भदहीनं मतत्वतः । यदित्थं तत्तथा यद्वत्खं तथेदं ततस्तथा अस्तु तर्हि ३४२ . न्तस्य । इत्यनुमानविरोध इति चेन्न, विचारागोचरत्वात् । वादावली ३४१. तथाहि-किमत्र स्वान्तर्भदहीनताशब्देन प्रत्येकं पदार्थानां स्वगतभेदराहित्यमुच्यते ? उत भेदाधिकरणत्वविरहः ? 340. नाद्य: ; सिद्धसाधनत्वात् । नोत्तरः; साध्यविकलत्वाद्दृष्ट)

• The thing under dispute is devoid (of real]

difference within itself, because it is cog misable ; that which is thus (cognisable) is so (dlevoid of real difference), like ether ; so is this (thing in dispute); therefore it [Let the confict be with this inference.' If this be said , 1० (says the siddhantin) ; for, it cannot stand incuiry . 341. It is thus' here by the expression “ devoid ८०f difference within itself ', is there stated separately the 101-existence of difference of each thing from it self, or (the thing) being devoid of (the quality) sub stratemess of difference ? 342 . Not the first, because of (the def४ct of) the establishtment of the established. Not the atter, since the वादावली ३४३. यथाकाशस्य स्वगतो भेदो नास्ति तथा जगदाख्ये पदार्थ समुदायेऽपि न तादृशभेद इति चेत् – अत्रापि कोऽर्थः ? यथाकाशस्या प्याकाशप्रतियोगिको भेदो नास्ति तथा जगतोऽपि तत्प्रतियोगिको भेदो नेत्यर्थाभ्युपगमे सिद्धसाधनम् । ३४४. अथ यथा घ टाकाशमठाकाशयोर्न भेदः, तथा जगदंशयोर पीति चेन्न; साध्यविकलत्वाद्दृष्टान्तस्य । व्योस्रोऽपि संयोगित्वेन सावय वत्वसाधनादित्यलम् । 343. [f it be said that just as the ether has 10 difference i7 itself, likewise the totality of things which goes u12der the 1ame * universe also has 10 such difference, here too, what is the meaning ? Just as the ether has no difference having the ether as its cou17ter correlate, likewise the universe also has no difference , having that (world itself) as its counter-correlate'. If this be the meaning accepted, there is (the defect of) the establishment of the establishced. 344. If them, it be said that just as there is no difference between the ether delimited by a pot and ether delimited by a monastry (Mutha) likewise there is 10 difference even between the parts of the universe, 10 (says the siddhantin), since, the example is devoid of the probandiumm; for, even of the ether (as for pot etc.) possession of parts is established, because of having conjunction (with others) . Hence, er10ugh (of this) भावात् । ३४५. भेदो मिथ्या भेदत्वाचन्द्रभेदवदित्यनुमानमस्त्विति चेन्न ; साध्यानिरुक्तः । दृष्टान्ते साधनविकलत्वञ्च । तत्र तद्वेदासत्वेन भेदत्वस्यैवा वादावली ३४६. परमार्थतस्तदभावेऽपि कथञ्चिदस्ति भेदः ; अतो भेदत्वम पीति चेन्न ; तादृशस्य भेदत्वस्य पक्षेऽनन्वयात् । ३४७. अवधूयैव बाधितत्वादिविशेषं भेदत्वसामान्यस्यैव हेतुतेति 345. If it he said that there can be the inference,

• difference is 1usory, because of the mature of differ

ence, like the difference of the moon (when delusively perceived as double)' no (says the siddhantim), since the probandum is not defined ; and the example t00 is devoid of probans ; for difference from there itself being unreal, the very nature (of difference is 346 . If it be said that though there is the m01 existence of that (difference) as absolutely real, differ. ence does exist somehow and consequently also the 17ature of difference, no (says the siddhāntin); for , 2 diffcrence of such character is 10t related to the subject. 347. If it be said that leaving out special features like sublatedness, etc., the generic character of differ ence **- one the probarns,'10 (says the siddhantin) . ३४८. धूमबाष्पयोधूमत्ववत्सामान्यस्याप्यभावात् । अन्यथानवधा रितचाधितत्वाबाधितत्वादिविशेषेण धूमवत्वमात्रेण हृदादेरपि सदहनतापातात् । ३४९ . अप्रमाणगम्यत्वमुपाधिश्च । भेदत्वादेव तदपि स्यादिति चेन्न ; प्रातिभासिकत्वस्याप्यापातात् । ३५०. अथात्र व्यवहारनिर्वाहकता प्रतीयते इति चेत्--तत्र प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणसिद्धतां च किन्न पश्यसि ? 348. For in thc case of smoke and vapour, a generic 17ature too is as much 101-existent as sा॥10keness (common to both). Otherwise, through the mere smoke 1es not ascertained to be particularised as sublated (or 11sublated or otherwise there is the c01ntingence of (the inference of) even a lake, etc., containing 349. And “ being not cognised by a means of valid knowledge ' is the adjunct. If it be said that that too is only because of being of the mature of difference, 10 (says the siddhantin) ; for there is the continger1ce even of the nature of mere appearance. 350. If then it be said that there is the cognition of being what brings about empirical usage in respect of that (difference ), then, why,do you 170t see als0 its being established by means of a valid k10wledge like perceptio7, etc. ? वादावली ३५१. ननु कथं प्रत्यक्षस्य भेदग्राहकत्वम् ? तकिं भेदमेव गोचरये दत वस्त्वपि ? ३५२. नाद्य: ; धर्मिप्रतियोगिप्रतीतिमन्तरेण भेदप्रतिपत्तेरयोगात् । ३५३. द्वितीये किं भेदपूर्वं वस्तु वस्तुपूर्वं वा भेदं युगपद्धोभयं गोचरयेत् ? ३५४ . नाद्य: ; दत्तोत्तरत्वात् । न द्वितीय: ; बुद्धेर्विरम्यव्यापारा योगात् । नापि तृतीय:; कार्यकारणबुद्धयोयौगपद्यायोगात् । ३५५. तत्तद्वेदस्य भेदान्तरभेदेऽनधस्थानम् । अनन्तभेदाभ्युपग मेऽपि मृलक्षतेरभावान्नानवस्थादोष इति चेन्न । 351. Now, how can percepti01 1ead to the cogni tion of difference ? Does that (perception) have as sphere the difference alone or the thing (.e., the sub strate of the difference) t00 ? 352. Not the first, because it is । impossible to have the cognition of difference, without the cognition of the substrate ar1d the counter-correlate. 353. In the second case, does it have as sphere (i.e. cognise) the difference prior to the thing, or the thing prior to difference or both simultaneously ? 354 . Not the frst, because the reply has been already given. Not the second, because delayed func tioning is impossible for the intellect . Not the third also, because simultaneity is impossible for two cogni tions that are cause and effect . 355. If a particular difference (say between the cloth -eि pot) from the differents (be recognised) ३५६ . अयमितो भिन्न इति वानयोभेद इति वा ? ३५७. नाय: ; विशिष्टत्वेनैव प्रतीतिनियमात् । न द्वितीयः, भेदे नैव विज्ञातस्य विशेषणत्वात् । ३५८. ततश्च पूर्वपूर्वभेदप्रतीतिमन्तरेणोत्तरोत्तरभेदाप्रतीतेरनन्तत्वा द्युगपत्प्रतीतेरयोगाच मूलक्षतेरनवस्था सुस्थैवेति । वादावली through another difference, there is infinite regress. If it be said that since even on the acceptance of infinite differences there is 101-existence of (the defect) of cutting-2t-the-root (of the argument), the infinite regress is 10t a dcfect, no (says the Advaitin) 356. (In what form is difference cognised,) whether this is different from that (er1ce between these two ' ? 357. Not the first, because of the 11 variability ()f the cognition (us “ this ' and ' that') being only as (५ualifed (by difference), (so that cognition of difference, and the cognition of its substrate pre-suppose each (७ther in an endless series). Not the second, because the gualification (* between these two') is only what is (already) cognised as different. 358. Therefore, since each later difference is not cognised in the absence of the comgnition of the prior differer1ce, because of the infinitude (cf these) and because the simultaneous cognition (of these) is im1 possible , *there is the cuttirg-at-the-root (of the argument) ; hence inffrite regress is certainly well established (as a defect) 5 १ ३५९. विद्यमानभेदस्य स्वरूपेण गृहीतस्य विशेषणतोपपत्तौ किं भेदाप्रतीतिः करिष्यतीति चेन्न । ३६०. दूरस्थवनस्पत्योः क्षीरनीरयोर्वा स्वरूपतो विद्यमानभेदयोरपि स्फुरतोः संयुक्तत्वादिप्रतीत्यदर्शनात् । ३६१. तत्र समानाभिघातदोषादप्रतीतिरिति चेन्न; विद्यमानभेदयो स्वरूपेण स्फुरतोर्विशेषणविशेष्यभावग्रहणस्थलस्य सम्प्रतिपन्नस्याभावात् । ३६२. किञ्च धर्मिणो भिन्नत्वेन प्रतीतस्य प्रतियोगिता ? अप्रती तस्य वा ? वादावली 359 . * When it is intelligble that difference which exists and has been cognised as thoe very nature (of the substrate), is the qualification, what ca11 the 101 cognition of difference do '? If this be asked, 10 (says 360 . For, as between two trees at a . distance, or as between mi!k and water, although difference exists in their mature and although (they are) manifested, there is 10t seem the cognition of being in conjunction etc. 361. If it be said that the non-cognition there is 1because of the presence of the defect i.e., intermixture with things belonging to the same class, no (says the Advaitin), because of the non-existence of an admit ted instance where relation of qualification and sub strate is apprehended between existent differences and objects manifested as existent (svaruperma). 362 . Again does' the counter-correlatterness belong to what is cognised as different from the substrate.or to what's not cognised (as different) ? ३६३. नाद्य: ; परस्पराश्रयतापातोत् ; स्तम्भात्कुम्भभेदसिद्धौ कुम्भात् स्तम्भभेदसिद्धिरिति । ३६४. न द्वितीय: ; आत्मनोऽपि प्रतियोगितापातात् । ३६५ . ननु निर्विकल्पकसंविदि भेदस्य भेदिनोश्च युगपदङ्गुलि त्रयबदवभासे पुन: सविकल्पकधिया तद्विशेषणविशेष्यभावग्रहणोपपत्ते कथमितरेतराश्रय इति वेन्न । ३६६. निष्प्रतियोगिकभेदग्रहणस्यैवायोगात् ; सर्वदा प्रतियोगि . घटित एव तस्मिन्प्रमाणप्रसरात् । १०१ 363. Not the first, because of the contimgence of reciprocal dependence in that the differe11ce of the pillar from the p0t is established (only) when there is established the difference of the pot from the pillar 364. Not the second, because of the contimgence of (the substrate of difference) itself bec017ing the 365.

• Now when in the indeterminate cognition

e1ce and the differents like (the cognition of) three fingers, since it is intelligible that, by the determinate cognition there is further the apprehension of the sub strate-attribute relation between them, how is there (the defect of) reciprocal dependence ? ' If this be asked, 10) (says the siddhantin). 366. Far, the very cognition of difference, with out the counter-correlate, is impossible, since alvays the mears of valid knowledge function1s in respect of it (the difference) only as bound with a counter-9relate. १०२ वादावली ३६७. किञ्च किमयं भेदो भिन्नमेव धर्मिणं परिभते ? उता भिन्नम् ? नाद्य: ; अनन्तभेदाभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गात् । ३६८ . सन्त्वनन्तभेदा: ; किं नश्छिन्नमिति चेन्न । ३६९. तेऽनन्ताः किं क्रमेण भेदा धर्मिणं परिरभन्ते ? युगपद्वा ? ३७०. नाद्यः; क्रमेण परिभमाणानन्तभेदसम्बन्धाय धर्भि णोऽनादिनित्यतापातात् ; प्रतिक्षणमेकैकभेदसम्बन्धेऽप्यनन्तक्षणवृत्तित्वस्य दुष्परिहरत्वात् । 367. Further, does this difference pertai7 to a substrate different from it, or that which is 101-dif eिrent from it? Not the frs, because of the conti gence infinite differences. of the acceptance of 368. If it be asked, “ Let there be infinite differ ences ; what is the harm to us (the Dvaitin) ?' no (says the Advaitin). 369. Those infाite differences, do they pertain to the substrate (of difference) in sequence, or simulta 1e0usly ? 370. Not the first, because of the contingence of the substrate becoming beginningless and eternal, for the sake of relation of the infmite differences that per taim to it in seguence. For, though at every single Imoment there is the relation (only) to a single ifference, it is impossible to remedy the existence (of the substrate) for an infinity of moments; वादावली १०३ ३७१. न द्वितीय: ; भिन्ने भेदस्थितिरिति पक्षक्षते: ; भेदसम्बन्धं विना भिन्नत्ववाचोयुक्तरयुक्तत्वात् । ३७२. तत्सम्बन्धेनैव च भिन्नत्वे केन भेदेन विशिष्ट कस्य भेदस्य स्थितिरिति नियामकाभावात्तेषां कलहात्रैकोऽपि भेदो निविशेत् । तथापि चेन्छद्धाजडोऽनन्तभेदानभ्युपैति, तदाभ्युपैतु यदि भेदपरम्परा संविद मध्यारोहेत् । ३७३. न द्वितीयः; विरोधादेव, सर्वत्राप्यतिप्रसङ्गाच । ३७४ . धर्मिणं परिरभ्यैव भेदो जायते; अतो नोक्तदोष इति चेत 371. Not the second ; for there is destructi७r of the position that in the different there abides the differ ence. For, the verbal desigmation of differe1ce in th0c absence of relation to does not stard to 372. And if there bc difference (only because () relation to that (difference), since there is nothing to regulate as to for what there exists difference, (and) as qualifed by what difference, there would be discord among those (differences) ; hence not even a single differe11ce will enter into that (substrate). If still the dull man of faith admits infinite differences, let him) admit them if the succession of differences get on to (his) consciousness. 373. Not the second, ever because of contradic. tion, and beeause of the countingence of undue exten sion in respect of all things . । 374. If it be said that the cognition of difference is born only as pertaining to the substrate.3and that १०४ –मैवम्; धर्मिणा सहैव धमत्पत्तेरनभ्युपगमात् । अभ्युपगमे चोत्पन्न द्रव्यं क्षणमगुणं तिष्ठतीति कल्पनावयथयात् ; गुणानां द्रव्यजन्यत्वे धर्माणामपि तथात्वात् । ३७५ . तस्मान्न भेदे प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणम् । यदा तु भेदे न प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाणं तदा का वार्ता तत्पादोपजीविनो वराकस्यानुमानस्याप्रमाणतायाम् । ३७६. आत्मभेदस्तु न प्रमाणगन्धमनुभवति । न तावत्तत्र प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाणम् , परमात्मनोऽप्रत्यक्षत्वात् ; प्रत्यक्षाग्रत्यक्षभेदस्य वायुवनस्पतिसंयोग वदप्रत्यक्षत्वात् । therefore there is not the said defect, not so (says the Advaitin) ; for, the origination of attributes ever1 along with the substrates is not accepted ; because if it were accepted, the assumption that an originated substa11ce (and) because if (qualities (1ike colour) are generated by substance (as material cause), the same is the casc with attributes (ike difference) to 375. Therefore, in respect of difference, percep tion cam10t be the means of valid knowledge. When perception cannot be the means of valid knowledge in respect of difference, why talk about in validity of poor inference which lives at the feet of that (perception)? 376. As for differences of the self, that d0es 10t enjoy the slightest scent of any means of valid know ledge. Now, in respect of it (difference of the self) perception is [10t the means of valid k10owedge, be cause the supreme self is not perceived ; for the differ ence between the perceived and the umperceived is वादावली १०५ ३७७ . आत्मा आत्मप्रतियोगिकभेदवान्, आत्मत्वादित्याद्यनु मानस्य दृष्टान्तलाभदुष्टत्वात् । ३७८. विप्रतिपन्नानि शरीराणि स्वसंख्यासंख्येयात्मवन्ति, शरीर त्वादित्यस्यातीतानागतशरीरेषु व्यभिचारः । वर्तमानशरीरत्वहेतोयोंगिशरीरे व्यभिचारः । ३७९. व्यवस्थानुपपत्तेश्च दुर्निरूपत्वेन भेदासाधकत्वम्। तथाहेि किं व्यवस्थापदेन धर्मभेदो विवक्षितः? भिन्नाधिकरणधर्मभेदो वा ? विरुद्धत्वं वा ? imperceptible like the col1junction that exists between 377. (And it is 50) because a11 inference like ** the self has difference whose counter because it is the self,' is defective, 071 10ccount of the 101-existence of an example. 378. In the inference “ the bodies under dispute h:1.vt the selves whose number is to be fxed by their owrn number, because of being a body', there is inc01 sta11cy (of the probarIs) in respect of the past and the future bodies. As for the nature of a present body being the prob21s, there is inconstancy in respect of the b0dies of yogins (each of whom can animate more b0dies than (01e) 379. And distinction (of experienc६s) being u1 demonstrable because of unintelligibility, it carm10t establish difference. It is thu5 ; what is it that is meant by the term “ distinction ? ' 1s it the differe11ce between the attributes (in substrates) that are &#fferent , १०६ ३८०. नाद्यः; धर्मिभेदाभावेऽपि धर्मभेदोपपत्तेः । न द्वितीयः; परस्पराश्रयत्वात् । ३८१. न तृतीय: ; *नाजात एकोऽन्यं हन्ति, नाप्यन्यमन्याधार ' इति न्यायेन सहावस्थानापेक्षणात् । तस्मान्न जडात्मनां भेदसिद्धिरिति । ३८२ . अत्र प्रष्टव्यम्--किं भेदस्य प्रतीतिरेव निराक्रियते ? उत तस्याः कारणजन्यता ? निदषकरणजन्यता वा ? the difference tween the attributes in differe substrates, or is it contrariety ? 380. Nof the first, for, though there is 101-exist ence of difference between substrates, difference Imong the attributes is intelligible. Not the second, because of the defect of reciprocal dependence. 381. Not the third, for 011 the principle that a thing which is not born docs not kill another, nor does one (destroy) what is in a different substrate, there is 1e d for the c0-existence of the contraries (in the same locus). Therefore there is no establishment of difference in respect of the i१ert und in respect of X. 382. Here it must be asked whether the cognition of difference itself is rejected, or its being originated by a cause, or its being originated by a non-defective istrument ? वादावली १०७ ३८३. नाद्यः; भेदस्य प्रतीतिमनुपजीव्य निराकर्तुमशक्यत्वात् । न द्वितीय: ; तत्किमजन्यतया स्यात्, अकारणजन्यतया अतत्कारणजन्यतया वा ? ३८४ . नाद्य: ; अनभ्युपगमात् ; भेदप्रतीतेर्नित्यतापतेः स्वप्राति कूल्याचरणप्रसङ्गाच । ३८५ . न द्वितीय : ; व्याघातात् ; तन्निवृत्तेरप्यकारणत्वापत्या प्रयायोगाश्च । ३८६ . नापि तृनीयः; तदुत्पादकस्यैव तत्कारणतया व्यवहारात् । न ह्यनुत्पादकादुत्पद्यते इति सम्भवति ; नाप्यन्योत्पादकात् । 383 . Not the first, because it is impossible to refute (difference ) without basing (oneself) on the cognition of difference. Not the second. Would that be because of mot being (originated (at al!), or because of not being (originated by a cause, or because of not being originated by that cause ? 384 . Not the first, because of not being admitted, and because, (or 20ccount of the contingence of the eternality of the cognition of difference, there is the contingence of the observance of what is opposed to yourselves (Advaitims). 385. Not the second, because of self-contradic tion ; and because, or account of the contingence of the removal of that (cognition) also being a non-cause, there is the impossibility of the effort (to attain release) 386. Nor even the third, since that which gives rise (to an object) is itself referred to as its cause . It cannot be that something is produced from what is not a producer or from the'producer of another. १०८ वादावली ३८७ . तृतीयेऽपि किं तर्केणैव सदोषत्वाध्यवसायः ? अथ स्फुटतर बाधकवशात्? ३८८ . नाद्य:; वेदान्तवाक्यवृत्तेरप्यविश्वसनीयतापातात् । दोष श्वात्राविचैव परस्येष्टा । सा च यदि वेदान्तानामपि मूलं तर्हि प्रत्यक्षे प्रद्वेषः किं निबन्धनः । ३८९ . . न द्वितीयः; निरवकाशस्य तस्यानुपलम्भात् । ३९०. कल्प्यमानमपि बाधकं किं भेदमेव गोचरयेत् ? उता भेदम् ? यद्वा यत्किञ्चित् , निरालम्बनस्यानुदयात् । 387 . In the third case t00 , is the defectiveness ascertained by counter argument or because of some more prominent sublater ? 388. Not the first, because of the contingence of the disbelief even in respect of psych0sis generated by scriptural state11ents. And the defect admitted here by the opponents (Advaitins) is unly 1escience. And if this (defect) be at the root of Vedantas to0, 'ther what is the cause of specia! a version t() perception ? 389. Not the second, because of the 101-cognition of such (sublaters) having 10 scope (for being explained away) 390. Even what is assumed as s1blatter, does it have for its sphere difference alone, or, non-diffe rerrce or something else, since what is baseless cannot वादावली ३९१ . नाद्यः; साधकत्वात् । द्वितीयेऽपि तदन्यः तद्विरोधी तद भावो वा नजर्थो वाच्यः । ३९२ . पक्षत्रयेऽपि दुष्परिहरो भेदः । भेदाभावप्राहिणापि प्रति योगिविलक्षणतया स्वविषयो व्यवस्थाप्यः । ३९३. नापि तृतीय: ; अविरोधादेव बाधकत्वायोगात् । ३९४. किञ्च नायं भेद इति वा, नास्त्यत्र भेद इति वा, अन्यदेव भेदात्मना प्रत्यभादिति वा, बाधकज्ञानेन भवितव्यम्; नेदं रजतं इत्यादिवत् । ३९५. तदेतत्सर्वथा भेदावगाहीति कथं तत्परिपन्थिभावमाकलयेत् । १०९ 391. Not the first, because it would establish (difference). In the second case t00, the negative particle must be stated to mean what is different from it, or what is opposed to it, or what is its non-existence. 392 . In all the three positions difference cannot be avoided. Even by one who apprehends the 101 content of his own (cognition) as different from the counter-correlate. 393 . Not the third, since even because of non conflict sublatership is not possible. 394. Again , “ this is not difference ; “ there is "mo difference here'; * some other thing itself is Imanifest as of the nature of difference': such must be the form of the sublating cognition, like the state 1ent * this is not silver, etc. , 395. Since this i7 every way comprehends differ ence, how ca11 it take on a nature inimica11 theret0 ? { ११० वादावली ३९६ . तस्मात्क्लप्तविषयत्वान्नानवस्थादेरूत्थानम् । उत्थितस्य वा भवेदाभासत्वम् । ३९७. पारमार्थिकभेदानभ्युपगमेऽपि व्यावहारिकाङ्गीकारेण विक ल्प्यनिराकरणोपपतिरिति चेन्न ; स किं प्रत्यक्षाद्याकलितो वा अन्यो वा यो निराक्रियते । ३९८ . आद्ये कथमङ्गीकृतस्य निराकरणम् ? अन्यश्चेन्निषिध्यताम्; न नो हानिः । ३९९ . न च प्रतिभासिक एवायं भेदः, अपसिद्धान्तापातात् । 396. Therefore, because of the content being determined (as validly known), there is no rise of (defects like) infrite regress, etc., or, in the case (of such as arise, there could only be the nature of 397 . If it be said that there is intelligibility of analysis and rejection, through the acceptance of the empirical reality (of difference) though there is the 10-1-acceptance of the absolute reality of difference, 1० (says the siddhāntirा). That (difference) which is rejected : is it what is established by perception, etc., or something else ? 398. In the first case, how can there be the rejec tion of that which is accepted ? If it is something else, 1et it be rejected ; there is no loss for us (Dwaitins) 399. Nor is this difference merely 'apparent , because of the contingence of opp0sition to their (Advaitins) doctrine वादावली ४०. नापि परप्रसिद्धया परबोधनम् , परस्य स्वक्रियास्वन्याय विरुद्धविकल्पसाधुत्वाप्रसिद्धचा बोधयितुमशक्थत्वात् । ४० १. कथश्चात्रापादनक्रमः ? यदि भेददर्शनं स्यात्, तदा अन्यो न्याश्रयादिकं स्थात् ; यदि भेददर्शनं वास्तवं स्यात्, तदा अन्योन्याश्रयादिकं स्यादिति वा ? यदि भेददर्शनं धम्र्यादिसापेक्ष स्यात्तहति वा ४०२. नाद्य: ; यदि भेददर्शनं न स्यात्तर्हि सकलव्यवहारविधुर परः प्रसज्यतेति प्रतिर्कपराहतत्वात् । १११ 400. Nor is it instruction of the opponent through what is established for the opponent; for there is 10 possibility of teaching the opponent because of the soundness of the alternatives not being established (for hium) in as much as they are unreasonable and conflict | * 401. What is the form of deduction (of the defect) here ? Is it that if there be the cognition of difference, then, there would be (defects like) recipr० cal dependence, etc., or that if the cognition of difference be true, there would be (defects like) recipro cal dependence, etc., or that if the cognition of dif. ference be dependent on the (cognition of) the sub strate, etc., the1, (there would be the defect of recipro cal dependence) ? 402 . Not the first, for, there is the refutation by the following. counter argument, against it, * If there were no cognition of difference, then there is the continge11ce of the opponent being devoid of a]] empirical usage ११२ ४०३. न द्वितीय: ; व्याप्तिवैकल्यात् । तृतीयेऽपि सापेक्षतामात्रं निवर्त्तताम् ; दर्शनस्य किमायातम् ? ४०४. प्रकारान्तरासम्भवात् स्वयमपि निवर्तते इति चेन्न; प्रका रान्तरेण निर्वाहकल्पनस्य शक्यत्वेन प्रतीतेरपह्नवायोगात् । अन्यथा स्वाभिल षितस्याप्यभेदस्यासिद्धेरुक्तत्वात् । ४०५. इयश्चात्र दर्शनस्थितिः--न भेदो युगधर्मः, किन्त्वेकस्य धर्मोऽपरेण निरूप्यः । 403. Not the second, because of the defect in respect of the pervasion (which is not established, thcre being 10 example). In the third case als0,1et the dependence alone disappear ; what (defect) (occurs to the cognition (of difference) ? 404 . If it be said that, because of the 101-exist ence of another mode (of arising) that (cognition of difference) t00 disappears, 10 (says the Advaitin), because it beirpg possible to ass117e 1710de , another of explanation, the denial of the cognition (of difference) is 10t reasonable; for it has been said that otherwise ever the 101-difference cherished by (the opponent) himself would be non-established XL 405. A11d this is the position of .the system in this 17atter, Difference is not a common. attribute . It is rather the attribute of one (object) indicated by ४०६. इमौ भिन्नावित्यत्रापि स्तम्भात्कुम्भस्थ भेदः, कुम्भात्स्तम्भस्य भेद इत्येवार्थः । ४०७. अनयोभेद इति तूभयधार्मिकं भेदद्वयमेव । एकवचनं तु अनयोः स्वरूपम्--इतिवत् । ४०८. स च भेदो धर्मिणस्वरूपमेव । अन्यथा स्वरूपं प्रतीयमानं सर्वात्मना प्रतीयेत । तथा चात्मन्यपि घटोऽहमिति प्रतीतिप्रसङ्गः । न हि दृष्टपदार्थस्य पुरुषस्य वस्त्वन्तरात्तस्य भेदे संशथः कचिद्दृष्टः । ४०९. न च सर्वतो व्यावृत्यनुभवे सार्वश्यापत्तिदोषः, सामान्यतः सर्वस्य साक्षिसिद्धत्वाङ्गीकाराच । 406. Even in (the statement) * these two are different the meaning is only the pillar is different from the pot a11d the p0t is different from pillar.' 407. As for (the statement) * the difference be tween the two ' (it denotes) only tw0 differences present (the usage) “ the existence (or nature - ११३

Savartipa) of the 408. And this difference is the very 1ature of the substrate. Otherwise a mature whe1 cognised wi]] be cognised as of the nature of all (things). And then there is the contingence of the cognitio7 “ I am a pot' even in respect of the self. Indeed, for *he individual] who has cog.lised a11 (object, there is nowhere seen any doubt regarding its difference from the other object. 409. Nor is there the defect that if there be the experience of difference fror all (others), there is the ११४ ४१०. अन्यथा सार्वत्रिकव्याप्तिपरिज्ञानासम्भवेन सर्वानुमानत कच्छेदप्रसङ्गः । ४११. वादावली न च विशेषज्ञानापेक्षा, भेदस्वरूपमात्रप्रतीतेस्तदनपेक्षणात्। ४१२. न च संशथाभावप्रसङ्गः, कुतश्चिद्वयावृत्तस्य वस्तुनः प्रती तावपि व्यावृत्तिविशेषाग्रहणवशादेव संशयोत्पत्तेः । अन्यथा सर्वकोटयवलम्बी सशयः स्यात् । contingence of Commiscience, because it is admitted that a]] objects are in their general nature established by witness (consciousness) 410. Otherwise, because of the impossibility of the proper cognition of pervation everywhere, there is the contingence of the destruction of all inferences and 411. And there is 10 need for kr10wledge of (all things) in their particularity ; for that is not necessary for the cognition of the mere existence (svatrtpa) of the difference. 412. Nor is there the contingence of the 101 existence of doubt. * For, though there is the cognition of a thing as different from some other, even because of the non-apprehension of the particular difference, there is intelligibility of doubt ; otherwise, (if difference were not at all apprehended) doubt would be in respect of a! possibilities (.८, in respect of a post, the doubt would be as to difference not merely from man, etc., but als0 from cloth, etc.) । ४१३. स्वरूपत्वेन च भेदस्यानेकप्रतीत्यभावान्नान्योन्याश्रयादेरव काशः । अस्ति तावत्, अस्तीदम्—इत्यत्र वर्तमानकालो वस्तुना सहैवानु भूयते साक्षिणेति । ४१४. तदुक्तम् तदेतदिति सर्वश्व दृश्यं वा स्मृतिगोचरम् । साक्षिसिद्धेन कालेन खचितं खेच वर्तते ॥ इति । ११५ ४१५. न ह्यानुमानिकः काल: ; कालसिद्धयसिद्धयोः सिद्धसाधना श्रयासिद्धिभ्यां तमेव पक्षीकृत्थानुमानस्थानुत्थानात् । 413. Since, difference being the very nature of the substrate, there is not more tha11 one cognition (to apprehend the thing and its differe1ce) there is no (0ccasion for (defects like) reciprocal dependence, etc. (In the cognitions) * 10w, there is ' (and) “ this is the present time (indicated by the word is) is certainly experienced together with the object (brought in) by the witness (consciousness). 414. That has been said (by Sri Madhva) : 415. inference (Things) cognised as ' that ' (related to past time) and recollected as ' this ' (related to preset time), all of them exist only as mixed with time, that is established by witness (con sciousness.) Nor is time established by inference ; for cannot arise with that (time) itself as the ११६ ४१६. नापि तत्सम्बन्धिनः कस्यचित्पक्षीकारेणानुमानप्रवृत्ति : ; कालवृतिमन्तरेण तेन साहचर्यस्मरणाद्यसम्भवात् । ४१७. अत्र केचिदाहुः-बहुतरणिपरिस्पन्दान्तरितजन्मत्वं परत्वम्। अल्पतरसूर्यसञ्चारान्तरितजनिमत्वं चापरत्वम् । एकतपनप्रचारविशिष्टत्वं यौगपद्यम् । अनेकतद्विशिष्टत्वमयौगपद्यम् । बहुतपनक्रियाविशिष्टत्वमक्षि प्रत्वम् । कतिपयक्रियाविशिष्टत्वं क्षिप्रत्वम् । तत्प्रत्ययैरनुमेयः कालः । subject (paksa), because whether it (time) is (already) established or 101-established there are (respectively the defects of) the establishment of the established 1d the non-establishment of the locus (of the inference, 2.e., the subject) 416. Nor is there the possibility of a11 inference having for its subject something related to that (time); for, in the absence of a psyclosis (in respect) of time, it is not possible to have recollection of concomitance (i.e., pervasion) etc. with that (time). 417. Here, some (the Logicians) say (thus) ; priority consists in having a birth remote (from present) by many circuits of the sum, and posteriority consists in having a birth remote by fewer circuits of the sun ; contemporaneity consists in being पualifed by the same locomotion of the surn ; 1707-contemporarneity consists in being gualified by different such (ocomotions of the surn) ; non-पृuickness consists in being ualified by Imary acts (of 10commotion) of the sum ; ५uickness consists in being qualifed by a few (such) acts ; time is what is inferred through these (cognitions. Inded ११७ तरणिपरिस्पन्दा हि पदार्थसार्थे विशिष्टप्रत्ययहेतुतया स्वप्रत्थासत्तिमपेक्षन्ते, विशिष्टव्यवहारजनकत्वात्, चन्दनसौरभवत् । ४ १८. स च सम्बन्धः परम्परया वाच्यः साक्षादसम्भवात्, पट विशेषणस्येव नीलिन्न । ४१९. अतः पदार्थानां तपनपरिस्पन्दैः संयुक्तसंयोगिसमवायात्मके सम्बन्धे यन्निमित्तं द्रव्यं स काल इति । ४२० . तदसत् ; वाच्यवाचकादिवत्स्वभावप्रत्यासत्यैव विशिष्ट प्रतीत्युपपत्तेः । अन्यथा युगपदुत्पन्नाभावादिषु यौगपद्यव्यवहारो न स्यात् । the circuits of the sum, being the cause of a cognition as gualified, re(1uire a connection of their selves with the assemblage (of objects, because they give rise to the en]pirical usage (of the objects) as (1ualifed (as prior, posterior, etc.), like the scent of the sandal-w00d. 418. Aाd this relation [must be said to be indirect, since the direct (relation) is imp0ssible, as in the case of blueness, as ar1 attribute of a cloth. 419. Therefore, that substance which is the (mediating) cause in (establishing) the relation of the 18ature of inherence in that which is conjoined to what is in conjunction, between objects and the movements of the st17, that is time. 420. That is unsound ; for there is intelligibility for the cognition of the (ualifed even through a rnatural relation, as in the relation betweer word and the wordsense. ()therwise, there would be no en pirical usage of simultaneity in respect of 101-existence, (cognitions) etc., that arise simultaneously . ११८ ४२१ . एवं परापरव्यवहारोऽपि । दिश एव कल्प्यतामुभयविध परापरत्वव्यवहारनिर्वाहकत्वम् । अप्रसिद्धकालकल्पनात्प्रसिद्धस्यैवोपनायकता कल्पनस्य लघुत्वात् । ४२२. शब्दाश्रयतया गगनानुमाने च जातिबधिरमूकादेर्गगना निश्चयात्सञ्चार एव कुण्ठितः स्यात् । अरूपिद्रव्येषु चक्षुव्यपारायोगात् । ४२३. कूपोऽयम् , रन्ध्रमेतत्-इत्यादौ चक्षुव्यपारस्यावरणा भावविषयतयाप्युपपत्तेः । 421. So also the usage in respect of priority ar1d posteriority. Let there be assumed of space itself the capacity to account for the tw()-fold usage of }]riority and posteriority ; for instead of assuming १I unknowा। time, the २१ssumption of mediatorship for the known in accorda11ce with thc principle of 422. And in the inference of ether strate of sou10d, since there is 10 ascertainment of (such) ether for those congenitally deaf (or du17b movement itself (dependent on cognition of th१er) would be difficult. (But this is not so. 1ence space to must be witness-established. Nor may it be said space is directly visible). For it is impossible for the eye to function in respect of colouress substances (like ether) 423 . In “ this is well ', this is a hole', etc . (where there is appare1t visible cognitium of ether) there is intelligibility for the functioning of the eye, even through (that activity) relating to the non-existence ११९ ४२४ . न चैवमाकाशस्यैवापह्नवः, अंत्रावरणाभाव इति तदाश्रय तया झडित्येव स्फुरणात् । न चैवंगने व्यवहारः । कचित्—इह गगनम् इति व्यवहारस्तु मूर्तवस्तुसम्बन्धवशाद्वा प्रदेशनिष्ठतया वा निर्वहति । ४२५ . शब्दो विभुगुणो न भवति, बाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यगुणत्वादिति किं नानुमीयते ? स्पशों न पृथिव्यादिगुणः, नीरूपेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वादिति द्रव्यान्तरं वा किमिति न लभ्यते । ४२६. अत आकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि सुखदु:वेच्छादथश्च सा 424. Nor is thus (the existence of) ether itself (lenied; for the form * here is 10) obstruction ' it (ether) is i7ाmediately cognised as the substrate of that A11d there is not thus such empirical usage (like * here is ether ) in respoect of ether. As, however, for the 1sage sometimcs (in the form1) * here is ether ', that is explained as due either to being related t) s()ाme corptoreal substance (like, pot, ro0m, etc.) or to referring to : (particular) 10cality (as content) 425 . Why is there not inferred that sound is 10t the quality of what is al-pervasive, because it is an attribute cognised by an external sense-orga7 (1ike colour) ? (Likewise), why is there 10t established some other substance (for touch etc.) since t010ch is not an attribute of earth, etc., because it is cognised by a sense.organ that has no colour (like sound (or cognition). 426. Therefore ether, time, space, self, mind, pleasure, pain, desire etc.,• are directly the spheres of १२० क्षात्साक्षिगोचराः । अन्ये तु पदार्थाः यथायथमिन्द्रियलिङ्गागमगम्या इत्या चार्यसिद्धान्तः । ४२७. प्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यनिर्वाहकत्वेन चापेक्षणीयः साक्षी । तद्धि याथाथ्र्यलक्षणं किमदुष्टकरणजन्यत्वेनावसेयम्, दुष्टकरणाजन्यत्वेन वा ? अथ प्रवृत्तिसामथ्येन, यद्वा ज्ञानान्तरसंवादेन ? किं वा विसंवादाभावेन ? आहोस्वित्स्वतः ? ४२८ . नाद्यः; तस्यैव दुरवधारणत्वात् । ज्ञानयाथाय्येन तन्निश्चये the witmess (consciousness). ()ther objects, however, are respectively cognised by the appropriate 1ea1s of valid knowledge of sense-organ, inference and verbal testi17ory ; this is the frmal position of the Teacher. L 427. A11d the witness (consciousness) has to be sought as accounting for the validity of the means of valid knowledge. Indeed, that (validity) consisting in corresponder1ce to the object, is it to be ascertained through (1) being generated by non-defective instru ments, or (2) not being generated by defective instru 1ments, or (3) successful mature of activity, or (4) the agreer1ent with another cognition, or (5) the absence or disagreement (with another knowledge), or (6) intri1si cally ? 428. Not the first, because that (being generated by 101-defective instrument) itself is difficult to ascer tain. In ascertaining (it) through the validity of cogn ition ४२९. वादावली १२१ अत एव न द्वितीयः । नापि तृतीयः, सर्वत्र ज्ञाने तदभावात् । ४३०. चतुर्थस्तु, सुखादिज्ञानेष्वसम्भावितः । ज्ञानमात्रसंवादेन च प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमे धारावाहेिकविभ्रमो नाम न स्यात् । यथार्थज्ञानसंवादा युपगमे च तस्यापि याथाथ्यवधारणायामनवस्था स्यात् । ४३१. न पञ्चमः ; अनुपसञ्जातबाधभ्रमेष्वपि प्रामाण्यनिश्चया पातात्, पुरुषदेशकालविशेषविकल्पानुपपत्तेश्च । there is the counti१gence of (the detect of) reciprocal dependence 429. For the same reason (it can) not (be) the second. Nor even the third, because that does not exist in all cognitions. 430. As for the fourth however, it is not possible in respect of the cognition of pleasure, etc. And if validity be accepted because of the agreement with cognition as such (10t valid cognition), there twould not be what s called a continuous stream of delusive cogniti And if what is accepted be agreement with a valid cognition , in ascertaining the validity of that (cognition) t0, there would be (the defect of) infinite 431. Not the fth, because there is the countingence of ascertainment of validity even in respect of delusions for which a sublation has 10t yet ariserm, and because there is unintelligibility on the, analysis (of the alter [natives in respect) of such details as person, place, time, etc. १२२ ४३२. सम्भवात् । ४३३. वादावली न षष्ठः ; अनात्मरूपेषु मनोवृतिज्ञानेषु स्वयंप्रकाशत्वा वेदवाक्याद्वराह्यस्योत्पन्ने ज्ञाने तत्प्रामाण्यं तेनैव स्फुरति ४३४ . आद्ये, न तन्निराकुर्यात् । द्वितीये, कथं स्वतस्त्वसिद्धिः । अपौरुषेयत्वादियुक्तिभिः कथं वा परः पश्चात्प्रतिबोध्यते । ४३५. न च ज्ञानतत्प्रामाण्ययोः सहैवानुमानमिति पक्षः, अनुमेयत्वे मानाभावात् , व्यवहारस्य त्वन्यथाप्युपपत्तेः, अपरोक्षानुभवविरोधाच । +32. Not the sixt]] ; for self-luminosity is not p0ssible in respect of cognitions which are psychoses of the mi 1d (manas) and 21e of the nature of 10t-self. 433. In the cog11ition generated by scriptur2] stater1ents in the m111d (of (one wh() stands outside (the belief in scriptural statements), is its validity 17:11ifested by itself or not ? 434. 11 the frst case, it should 10t have been rejected (by bim). In the second case, how is (its) ic nature established? And how can it be that subseguently the opponent is enlightened with (the help of) such probams 25**being (of) superhuman (c017posi tion)' etc. : 435. Nor (can) the view (be held) that of cognition and its validity there is inference even together, since in respect of (validity) being inferred there is no author ity, ir1 as Imauch as, empirical usage is iगtelligible even (otherwise, and since there is confict with the direct experience. ४३६. ज्ञानं हि ज्ञाततया व्यवहारेण वा कार्येणानुमेयम् । न च तत्प्रामाण्याविनाभावि ; शुक्तिरूप्यादौ व्यभिचारात् । ४३७ . बाह्यागमज्ञानानामपि प्रामाण्यानुमानप्रसङ्गः । प्रसक्तमप्य पोह्यते इति चेत्-तपवादनिरासाय परीक्षापेक्षायां यौगपद्यभङ्गात्कुतो ज्ञान ग्राहकमात्रग्राह्यत्वम् । तस्माज्ज्ञानग्राहकेणैव साक्षिणा तत्प्रामाण्याध्यवसायः । ४३८ . स च ज्ञानं गृह्णन्न दोषं वेत् प्रमाणम्, न चेदन्यथा इत्येव व्यवस्थया गृह्णाति । तथा च नारोपितज्ञानप्रामाण्यग्रहणप्रसङ्गः । १२३ 436. Cognitio7 indeed would have to be inferred from the effect .८., cognisedlness (or empirical usage . And that (e:ffect) is 1ot non-existent without validity, because ()f iconstancy in the case of shell-silver etc. 437. There is the C011tingence of the inference (); validity even in respect of cognitions from the scriptures by outsider5 (those who do not believe in vedas). If it be said that (such validity) though contingent is demied, then, verification being 1eeded to refute ex ceptions (to validity), the stimultauneity (of cognition and validity) {ails ; whence them is the (possibility which apprehends the cognition ? Therefore only by the witness (consciousness) which apprehends the cogni tion is its validity ascertained . Xा . 438. * And that (witness-consciousness) in appre hending cognition, apprehends it only as thus disti:1ct,

• if non-defective, then valid ; if not, it is otherwise.' १२४

४३९ . यदा त्वर्थित्वेन प्रामाण्यं निश्चिचीषति, तदा सजातीय विजातीयसंवादविसंवाद्भावाभावलक्षणया परीक्षया दोषाभावं निश्चित्य प्रामाण्यमवधारयति । दोषदर्शने त्वप्रामाण्यम् । ४४०. न च परीक्षायां परीक्षान्तरापेक्षायामनवस्था । नापि स्व परीक्षापेक्षा । साक्षिरूपस्यानुभवस्य स्वप्रकाशात्मस्वरूपत्वाभ्युपगमान्न तत्र परीक्षापेक्षा । ४४१. मामहं जानामीत्यनुभवाद्विशेषबलाच न कर्तृकर्मभाव विरोधः । 41d thus there is not thc c01?tingence of the cognition of validity in respect of a superimposed cognition . 439. However, for any one seeking (a successful result) there is desire to ascertain validity, thern (such a person) after ascertaining 101-existence of defect through of aggreement and disagreement with what are of the same class (or are of a different class, concludes the validity ; but, on the cognition of defect, (he concludes) invalidity. 440. Nor through dependence for (this) verification (or another verification is there (the defect of) infinite regress. Neither in respect of (witness-consciousness) itself is there need for verification. Since the experi er1ce (of the nature of the witness is admitted to be the very nature of the self-1uminous self, there is not in respect of that, the dependence on verification 441. There is no conflict between the relation, of agent and object (in one and the same), because of ४४२ . वकाशात् । ४४३ . ४४४. १२५ नापि स्वानुभूतेषु परीक्षाकांक्षा ; तस्यादोषतया संशयान तदुक्तम् सुदृढो निर्णयो यत्र ज्ञेयं तत्साक्षिदर्शनम् । न परीक्षानवस्था स्यात्साक्षिसिद्धे त्वसंशयात् ।। इति । यत्कचिद्वयभिचारि स्याद्दर्शनं मानसं हि तत् । इति च । तथाहि---अस्त्यत्र पानीयमिति श्रुतवतः तत्प्रामाण्ये सन्दि the experience * I know myself and on thc strength of (the category) particularity (..., the specific capacity of entities- vise52). 442 respect of what are experienced by (the witness) itself ; for, that (witness-consciousness) being non-defective, there is 10 scope for doubt. 43. That is stated : “ where there is very frm certainty, that should be known to be witness-cognition ; there would be no infinite regress through verification, because there is 10 doubt i7' respect of whatever is established by the witness (consciousness),' 2 1d 'where in some cases that (the above prin ciple) is inconstant that, indeed, is a mental cog inition (due to a psychosis),' . 444. It is thus : for him wh०, having heard that there is (water) to drink here, doubts the validity of १२६ हानस्य वायुविशेषादिभिरनुमानमपि समुदेति । तत्रापि साशङ्कश्चेचक्षुवैव निश्धिनोति । वादावली ४४५. प्रत्यासन्नश्ध सलिलपानानन्तरमुदन्याभावनिमित्तं दुःखाभावं सुखश्च साक्षादेव साक्षिणानुभवन्न तत्र संशेते । ४४६. सुखदुखेच्छातदभावादिषु साक्षिसिद्धेषु कचिदन्यथाभाव स्यानुपलम्भात् । ४ ४७. अन्यथा सवत्र सशयानपगमात्सवव्यवहारलापप्रसङ्गः । that (statement), there arises inference also through a particular (i.e. cold) breeze, etc. If doubtful even in that case, he (then) makes certain even with the sense of sight. 445. And he who has goाe mear it (water) and after drinking the water, experiencing directly through the witness (consciousness) the pleasure and the abser1ce of pain, due to the non-existence of thirst, has 10 doubt in respect of these. 446. For there is not anywhere the cognition as being otherwise (than they are) in respect of what are established by the witness (consciousness) such as pleasure, pain, desire and their (respective) 101-exist 447. Otherwise, because of the non-emoval of doubt i1 every case, there is the contingence of the failure of all empirical usage. वादावली ४४८. मानसवृतिषु पुनरनादौ संसारं द्वयीं गतिमनुसन्दधत्साक्षी सहसैव प्रमाणमेतदिति न निश्चेतुं प्रभवति । किन्तु दोषाभावनिश्चयद्वारैव । ४४९. दोषाभावं च न स्वयमेवावधारयितुमीष्ट ; अपि तु परीक्षा सहकृत एव । परीक्षाया अपि यावत्स्वविषयेषु सुखादिषु पर्यवसानं तावत्प रीक्षान्तरमनुसरति । ४५०. न हि स्वात्मनि कदाप्यन्यथाभावः, येन परीक्षानवस्था स्यात् । ४५१. न चैवं परतस्त्वापतिः, परीक्षायाः प्रतिबन्धकदोषशङ्का निरसने परिक्षीणत्वात् । 449) १२७ 448. I respect of mental psychoses however, the witness recollecting the two ways (validity as well as invalidity) in this beginningless world (samsara) is not capable of ascertaining at once , “ this is valid '. But (it does so) only through the ascertainment of the defect ascertain, not of itself, but only as aided by verifica tion. A11d1 ti]] there is culmination of the verifications in pleasure, etc., which are the contents (of (the witness) itself, it goes after another verification. 450. There is never indeed any (cognition as) being otherwise in respect of that (witness-conscious mess) itselई, in which case there would be infinite regress 451 . Nor is there thus the contigence of extrinsic mature (for validity), for vertffcation becomes obsolete १२८ वादावली ४५२ . न हेि गोक्षुरकापसरणसापेक्षत्वेन गजस्य गमनशक्ति परतन्त्रा | ४५३. न चैवमप्रामाण्यस्यापि स्वतस्वापतिः । विसंवादानुसन्धा नवतामेवाप्रामाण्यज्ञप्तिरित्यव्यभिचरितानन्यथासिद्धान्वयव्यतिरेकवशादनुमेय त्वाध्यवसायात् । ४५४. प्रामाण्यनिश्धये तु प्रतिबन्धकनिवर्तकतया कचिदेव परी क्षापेक्षेति वैषम्यम् । न चाप्रामाण्यं कापि निरपेक्षेण साक्षिणा निश्चित चरम् , येन प्रतिबन्धकनिवर्तकतां तस्यां प्रतीमः । (in function) with the refutation of the doubt as to obstructing defect. 452 . Because of dependence o11 the re70al of the thorm, the elephant's capacity for motion is not indeed dependent on something else. 453 . Nor is there thus the contigence (of intrir1sic mature for invalidity to0. For, the cognition of invali dity is only for th0se men who recollect disagree71ent; which are 107-10c01start and 10t accounted for other wise it is concluded that (invalidity) is (only) inferable. 454. 11 respect of the ascertainment of validity, however, there is only iा 50me cases the dependence on verification as removing obstructions ; hence there is disparity (between the two). And nowhere previously: has invalidity been ascertained by the ५witness (co1 sciousness) without depe1dence (or veriffeation), in which case we would cognise there (too) the removal १२९ ४५५. दोषाभावान्वयव्यतिरेकनियमांत्प्रामाण्यस्य परतस्त्वं किं न स्यादिति चेन्न; यादृच्छिकसंवादिषु प्रामाण्येऽपि दोषाभावाभावेन कारण त्वभङ्गात् । ४५६. वेत्रबीजस्य स्वाङ्कुरजननशक्तदहाभावप्रयुक्ततापतिः । तथा च न काप्युत्सर्गापवादौ स्यातामिति । ४५७. कथञ्चित्सापेक्षत्वेन परतस्त्वे साक्षिणः साक्षात्स्वत:प्रामा oयम्, तदन्यस्यासाक्षादिति व्यवस्था स्यात् । 455. It if be asked why there should not be ex tri1sic nature for validity (to0) because of regulation by c011commita11ce and non-concomitance with morm-ex ister1ce of defect, no (says the siddhantin) . For though there is validity ir1 cases of accidental augreement , of defect, there is failure of causality (for the said non exister10ce) came (vetra) seed to give rise to its own sprरout, being 41d thus there would 1०where be a general law and the exceptions. 457 account bf dependence, there could be a distinction that the self-validity for that witness ( consciousness) is direct, and for what is other than that (witness-con sciousness) it is indirect . १३० वाढ़ावली ४५८. तस्मात्सुषुप्तावपि सुखानुभवादिविशेषणतया प्रतीयमानः कालः साक्षिणैवेक्षणीयः । ४५९. तथा चात्र प्रयोगः-कालो बाह्यप्रत्यक्षाद्यतिरिक्तप्रमाण विषयः, असत्स्वपि तेषु प्रतीयमानत्वात्; यो यस्मिन्नसति प्रतीयते स तद्वय तिरिक्तप्रमाणविषयः, यथा सति चक्षुषि प्रतीयमानो गन्थ इति । ४६०. तेन च कालेन सर्व विशिष्टमेवानुभूयते इति सर्वाधारतय स्थेयम् । अस्त्यासीद्भविष्यतीति वा प्रतीतिमपहाय पदार्थप्रतीतेरौदासीन्येना ननुभवात् । 458. Therefore, even in sleep, time, cognised as the qualification of the experience of pleasure etc., is to be cognised only by the witness-consciousness. 459. And thus the inference here is Time is the object of a means of valid knowledge, other than external perception, etc., because of being cognised even where they (other mearns of valid knowledge) are 101-existent ; that which is cognised in the absence of some (means of valid knowledge) is the content of a means of valid lk10wledge (other than that, 1ike sme]] that is cognised in the absence of the sense 460. Since everything is experienced only as qualified by such time (as established by the wit mess-consciousness) it (time) is to b8 admitted as the substrate of all. For, there is 10 experience of a १३१ ४६१. तद्वदेव युगपत्प्रतीतयोर्धर्मिप्रतियोगिभावेन भेदप्रतीत्युप पत्तेरपि नान्योन्याश्रयाद्यापातः । ४६२ . अत एव परस्परभेदप्रतीतेरपि तत्तत्प्रत्ययापृथग्भावान्ना न्योन्यापेक्षा । ४६३ . परमात्मतदितरभेदोऽपि तत्तत्स्वरूपग्राहकप्रमाणावसेय इति नोक्तदोषावकाशः । न हेि घर्मिप्रतियोगिभेदप्रत्ययानां क्रमभावे मानं पश्यामः । neutral cogTition of objects without the cognition * is ',

• was , or ' wi]] be

461. Fve1 likewise, there is no contir1gence of (the defect of) reciprocal dependence etc , ever be cause of the intelligibility of the cognition of difference as substrate and counter-C0relate, in the case of 2) pair simultaneously cognised. 462 . For the same reas01 evel1 in the case of the cognition of reciprocal difference, since each (such cognition) is inscparable from the corresponding cog 1ition (of the substrate (or the counter-correlate) thcre is 10 mutual dependence. 463. There is no r00m for the add11ced defect, since even the difference between the Supreme self and (other things has to be determined by the means of valid kn७wledge apprehending the respoective entities. We see modeed no authority for a relation of seguence among the cognitions of the substrate, the counter १३२ ४६४. जीवब्रह्रैक्यंवदेव स्वरूपयोः सापेक्षनिरपेक्षत्वे, कचित्प्रतीता प्रतीतत्वे अस्येदमिति सम्बन्धितयावभासोऽपर्यायशब्दवाच्यत्वमित्यादिवै चित्र्यं द्रष्टव्यम् । ४६५. व्यपदेशमात्रमन्नेति चेत् कोऽर्थः ? किं परमार्थेन स्वरूपं नाम बाधितम्, ऐक्यं वा, तत्सम्बन्धो वा, व्यवहारो वा तन्निमित्तं वा वादावली ४६६. नाद्यः; निराश्रयस्यैक्यस्यानिर्वाहात् । निर्वाहे वा ब्रौक्य वादस्तुच्छाद्वैते पर्यवस्येत् । 464. Like the identity of thc individual self and Brahma11, there is t() be [10ted variety for (one's owr। 11ature (as between two things) such as, deper1dence and non-dependence, cognisedness and 101-cognised Imess in 5017e place, manifestation in the relation (of the form) “ of this it is ', and denotation by 101 synonymous words and others. 465. If it be said that it is a . Imere verbal state ment, “ what does it me21 ? ' (asks the siddhārtin ). Is it that what is called existence is sublated in reality, or identity, or its relation, or empirical usage, or its 466. Not the first, because of the impossibility 0f maintaining identity devoid ] of a substrate. Or if maintained, the doctrine of the identity of the.Brahman ५with the (individual) self would culminate in the 101 dualism of nullity. वादावली १३३ ४६७. न द्वितीय: ; भेदोन्मज्जनप्रसङ्गात्; न ह्यभयोदासीनतत्व सिद्धिः ; उभयात्मकवस्तुवत्तस्यापि व्याहतत्वात् । ४६८. न तृतीयः; ऐक्यस्यान्यसम्बन्धितापातात् । मेरुमन्दरादि वत्स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रतीतिप्रसङ्गाच । ४६९. नापि तुरीय: ; अर्थबाधमन्तरेण व्यवहारबाधस्यासिद्धे ; आत्मैक्यस्य बाधितत्वे तत्वमसीति वाक्यस्यातत्ववेदकत्वापातात् । ४७०. न च पञ्चमः ; नैमित्तिकदर्शनादेव निमित्तकल्पनासौ लभ्यात् । अन्यथात्मैक्यपदयोः पर्यायताप्रसङ्गः । 467. Not the sccond, because of the continger1ce (of differe1ce rising up. Nor is there, indeed, the esta 1blishment of a reality indifferent to either, because that t00 is contradicted, like the thing which is of the mature (0f b0th. 468. Not the third, since there is the contir1ge11ce of identity bcing related to something else, and since there is (als0) the contingence of the independent cognition (in respect of it) as in the case of the moun tailms, Mcru and Mandara 469 . Nor the fourth, since there is no cstablish ment of the sublation of empirical usage without the sublation of the object ; for if the identity of the self be sublated, then for the text * That thou art ', there is the contingence of making known the 470 . Nor the fth, because of ease in postulating the cause even from the cognition of the caused १३४ वादावली ४७१ . तच निर्मितं भेदोऽत्र बाधित इतेि चेत्तर्हि तत्प्रतिनिधिः स्वनिर्वाहको विशेषो नाम पदार्थशक्तिरभिषिच्यताम् । ४७२. न चैवमतिप्रसङ्गः, मुख्यनिमित्तस्यान्यत्र सम्भवेऽन्यस्य कल्पनायोगात् । ४७३. निभेदे वस्तुनि भेदवन्निर्विशेषे तस्मिन्विशेषोऽपि व्याहत इति चेन्न ; निर्विशेषत्वविशेषवदुपपत्तेः । स च यदि विरोधात्यज्येत, तर्हि सुतरां सविशेषतासिद्धिः । (Otherwise there is the contingence of the terms * self and “ identity ' becoming synonymous. X.X 471. If it be said that that cause, namely, differ (ence, is sublated here, then (the siddhantin says) 1et there be installed as its substitute a potency of things called particularity (wisesa) which can account for itself. 472. And there is not thus (the defect) of undue exter19ion. When there is the possibility of the principal cause (vi४. difference) in other cases (pot, cloth etc.) it is not proper to assume some other (like 473. If it be said that just like difference in art object devoid of difference, particularity to in ar। object devoid of particularity is contradicted, 10 (says the siddhantin); for it is intelligible like the partic ularity of being devoid 5f particularity. And if that ४७४. वादावली १३५ तदुक्तमाचायै भेदे हीने त्वपर्यायशब्दान्तरनियामकः । विशेषो नाम कथितः सोऽस्ति वस्तुष्वशेषतः ॥ इति । ४७५. स्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तं भेदमभ्युपगच्छतामपि स्वरूपभेदयोभेदस्य स्वनिर्वाहकता सिद्धा । तैरपि निर्वाह्यनिर्वाहकनिर्वहणादिरूपवैचित्र्यमेकस्यैव भेदस्याङ्गीकृतं भवेत्, अन्यथानबस्थानात् । ततो वरं पदार्थस्यैव विचित्र शक्तिस्वीकार इतेि । the1 all the easier is the establishment of the p0ssession of particularity. 474. That has bee1 said by the Teacher : “ But where there is no difference (the category) called particularity is declared (to exist) as the regulator of (the use of) another 101-synonymous word ; that exists in all things without exception '. 475. Even for those who accept the difference as (other than one's own nature, there is established the self-explanatory nature of the difference between one's own nature and difference. By them to0 comes to be accepted.in.respect of one and the same difference such a variety of characteristics as being that which is explained, that which explaims and explanation, as otherwise there is (the defect of) infinite regress. Better १३६ ४७६. णीया । वादावली अन्यैरपि संमवायस्याश्रितत्वादिव्यवहारे गतिरियमेवानुसर ४७७. तस्माद् ब्रह्मस्वरूपावगाहि *विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म 'इत्यादि वाक्यसमानयोगक्षेमतया भेदप्रपञ्चमध्यक्षवतः प्रत्यक्षस्य दुराक्षेपैर्नाधिक्षेपः । ४७८. शरीरत्वहेतुरपि परस्पराननुसंहितभोगायतनत्वेन विवक्षित इति न तत्रापि दोषः । नाप दृष्टान्तालाभः । योगिशरीराणां व्यतिरेकि दृष्टान्ततासम्भवात् । than that is it to accept the variety of potency for the thing itself. 476. By others als0, in respect of empirical usage as to inherence being 10cated (in the substrate) and 50 0m, this Imethod (of explanation) alone has to be adopted. 477. Therefore there is no (point in) the countering with defective (objections, of the perception (of hi7 who ses the world of differences, since there is parity of welfare with the (scriptura]) stateme1t that apprehends the mature of Brahman, 1ike * Brahman is knowledge, 478. There is no defect even in respect of the probarns * being a body ' because it is intended to Imean “ being the abode of enjoyment for those who have restrictions of each other of example ; for there is possibility of the negative example in the case of the bodies of the yogins. ४८०. प्रभवेदिति । ४७९. अत एव न व्यवस्थानिरुक्तिदौर्घश्वम्, सुखदुखाद्यनु सन्धानभावाभावरूपव्यवस्थाया अङ्गीकृतत्वात् । ४८१. वादावली १३७ अतो भेदत्वहेतुरुपजीव्यविरोधान्न भेदमिथ्यात्वं साधयितुं किञ्च व्यवहारनिर्वाहकतया सत्यता च भेदस्य कुतो न ४८२ . ननु भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षादिविषयत्वेऽपि न तत्वावेदकप्रमाण विषयत्वम् । मैवम् ; तत एव तत्साधनसम्भवात् । 479 . For the same reas07 there is 10 ir10c07gruity in the establishment of the regulation (of experi ence- vyavasthā); for there is the acceptance of the regulation (of experience) consisting in the exister1ce and 101-existence of the recollection of pleasure, 480. Therefore because of the conflict with that which supports it (upajivya), the probarns * being differ ence is 1०t capable (of establishing the illusory nature 481. Further why should not there be reality for difference as accounting for empirical usage ? 482. Now, though difference is the content of a perception etc., still it is not the content of a means of valid knowledge that makes 10wn the reality. Not s० (says the siddhantin) ; for even by that (former) it is possible to establish that (atter) १३८ वादावली ४८३. किञ्च धर्मित्वहेतुना तत्वावेदकप्रमाणवेद्यता च कुतो नृ भेदस्य स्यात् ? ४८४. न चात्मनि धर्माभावः, आनन्दो विषयानुभवो नित्यत्वं चेति सन्ति धर्मा इत्यभ्युपगमात् । न परमार्थतो धर्मा इति चेन्न; नित्य त्वाद्यभावेऽनित्यत्वाद्यापातातू ; तत्पक्षे पारमार्थिकस्यैव साधनाङ्गतानियमा भावान् । ४८५. चन्द्रभेदे धर्मित्वहेतोव्यभिचार इति चेत्-कोऽर्थः ? चन्द्रभेदमात्राभाव इति वा, चन्द्राञ्चन्द्रभेदाभाव इति वा । 483. Further why should not difference be the (object of cognition by a means of valid k70wledge maki1g knowIn the reality, because of the probars,

• possessing an attribute ' ?

484. Nor is it that in the self there is 10 attri bute : for it is admitted that there exist attributes iश., bliss, (experience of objects and eternality. If it be said that they are not attributes in absolute reality, m० (says the siddhantin), because of the contingence of non-eternality etc., in the non-existence of eternality etc., also because, according to that position, there is 10 restriction (to the effect) that only the absolutely real can serve as probarns 485. If it be said that there is inconstancy of the probarns “ possessing an attribute in respect of the difference in m10 1s, what does this mear1 ? Is it the non-existence of (all) difference as such from the moon (.e., difference from non-imposed moon as well as वादावली ४८६. आद्ये न व्यभिचारः, पक्षसमत्वात् । द्वितीये तस्यैवाभावेन धर्मित्वहेतोर्यभिचारस्य दूरतः परास्तत्वात्। ४८७. किञ्च भेदत्वहेतोरविद्यानिवृत्तिरूपमोक्षात्मभेदे व्यभिचारश्च । न च तयोभेद इति चेत्तह्यात्मनोऽनादिनित्यतया तदभिन्नमोक्षस्य ज्ञानसा ध्याविद्यानिवृत्तिरूपत्वानुपपत्तिः । १३९ differences from the imp0sed [7001), or the mon existence (of the difference (of (one) m00m from the (other) m001 (.8., 10 difference of real 1700 from a non-imposed moon) ? 486. In the frst case there is n() inconstary (of the probaums), since it is on a par with the subject. It the second case that (differe1ce of 17001 from the 1701-imp05ed 7001) being itself 101-existent, the i1 colnstancy (adduced in respect) of the probams' p05se55 ing an attribute is refuted (evern) at a distance ; (hence there is no inconstancy) [[ 487. Besides, of the proba1s * being difference there is also inconstancy in respect of the difference between release (molksa), which is of the form of remov al of mescience, and the self. . And if it be said that there is no difference between those two, then the self being betiIninglessly eternal, it is not intelligible that release which is non-different from that (self) has the form of the removal of mescience, that has to be accorm1 plished by knowledge. १४० वादावली ४८८. अन्यतरचन्द्रस्यैवारोपितत्वेनारोपितानारोपितभेदे च्यभि चारश्च । मुक्तामुक्तभेदेऽनैकान्यं च । ४८९. मुक्तामुक्तयोभेदोऽसिद्ध इति चेन्न ; विमतो भिन्नो मुक्तत्वादिति तत्सिद्धेः । शुक्ताविव रजतमाविद्यको भेदो मुक्तऽप्यङ्गीक्रियते इति चेन्न ; मुक्तस्याविद्येति व्याहते । ४९०. ननु किं भेदः परमात्मप्रतियोगिकः साध्यते ? उत जीव प्रतियोगिकः ? अथवा जडप्रतियोगिकः ? आहोस्वित्सकलप्रतियोगिकः 488. And there is the inconstancy (of the pro bams) in respect of the difference between the super imp0sed a11d the 10n-superimp0sed (m00rns) since only one of the two 1701s is superimp0sed. And there is the 1conclusiveness (of the probams) in respect of the difference between the released (mukta) and the 101-released (amukta) 489. If it be said that there is non-establishment of difference betwee the released und the 107-released, 10 (says the siddhantirm) ; for it is established thus : those (selves) in dispute are different, because they are 1iberated.' 1f It be said that just like the (illusory) Silver in macre, there is accepted (only) a mescience created difference eve1 of the liberated, 10 (says the siddhāntir1) ; for there is the contradictiotr in (the words) “ 1escience of the .” liberated 490. Now, is the difference established with the supreme self for its counter-correlate, or the (individual) वादावली ४९१. नाद्यः ; परमात्मनि हेतोरनैकान्त्यात् ; संसाराभावलक्षण मुक्तत्वस्य तत्र सम्भवात् । १४१ sclf its ४९२. द्वितीयेऽपि सकलजीवप्रतियोगिकः स्वल्यतिरिक्तजीवप्रतियो गिको वा ? नाद्य: ; मुक्तस्यापि जीवत्वेनांशे बाधात् । ४९३. नोत्तरः ; मुक्तस्य तद्वेदसिद्धया विना तेषामेतद्वयतिरिक्त त्वासिद्धयाप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वात् ; सिद्धौ च सिद्धसाधनत्वात् ; सकल जीवप्रतियोगिकभेदसाधनस्य प्रकृतानुपयुक्तत्वेनार्थान्तरत्वाच । f(1r its counter-correlate, or the imert (matter) for counter-correlate, or everything for its counter 491. Not the first, because the probat1s is inc011 culsive in respect of the Supreme self, since there is the possibility there of the state of release consisting in the non-existence of the world (sarisāra- cycle of births and deaths) 492 . In the second t00, has it all the (individual) selves for its countcr-correlate or (all) selves other than itself for its counter-correlate ? Not the first, because there is sublation in respect of part (of the subject) sij1ce the released (self) also is a self 493. N७t the latter, because since without the es. tablishment of the difference of the released (self) from those (othe selves), their being other than that (re leased sel) is non-established, there is 101-established prbandum, and because if that (i.e., being other) be established, there is (the defect of) the establishment of १४२ वादावली ४९४ . अत एव न तृतीय: ; नापि चतुर्थ: ; पूर्ववदंशे बाधाद प्रसिद्धविशेषणात्वाचेति । ४९५. मैवम्—अविवक्षितप्रतियोगिविशेषस्य भदस्य साध्यत्वात् । ४९६ . न चैवमर्थान्तरता, मुक्तस्य भेदमात्रमाक्षिपन्तं प्रति तत्सा धनस्य संगतत्वात् । ४९७ . अथवा प्रागवस्थायां येन भेदेन विशिष्टः, तेनैव मोक्षेऽपी त्यमर्थोऽत्राभिप्रेत इति न कश्चिद्दोष इति । the established ; and (als0) because the establishment of the difference which has 2] (individual) selves for its counter-correlatte being useless for the present purpose, there is (the defect of the establishment (of) the 101 intended 494 . Hence to0 10t the third. Nor the fourth for as in the previous case, there are (the defects of) the sublation in respect of part (of the subject) 21d mon-established probandum 495 . [t is not so (says the siddhāntin); for the probandum is that difference for which no specified c011ter-c0relate is intended. 496. And there is not thus (the defect of the establishment of) the unintended, because in regard to him wh0) (objects to difference as such for the released, it is appropriate to establish that (alone). । 497. Or else, there is 10 defect si1-ce this is the mearning intended by us (Dvaitins) here, that in release to that (self} is qualified by that same १४३ ४९८ . ननु किमिदं मुक्तत्वं नाम ? किं संसारप्रध्वंसः, तत्संसर्गा भावो वा ? नाद्य : ; परमात्मन्यसिद्धेः ; निगादादिदृष्टान्तस्य साधनवैकल्या धत्तेश्च । अत एव नोत्तर इति चेन्न ; अविवक्षितविशेषसंसर्गाभावस्य हेतुत्वात् । ४९९. ननु चात्र सम्बन्धमात्राभावाधिकरणत्वं हेतुः । तत्राभावा धिकरणमात्रेणालम्, किं सम्बन्धमात्रग्रहणेन ? अथवाधिकरणत्वमात्रं हेतु रस्तु, केिमभावग्रहणेन ? किश्वाधिकरणं कारणविशेषः । तत्र किं विशेष ग्रहणेन ? एवं कारकं कारणविशेषः । तत्र किं विशेषग्रहणेनेति चेन्न । difference, whereby it was qualified in the prior state (of satisara) 498 . “ Now what is it that is meant by being released ? Is it the posterior 101-existence of worldly b00ndage (sarisara), or non-existence of relation theret0 ? Not the first, because it is not established in the supreme self (Paramātman), and because there is the contingence of the non-existence of the probarns in the case of such examples as (these released from) chains etc. For the 5ame reason it is 10t the latter '. If this be said, 10 (says the siddhantin); because the probams is that 107-existence of relation wh0se specific nature is u7 499. “ And now the probans here is 'being the substrate • of. 10n-existence of (all) relations as such ' That being so it is enough to (say) * being the substrate of the 171ere non-existence (as such).' What is the use of taking (the words) * all telation1s.' (Or else, let the १४४ ५००. तथा सति प्रमेयत्वादीनामपि केवलान्वयित्वभङ्गात् । प्रमाविषयत्वं प्रमेयत्वम् । तत्र विषयत्वेनालम्, किं प्रमाग्रहणेनेत्यादेः तत्रापि ॐत् । ५०१. यद्धेतुव्यवच्छेदकत्वेन पृथगुपादीयते तदेव विशेषणं प्रयो जनान्तरमपेक्षते; न पुनस्तन्मात्रान्तरगतमिति चेत्समं प्रकृतेऽपि । ५०२ . अथवा संसारसंसर्गाभावो मुक्तत्वम् । तथात्वे घटो दृष्टान्तः । probarns be merely * being the substrate'; what is the use of taking (in the word) * 107-existence ' ? Besides, the substrate is (1e of the special causes. That being so what is the use of taking (in the word) * special ' ? Similarly the caus21-correlate is a specia! kind of cause; that being so what is the use of taking (in the word)

• special ' ? [f this be said, m०.

down of the nature of merely positive concomitance even in the case of knowability etc. thus : kा6owability consists in being the content of knowledge ; here * being the content ' will do ; what is the use of talking (in the word) * knowledge  ? Such (objections) are easy to 501 . “ It is only such a qualification as is taken up for delimiting the probams, which stands in need of a distinct purp0se, but not such as is contaimed in that (probarns itself)'. If this be said, there is parity (of this) in the present context too. 502 . Or else, being released is the non-existence of relation to worldly b00ndage (sansara) ; in that case, परमात्मप्रतियोगिको वा भेदोऽत्र साध्यः । बन्धप्रध्वंसाधिकरणत्वञ्च मुक्तत्व मिति न परमात्मनि व्यभिचारः । ५०३. किञ्च मुक्तामुक्तयोभेदाभावे मुक्तस्य संसारः, संसारिणो वा मुक्तत्वं स्यात् । ५०४. क्यमापाच्चत ? उत संसारानुभवः ? ५०५. १४५ ननु मुक्तस्य संसारः स्यादिति किं संसाराधिकरणस्वरूपेणै 10 pot is the example. (Or the probandum here is the difference which has the supreme self (Para.matman) for its counter-correlate. And there is no inconsta1cy (f the probans) in respect of the supreme self, because to be released is to be the substrate of the posterior Inon-existence of worldly bondage (sa1iौsara) 503, [3esides, if there be no diffcrc1ce betweer the released 71d the 101-released, then there w()uld be worldly bondage for the released or releasedncss for the pr1e iIn worldly b011dage. 504 . Now (in the statement), “ there would be worldly bondage for the released ', is there deduced the identity of existence (swartpa) with the substrate of worldly bondage, (or the experience of worldly boundage ? . 505. Not the first, because it is deducing the desirable, and because there is hon-difference between the (conclusion) deduced art the ground of deduction. नाद्यः ; इष्टापादनात् । अपाद्यापादकयोभेदाभावाच । १४६ वादावली ५०६. नोत्तरः; अंनुभवस्यान्तःकरणादिसापेक्षत्वात् , अंत:करणा देश्चाज्ञानसापेक्षत्वात्, निवृत्ताविद्यस्य कार्यान्वयायोगात् । ५०७. एवं संसारिणो मुक्तत्वं स्यादिति कोऽर्थः ? किं संसाराधि करणस्वरूपस्यैव मुक्तत्वं स्यादिति ? किं वा संसारिण एव सतो मुक्तत्वानुभवः स्यादिति ? ५०८. नाद्य: ; पूर्ववदिष्टापादनात् । नोत्तरः; संसारिणो मुक्ताद्धे दसद्भावात् । ५०९. मुक्तस्य संसारिणो भेदाभावे कथं संसारिणो मुक्ताद्वेद इति 506. Not the latter, because experience is de pendent on the internal organ etc., because internal orgar etc., are dependert on neScience, and for him whose 1escience has disappeared, the persistence of the product (of mescience) is impossible. 507 . Likewise, what is the meaning of (the state ment) “ there would be releasedness for the one in worldly bondage'? Is it that there would be released 1ess for the very one whose existence (svarpa) was the substrate of worldly b011dage or that even while being one in worldly bondage there would be the experience 508. Not the first since, as in the prior case, it is deducing the desirable. Not the latter because there is difference for the one in worldly bond:१ge from the released. 509, [f it be asked how, wher1 for the released there is no difference from the one in worldly bondage, १४७ चेत्--भवेदेवं यद्ययं भेदो वास्तवः स्यात् । अज्ञानकृतो हि मुक्तात्संसारिणो भेदः। सोऽज्ञानिनः संसारिणः प्रतीयते, न निवृत्ताज्ञानस्य मुक्तस्येति कात्रा नुपपत्तिरिति चेन्न । ५१०. यद्यज्ञानकृतो भेदः तहश्वस्याज्ञानाभावात्संसारिणैक्यं तेना नुभूयेत । अनुभूयते इति चेत्, यदीश्वरः संसारिणैक्यमनुभवेत्तर्हि दुःखी स्यात् । न चैवम् । ततो नेश्वरस्य संसारिणैक्यानुभवो ऽङ्गीकर्तुमुचितः । ५११. यदुक्तं मुक्तस्यान्तःकरणाद्यभावान्न संसारानुभवप्राप्तिरिति there is difference for the one in wordly b01dage from the released, (the Advaiti7 answers that) it would be so, if the difference (that is deduced) were real. The differe1ce for the one in worldly bondage from the released is indeed a product of mescience, That is cognised for the Tescience-tainted one in worldly b00ndage, Imot for the released from whorाm mescience has disappeared. Thus, what is it that is unintelligible here ? If this be said, 10 (says the ID)vaitin) : since there is no mescience in the Lord, there should be experienced by !im identity with the o!॥e in worldly bondage. If it be said that it is experienced, (then) in case the Lord experiences identity with the ore in worldly bondage, he would be the experi encer of sorrow ; and it is not thus. So it is not proper to accept the Lord's experience of identity with the one in worldly" boundage 511 contingence of experience of worldly bondage for the १४८ वादावली तदसत् ; निर्विशेषत्वादेकरसे चैतन्येऽन्तःकरणसंसर्गभावाभावयोरप्ययोगात् । ५१२ . अज्ञानसद्भावाभावाभ्यां सम्भवत इति चेन्न । तदपि तादृगेव । ५१३. किश्वेश्वरवचनैस्तस्य संसारिभेदानुभव एवानुमीयते । कुत स्तत्राभदानुभवप्रत्याशा । तान्यहं वेद सर्वाणि न त्वं वेत्थ परन्तप । सुखं दुःखं भवोऽभावो भयश्चाभपमेव च । इत्यादिभि । released because of the mon-existence of the interna] organ etc. (for him), that is not sound. For in the case of the intelligence which, because of being attribute 1ess, is homogeneous in essence, even the existence a11d 101-existence of relation to the internal orgam are not p0ssible. 512 . If it be said that they are possible because of the existence and non-existence of mescience, no ; (for) that t00 is only like that (unsuitable). 513. Further, from the (following) words of the Lord, there is inferred only His experiences of differ ence from the one in worldly bondage. Why then the obstimate desire for establishing the experience of identity for Him ? '] (Krsna) know them all; you (Arjuna), () terror of the enemies, do not know (therm).'

• Pleasure, pain , creation, existence, fear

fearlessness (of creatures proceed from Me).' From these and other (statements, there is the inference). ५१४. किञ्च विमतो भेदो मुक्तौ न निवर्तते, ईश्वरेणानुभूयमान त्वात , स्वरुपवदिति तत्सिद्धिः । ५१५. नन्वीश्धरेणानुभूयमानोऽपि मुक्तौ निवर्तताम् ? किं विपक्षे बाधकमिति चेन्न । ५१७ . ५१६. यदीश्वरेणानुभूयमानोऽपि बाध्यते तहींश्वरस्य भ्रान्तत्वं प्रसज्येत, बाध्यशुक्तिकारजतद्रष्टवत् । तस्य त्वभ्रान्तत्वान्नानेनानुभूयमानो ब्रह्मात्मभेदो निवर्तते इति सिद्धम् । वादावली अपर experienced १४९ by 514. Further, by this (inference) * the differeाce 11der (disputc d()es 10t disappeaur with release, because it is experienced by the Lord, like his own form (svarup2)' that (difference) is established . 515, “ Now though it be experienced by the Lord, |et it disappear ill release. What is the sub later in (maintaining the) opposite view ? [f this be asked, 10 516. If there b0e Sublati()r even for what is (2x perienced by the Lord, then there is the contingence of the dcludedness of the Lord, as for him who cognises the sublatable shell-silver. Since, however, He is 10t आह—नेश्वरेण स्वस्मात्संसारिणो भेददर्शनेऽपि him does not disappear : this is estab • 517. A10ther one says, "though by the Lord is cogाised the difference of the one i E worldly b01dage १५० वादावली मुक्तस्य भेदः सिद्धयति । न हि वयं मायावादिन इव जीवब्रह्मणोजीवानां वा भेदमपारमाथिकं ब्रमः, किन्तूपाधिकृतमेव । ५१८. अतः पारमार्थिकत्वादीश्वरेणानुभूयमानत्वं युज्यते । औपा धिकत्वादुपाधिनाशे मुक्तौ तन्नाशात्स्वाभाविकाभेदः सिद्धयतीति । ५१९ . तदसत्, अभेदस्य स्वाभाविकत्वे सुखदुःखाद्यनुसन्धान प्रसङ्गात् । न हि चैतन्यैक्ये स्वाभाविके वर्तमाने सुखदुःखाद्यननुसन्धानं कचिद्दृष्टम् । ५२०. ननु वयं जीवान्ब्रह्मणोंऽशानभ्युपगच्छामः । तत्र किमंशा from Hi!mself, still the difference for the released is not established. For we do not, like those wh0 uphold the doctrine of Maya (Mayavadims), say that the difference between the self and Brahman (or a170ng the selves is m101-real, but (that) it is the product of adju11cts , 518. He20ce because of being real, it stands t८) reaso1 that it is experienced by the Lord. Because of beil1g due to adju1cts, it (.४. difference) is destroyed when the audjunct is destroyed at release ; hence there 519. That is not sound (says the siddhantin); for if 101-difference be natural, then there is the con tingence of the recollection of (011e another's) pleasure, pain, etc. There is not indeed cognised anywhere the 101-recollection of pleasure, pain, etc., 'when there exists natural identity of intelligence. 520 , * Now, we admit the individual selves , as parts of Brahrma. Here, is there deduced reciprocal १५१ नामन्योन्यानुसन्धानमापाद्यते, उतांशिनः। नाद्यः; हस्तपादाद्यवच्छिन्नात्मां शानां तदभावात्; औपाधिकभेदस्य सत्वात् । अत एव नोत्तर इति चेन्न । ५२१. अंशिनः परमेश्वरस्यैव स्वाभाविकाभेदे सकलजनसुख दु:खाद्यनुसन्धानापादनात् । ५२२. ननूक्तमत्र जीवेश्वरयोः स्वभावेनाभेदेऽप्युपाधिकृतभेदस्य सत्वान्न जीवगतसुखदुःखादिप्राप्तिरीश्वरस्येति । ५२३. तन्न ; हस्तपादाद्युपाधिभेदेऽपि भोक्तुरेकत्वानुभवात् । rect)llection as among the parts (or that which has parts (i.e. the whole)? Not the first because that (recol lection) does not exist for the parts of the self delimited by handls, feet, etc ., since difference due to adju71cts is real. For the same reas01 10t the latter (alternative).' If this be said, no (says the siddhantin) 521. For if it is in the case of the Supreme Lord] Himself, wh0 has the parts (t.४. who is the whole) that there is natural not1-difference, there is deduced recol lection of the pleasure the pair etc., of all persons. 522. Now it has been said with regard to this, individual self and the Lord, yet since there is the difference produced by adjunct there d0 not result for the Lord the pleasures, pair, etc., present in the individual self. 523. That is not (sound); for in spite of differ ences due to adjuncts like hands, feet, etc., there is admitted the 01eness of the enjoyer . ५२४. ननु संश्लिष्टोपाधित्वमनुसंधाने प्रयोजकम् । तदभावात्प्रकृते नानुसन्धानमिति चेत्---किमुपाधिसंश्लेषमात्रं प्रयोजकमुत स्वरूपैक्ये सति ५२५. नाद्य: ; मातृसुखादेर्गर्भस्येनानुसन्धानप्रसङ्गात् । नोत्तर : ; स्वरूपैक्यमात्रस्थ प्रयोजकत्वे सम्भवति विशेषणप्रक्षेपे प्रमाणाभावात् । तस्मात्स्वरूपाभेदेऽनुसन्धानमपरिहार्यम् । ५२६. तदेवं जीवेश्वरभेदस्यौपाधिकत्वे स्वाभाविकाभेदेनेश्वरस्य जीवगतसुखदुःखाद्यनुसन्धानप्रसङ्गस्यावर्जनीयत्वात्, तदङ्गीकारस्य च प्रमाण विरुद्धत्वात् , स्वाभाविक एव जीवेश्वरभेदः, न त्वौपाधिकः । 524 conjoined mature of the adjurcts ; because ()f its &bscence there is 10 recollection in the present context.' If this be said, is the moete conjoining of adjuncts the determina7t or (only) when there is identity of th0c 525. Not the first, because of the contingence of the recollection of the Mother's pleasure etc., by the child in the w011b. Not the latter ; for when it is poss sible for the identity of the entity alone to be the deter Imina11t, there is no authority for introducing a guali ffication. Therefore where there is norm-difference of entity, recollection cannot be avoided . 526. Thus, therefore, since, if the difference be tween the individual self and the Lord be due to adju11ct, the contingence of the Lord's recollection, due to matural 101-difference, of the pleasure, pain , etc., present in! the individual self, cam10t be avoided, a1d since its ५२७, किञ्च विमतो भेदः पारमार्थिकः, असद्वयतिरिक्तत्वात्, ब्रह्म वदित्यनुमानबाधितत्वाच्च न भेदत्वसाधनं भेदमिथ्यात्वे मानमिति सिद्धम् । ५२८. अत एव विमतानि शरीराणि देवदत्तस्यैव भोगायतनानि ; शरीरत्वात् , संप्रतिपन्नवत्-इत्याद्यनुमानं प्रत्यक्षबाधितम्, परस्परसुखदु खाद्यनुसंधानप्रसंगपराहतं च इति । ५२९. विमतानि कलत्राणि देवदत्तस्यैव भोगायतनानि ; कलत्र त्वात् , सम्प्रतिपन्नवत्-इत्याद्यनुमानाभाससमानयोगक्षेमतयापहास्यम् । acceptance is opp050ed t० (al) authority, the difference betwe(21 the individual self and the Lord is natural, and 527 . And further because of being sublated by the inference * thc difference under dispute is real. it is established that the proba1s “being different' is Imot the authority for (the establishment of) the. illusory [ [ 528. For the same reason, arly inference like the following : “ the bodies under dispute are objects of enjoyment for Devadatta alone, because of being bodies, like the admitted (body)' is sublated by perception, and is reftted by the contingence of the reciprocal recollector1 of pleasure, pain, etc. • 529. It is to be ridiculed because of parity of welfare with a falacious infere1ce,. “the wives under १५४ ५३०. जयतीर्थमुनीन्द्रेण बालबोधाय निर्मितम् । वाङ्मुखाद्वाङ्मुखं भूयात्प्रीत्यै माधवमध्वयोः । इतेि वादावली समाप्ता । dispute are the objects of enjoyment for Devadatta. alone, because of being wives, 1ike the admitted (wife). ' 530. This discourse compiled by the vermerable sage Jayatrtha for the instructions of the learners, out of the discourses (of Sri Madhya) may it be for the pleasure of Madhava (Vispu) arाd Madh va. [The Roman figures denote the 1ain di४isions indicated in tle translation and the figures within brackets denote the secti011s]] 1 (1). Jayatrtha the great waita Vedantir offers his prayers t0 Lord Vispu and asks for his grace. It is the traditional practice work the as against NOTES the propose to write in the opening verse of the work. Advaitims' contention that it is illusory, The C011 The for its object the perfect 13rahman (Madllhva points out that the term1 Brahman means the ab0dle of infinite auspicious attributes). The reasor) for the assertion of the perfection of 13rahman s sta.ted in the second Sutra. 1.e., because He is the creator, sustainer, etc., of this; universe. If the created universe proves to be unrel, its creator's perfection would also become unreal ; once His perfection bec0131es unreal meditation of him1 is meaningless. In order to establisll the necessity and propriety of the meditation o advocated in the W८datf( s?!।४८७, Jayatirtha prop0ses to establish the absolute reality of the universe through an elaborate criticism and refutation of the Advaitims' argument establishing the illustory nature of the universe. The first 1ime in the invocatory verse is the substance of the f the universe, He is the efficien 156

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the soul is not created by God, but is dependent on Him. He is not the Satta-prada, but the satta is in His adhWcl i.e., (it is dependent on Him). Eight:fold functions are attributed to God (1} utpam=creation, (2) 'Sthiti·o- maintenance, (3) Smizharcv-destruction, (4) Niyammza- -'control, (5) Jitana--=-knowledge, (6) ajnana'~:nescience, (7) Bandfla- Bondage and (8) Mok~a=-=libera­ tion. II (2). Jayatirtha's reference to Vi~Qu as the creator, sustainer, etc., of the real universe is objected to by the fiurvapak:jln on the ground that the universe is not real. As the illusory nature of the universe is clearly established by scripture and other pramat}as, the Advaita writer Anandabodha in his Nyayamakaranda sets forth the three inferences to establish the illusory nature of the universe. The Advaitin's inference proceeds with three probazw, namely cognisablity, inertness and finitude. The subject of the inference is " that in reference to which there is dispute--whether it is illusory or absolutely real." That is to say it is other than Brahman, the uncreated and the barely phenomenal. The subject should have been stated as follows; the world under dispute, that is other than Brahman, non-existence and apparent reality. The statement of the subject by the use of only one word is attributable to the principle of parsimony. III (3). Mithyii.tva i.e., the probandum in 'the above inference is undefined. The probandum in any inference must be known as existing somewhere, in some place other than the subject (Pak~a). No Knowledge of the probandum is possible where it is indefinable. Inference can be of no help to us where we do not have the knowledge of the probandum. In Advaita literature mithyatva is defined in the seven forms mentioned. Jayatirtha proposes to examine each of the definitions in detail. In the criticism of the Advaitin's inference' Jayatirtha first directs his attack against the defects of the probanhum. For a statement of alternatives' 3-7 seeTattvapradiPika (2nd editi~n), p. 33 ; for the Advaitin's refutation of the Dvaita criticism, see· NOTES

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Advaitasiddhi (Advaitamafijari), p. 9 'establishing alternatives ·(3) and (7). IV (4-15). Jayatirtha points out in the rest of the text that not one of the alternative explanations of illusoriness holds water, Of this it cannot be the first. "".Lhe second alternative is further resolved into two alternatives i.e., the content that is lacking it, real or unreal. Both the alternatives are rejected on the ground qf the defect of overpervasion in respect of Asat and Brahman, According to the Advaitin neither is illusory. The probans" being different from sat " is found in asat, which is not illusory. The probans " being different from asat " is found in Brahman that is not illusory. Hence the defect of overpervasion. The difference predicated with reference to indeterminability has for its counter-correlate the real-and-the-unreal together. The Dvaitin no doubt admits that the universe is non-different from real. This does not prevent him from pointing out that the universe is different from the real-and-the-unreal together. The Dvaitin secures the difference from the real for the universe by taking the instance of Brahman, because that is what the Advaitin understands by real. We must not fail to note the fact that Madhva admits difference between reals. In fact according to him there are no two perfectly identical things. This fact is brought out by his doctrine of fivefold differences (paficabheda). The interpretation of the term indeterminability as " not being the locus of reality and unreality" fares no better at the hands of the Dvaitin. The Dvaitin admits that the universe is not at the same time the locus of the real and the unreal. The adduced defect, namely, establishment of the established is still there. The quotation " that which is not indeterminable " is from Citsukha's TattvapradJpika (p. 79). The main objection of the Dvai'tin •is not that the probandum indeterminability is not . -cognised .anywhere. We should note the fact that the. Dvaitin's analysis of reality admits of no compromise. There is no half way house between the real aild the unreal. The law of the 158

VADA:VALi

excluded middle applies ·to reality and admits of no exception .. Whatever is not real is unreal ; whatever is not unreal is real. The disjunction is complete. They don't admit a non-descript tertitum quid.

The Advaitin maintains that the two-fold differences predicated by him with reference to indeterminability are not to be taken as absolutely real. There would result contradiction only when we have two really opposed negations in one and the same locus. Where the negations are not absolutely real, there is no scope for contradiction. (See Tattvapradfpika, p. 16). The Advaitin is of opinion that the universe cannot be determined in terms of the real and the unreal. So he calls it, "different from the real and the unreal." But he maintaines that it is the indeterminable nature of the universe in terms of the real and the unreal that has led him to describe them as different from either. The differences should not be taken as real. The word only is significant for the Advaitin who wants only to establish that the universe cannot be defined in terms of the real and the unreal. He does not affirm the difference from the real or the unreal predicated about the Universe. The Dvaitin urges as against this argument, " because the universe cannot be determined in terms of inderminability let him describe it as the opposite of indeterminability." The Dvaitin has stated two pervasions: (1) wherever there is the non-existence of unreality, there is reality; (2) wherever there is non-existence of reality, there is unreality. The Advaitin urges that these pervasions are not established, and as long as they are not established the Dvaitin cannot treat the Advaitin's description of the universe as contradictory. The Dvaitin holds that the prevasion can be secured in the Atman i.e., the Brahman. In the Brahman there is the absence of unreality, and the presence of reality, V (16-25). The Advaitin points out that the peumsion between reality and the non•3xistence of unreality put forth by the Dvaitin in the case of Atmaq is conditioned by the adjunct NOTES

159'

atmatva. The Dvaitin in reply analysis the term iitmatva into eight alternatives and refutes them one after another. The Nyaya definition of generality is that it is eternal, one, and abides in many. As Atmatva is present only in Brahman and not anywhere else, it is impossible to treat it as a generality. The Advaitin in reply contends that there is possibility for generality on the ground of the presence of the assumptive differences in the ii.tman. The Dvaitin's answer to this objection is that such assumptively different ~itmans form a part of the subject, because all that is illusory is treated as the subject. Hence atmatva cannot be an upii.dhi and no counter-argument in the form "the world is not real, because it is anatma" would be tenable because of partial non-establishment of the probans "atmatva ". The second alternative, reality (sattvam), happens to be the probandum itself. Hence there is the defect of non-difference of the probans and the probandum. The third alternative, unsublatability, is found in non-existence and there is no probandum there. Hence the inconstancy of the pervasion. The fourth alternative, knowledgeness, is found in the subject, because vrtti-jffana is also a kind of knowledge ; hence ii.tmatva cannot be an upadhi. The fifth alternative, being the substrate of knowledge, is not found in the atman though it is real. Hence the inconstancy of the pervasion. Atman according to Advaita is not a knowing entity. There is no substrate-attribute relation in it. The sixth alternative, self-luminosity, is discussed when the criticism of the probans, i.e., cognisability is taken up (XV ff). The seventh and the eighth alternatives are not found in the ii.tman. The advaitin's Brahman admits of no predication, for the reason that there is nothing outside it. The A.d'Witin finds fault with the Dvaitin for the analysis of the term Jtmatva, on the ground that such an entity is established for the Dvaitin. The resourceful Dv~itin turns round and retorts th!lt whatever alternatives may !>e acceptable to the Dvaitin, they 160

VADAVALi

are all defect-ridden for •the Advaitin. The Dvaitin concludes that the Advaitin's position that the universe is different from the real and the unreal is contradictory. VI (26-+2). The siddhantin refutes the inference urged to establish indeterminability. The commentator states the inference in full : " what is under dispute is different from the real and the unreal, because it is sublatable, like Brahman as a negative instance". Some logicians are of opinion that the non-established qualification is no defect at all, and others are of opinion that it is a defect. The school that holds the opinion that it is a defect argues that a non-established qualificatioR obstructs our cognition of pervasion. Thus it taints the inference. As against this, certain neo-logicians point out that the definition of the subject (pak~a) should not include the term "doubt". In negative pervasion where the probandum is a negation there is no need for the estab· lishment of the qualification; so it is urged that the non-established qualification is no defect at all. The defect is alleged from the opponent's point of view. S' ri Madhva is of opinion that "as1rayasiddhi ", "vyadhikarat;iisiddhi," .etc., are not defects. They are cases of the defects of the positive instances. In this inference of the Advaitin there is not the defect of non-established qualification. The subject in the inference is reality and unreality. If any one of them by itself is taken as the subject there is the non-fulfilment of the object for which the inference is used. The purpose of the inference is to establish that the universe is different from the real and the unreal. Such a position cannot be established with reality or unreality alone as the subject. Further there will be the defect of the establishment of the established if only one term (the real or the unreal) is treated as the subject. So the subject comprises two terms reality, and unreality. The probandum is "being the counter-correlate of a~olute nonexistence located in a sin£'1e entity." The statement of the probandum in this manner helps ,the Advaitin to get over the deiect NOTES

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of the non-established probandum. The' positive instance cited is colour and taste. In this positive instance there is the probandum " being the counter-correlate of the absolute non-existence located in a single entity". Let us assume Vayu (air) as the single entity. In Vayu there is the absolute non-existence both of colour and taste. There is the probans 'being an attribute." The Davaitin criticises the inference in detail. The term " vastu" in the inference means reality, and as such that part of the subject cannot be the counter-correlate of the non-existence present in itself. Hence the contradiction. The probans is inconstant in respect of knowability and nameability. These two attributes are not absent from any place. They are called kevalanvayi dharmas. As such there is no non-existence for them. Hence the probandum " being the counter-correlate of absolute non-existence located in a single entity" is not found in them. The probans, " being an attribute " is present there. Hence the inconstancy. Besides this, the inference is conditioned by an adjunct "being non-contradictory", An adjunct is that which is pervasive with the probandum and nonpervasive with the probans. "Being non-contradictory" is found in all those places where the probandum is present. Let us take the example itself, i.e. colour and taste. There is the adjunct there. Colour and taste are not opposed. They are found together in the fruit. The adjunct is not pervasive of the probans. The probans " being an attribute" is present in the subject. The adjunct is not there for the simple reason that reality and unreality are contradictories. An unacceptable counter-inference like the one formulated by the Advaitin is put forth by the Dvaitin. There is only a slight modification in the counter-inference. The term "vastu" is replaced by the term Dharmi (substrate). The conclusion reached by the counter-inference is not acceptable to the Advaitin, because there is nt> o•e substrate in which there is the non existence of the potness as .veil as the non-existence of non-potness. The Advaitin makes use of " pret;limption " (a pramal}a) to proVe indeterminability. He sta~s two general rules pertaining 11 162

VADAVALl

to reality and unrealiti- The real cannot be sublated, and the unreal cannot be cogrl.ised. (See TattvapradiPika, p. 76). The universe is sublated as well as cognised. Sublatability and cognisability cannot be accounted for except by the presumption that the universe is neither real nor/unreal. This Pramal)a according to Madhva is subsumed under inference. The presumption in this case can be expressed in the form of an inference: "what is under dispute is indeterminable, because it is sublatable as well as cognisable." The Dvaitin with a view to point out the inconstancy of the pervasion in the presumptive argument proposes first to examine the term " sat " in the counter-argument urged with a view to establish the presumptive arguments. If_ it is interpreted as one that possesses reality, then the universe which possesses reality is sublatable, according to Advaita; and as such there is the contradiction of the following pervasion of the Advaitin " that which is real is not sublatable ". It may be contended that there is no sublation of the universe in empirical state. The Dvaitin replies that in vyavahara stage inference does establish the sublatable nature of the universe. There are certain errors like the perceptions of the blue colour in the AltaS'a which are not at all sublated. There would be non-difference with them for reality. If it is interpreted as that which is unsublatable there would result the defect of the non-difference of the subject from the probandum. It cannot be the third for the reason that the Dvaitins accept that Brahman is unsublatable. Hence the defect of the establishment of the established. The Dvaitin analysis the statement that " the unreal is not cognised ". What is it, that is not cognised ? Is it the cognition of the unreal as unreal ? If that is so, then there would be no empirical usage in respect of the unreal. If the eogriition of the unreal as real be denied, there would be no empirica.l usage in respect of delusion, beca.1le the very definition of delusion is the apprehension of the unreal as trea.l. If it be contended that what NOTES

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is deluded is indeterminable, then is thaf indeterminable cognised as indeterminable, or, as otherwise ? If it be cognised as it is, tl.en there could be no empirical usage about delusion, because the indeterminable is cognised as indeterminable. If it be cognised as otherwise, then there is the violation of the statement that the unreal is not cognised. On this ground there is no possibility of erroneous cognition. (For Advaitins refutation of the criticism, see Ad·writa siddhi, p. 121). VII (43). The second alternative referred to (the second of the first seven alternatives stated in the beginning of the text, i.e. unreality). The Dvaitin points out that it cannot be unreality. Indetenninability according to the Advaitin is other than both the real and the unreal. The statement that indeterminability is unreality is opposed to AdYaita. VIII (44-60). The Dvaitin examines the third alternative "being different from the real". He resolves this again into four alternatives. Is it para jati (summum genus), or being not Brahman, or unreality, or being other than unsublatability. In the first case there is the defect of apasiddhanta (being opposed to the doctrines of one's own school). The advaitin does not deny the presence of generality in the universe. In the second case, i.e. "being not Brahman, there is the defect of the establishment of the established, because the Dvaitins admit that the 1aniverse is not Brahman. In the third case i.e. unreality, there is oppo· sition to their own school of thought, because the Advaitins do not admit that the universe is unreal. They hold that it is indeterminable i.e. being other than the real and the unreal. In the fourth case there is the defect of the establishment of the established. The Dvaitin admits that the universe is other than the unsublatable. The unsublatable is Brahman, and the universe is other than Him. Hence the" defect of the establishment of the established. If the term " beitlg other than the unsublatable " is interpreted as s1~b· latabilit;v, the Dvaitin proceeds resolve the sense of the term into two. (a) Is sublatability an enoneously cognised object or (b) is

to 164

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it being the counter-correlate of negation in the locus of the cognition ? It cannot be the first. The Dvaitins too have admitted that kind of sublatability for the universe. The universe which is delusively cognised as indeterminable is validly cognised by the Dvaitin as real. Hence the defect of the establishment of the established. The second alternative is resolved into two ; the negation in reference to the locus, is it at a particular place and time, or is it in all three times, and all places? In the first case there is the defect of the establishment of the established in respect of a part of the subject. In the second case there is contradiction in relation to a part of the subject. Eternal and omnipresent Akas'a and Time form a part of the subject. They can never become the counter-correlates of the nonexistence in respect of all three times and all places. Hence the contradiction. The commentator discusses in this connection whether Akas'a and Time are eternal and omnipresent. There are scriptural decla· rations to the effect that Akiis'a emerged out of Atman, and night and day are created. The scripture in these contexts refers to the elemental Akas'a and secondary Time. The Akas'a and Time referred to by the Dvaitin are not primary ones. It is called Avyakrta Aka~a and not Bhutakas'a. The Time referred to is Mahakala. They are eternal and omnipresent. They are cognised by witness-conciousness. The Dvaitin examines the term "being cognised" and resolves it into the two following alternatives. Is it being validly cognised, or delusively cognised ? The first alternative leads to the defect of undue extension. The Dvaitin points out that the term negation (ni!Jedha) can mean two things :-It may mean cognition of non-existence, or cognition of" being different from the real." It can'hot 'be the first because of the contingence of absolute unreality. It caflnot be the second for the reason thaf the Advaitin has not yet explained the term "being different from the nml". " NOTES

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IX (61-68). The Dvaitin examines the fourth alternative" not being a content of PramaiJa ". He resolves the sense of the term into two: (1) not being a content of some one prama9a or (2) not being a content of any pramal)a at all. It cannot be the first, because the Dvaitin admits that attributes like odour are not ~ontents of some prama:r;ta like the sense of hearing. Hence the defect of the establishment of the established. It cannot be the s~tcond, because of the contingency in respect of Brahman becom· ing illusory. Brahman according to Advaita is not the object of any pramaqa. Besides, it is impossible to define the universe as the subject because it is said to be not the content of any prama:Qa. In the absence of pramii.IJas we cannot have any knowledge. Hence the difficulty of defining the universe as the subject. If it be contended that the universe is known through perception which cognises the phenomenal and as such it is impossible to define the universe as the subject, no says the siddhantin. There is no prama:Qa to the effect that perception cognises only the phenomenal contents. It may be that because of the unreality of the objects that perception cognises, it is said to cognise phenomenal objects. The Dvaitin asks, "how do we know that the objects of perception are only phenomenal?" The statement that something is a pramii.Qa and yet cognises only the phenomenal contents is contra· dietary. The term prama:Qa means valid cognition. It is contradictory to state that valid cognition cognises phenomenal objects. If that which cognises phenomenal objects is pramiiiJa there is nothing to prevent us from regarding the shell-silver cognition as pramaiJa. The Dvaitin constructs an inference and draws a conclusion opposed to Advaita: "pramaiJa cognises the non-phenomenal, because it is a pramiiiJa, like the non-dual texts." One is tattvika pramaiJa and the other "is ~tattvika pramii:Qa. The argument is based on the Advaitin'se theory of threefold reality. The Dvaitin points out that such an argument is valid only aft~r the establishment of the • threefold nature of reality and not•prior to it. 166

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X (69-70). The Dvaitin examines the fifth alternative i.e., being the content of an invalid cognition. It is acceptable to the Dvaitin. Hence the defect of the establishment of the established. S'ri Madhva is of opinion that everything in the universe is real. His test for reality is that it must have existed at some time. For a thing to be real it need not be eternal. So he regards the Advaitin's statement that " the universe is indeterminable " and the Buddhists statement that "the universe is momentary" and the atheistic Sarikhyan's statement that "the universe is a modification of Prakrti" as invalid. The .Dvaitin is opposed to all the three doctrines, Vivartavada, K~aQ.ikavada, and Paril}amavada. God, according to Dvaita Vedanta is the nimitta-karaQ.a (efficient cause) of the universe. He does not create the universe out of nothing; He is just like the potter, with this difference that He is omnicient. XI (71-88). The Dvaitin examines the sixth alternative i.e., "nescience." Is nescience the beginningless indeterminable, or the beginningless positive existent that is destroyed by the cogni· tion, or the material cause of the delusion ? All these three modes of definition are vatiated by defects. It cannot be the beginningJess indeterminable, because indeterminability as such is not yet established. The non-establishment of indeterminability leads to the defect of the non-established qualification. Besides, the definition as what is beginningless and indeterminable is overpervasive in respect of Akas'a. Akas1a is beginningless as well as indeterminable. The adduced overpervasion is refuted on the ground that Akas1a is not beginningless, because of the non-existence of beginninglessness in any entity other than Brahman. The Dvaitin points out that in that case nescience too cannot be beginningless ; hence the definition is inapplicable. The second definition is taken up for criticism i.e., "a beginningless positive entity, destroyable by cognition". This definition is inapplicable because in nescience there is the absetce of the attribute " beginninglessnes~ ". For the Advaitin no entity other than Brahman is beginningless !n the plenary sense of the te~m NOTES

167

Hence its absence from nescience. Further it is unintelligible for us to admit destruction by cognition for what is beginningless and existent. Brahman is beginningless and positive and it is not destroyed by any cognition. The same position holds good in the case of nescience also. To this the Advaitin replies that the term " positive entity " is used with reference to nescience in a figurative sense. It does not in reality mean a positive entity. The term signifies that it is different from non-existence. The siddhantin replies that the intended significance of the term "positive entity" alone will do for the purpose of establishing the non-destruction by cognition for the beginningless existent, on the analogy of Drahman. Instead of a positive existent we have in its place the beginningless being different from non-existence ; the same analogy holds good in the case of nescience also. The Advaitin contents that the Dvaitin's inference is conditioned by the adjunct "self-hood." The Dvaitin's inference is as follows. "That which is a beginningless and positive entity is destroyed by cognition, because it is a beginningless and positive entity like Brahman." The adjunct self-hood is present wherever there is the probandum. If Brahman is the probandum, self-hood also is there. Thus the pervasion between the adjunct and probandum is secured. The adjunct must be non-pervasive in respect of the probans, i.e., "beginningless and positive entity". This is present in the subject and there is no self-hood there. Thus the non-pervasion in respect of the probans is secured for the adjunct. The Dvaitin points out the inconstancy of the pervasion of· the probandum by the adjunct in respect of absolute non-existence. Absolute non-existence is not destroyed by cognition. Being not d~troyed by cognition is the probandum. It is present in absolute non-existenc1:1 and the adjunct selfhood is not there. Hence the inconstanty of the pervasion. Thus it is established· that the adduced adjunct is defective. Therefore the inference is not con· ditioned by an adjunct. • 168

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The Dvaitin examines the third alternati ·e, namely " being the material cause of delusion", What is it that is meant by the term "delusion " ? Is it the content of the delusive cognition, or the delusive cognition itself ? It cannot be the content of the delusive cognition, because it is unreal ; and for the unreal there is no material cause. It cannot be the second, because the definition "being the material cause of delusive cognition" is over· pervasive in respect of the internal organ. The internal organ is the material cause of the cognition in general. Further the defini· tion is also inapplicable, because nescience is not directly the material cause of the delusive cognition. The Advaitin points out that non-acceptance of the position that nescience is the material cause of delusion would result in the admission of the reality for the delusive cognition. The Dvaitin points that such a position is acceptable to him. The Advaitin points out that the acceptance of the reality of the delusive cognition contradicts the possibility of sublation. If the delusive cognition is to be real, there should be no sublating cognition as invalid knowledge; but there is the sublating cognition. So the delusive cognition is not real. The sublating cognition denies the reality of the content of the cognition. The Ad,·aitin's argument leads to the conclusion that if the content of the cognition is real, the cognition is real. XII (89-130). The Dvaitin after dismissing the definition of nescience, proceeds to point out that nescience has no pramaQa. It is not nescience as such that has no pramaQa; but it is nescience as defined by the Advaitin that has no pramaQa. The Dvaitin also admits a kind of nescience that is beginningless ; but it is not indeterminable. The Advaitin puts forth this inference to establish the positiwe nature of nescience. (See Taft'I.Japradrpika, p. 58). 'lhe ~ubject of the inference is Devadatta's valid cognition and the pl'obandum is positive nescience. It h'as to be established; so it cannot be stated barely. If it is barely stated, the Dvaitin would urge the

. NOTES

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defect of non-established qualification; so it is stated in an indirect manner. The valid cognition of Devadatta i.e., the subject, destroys its anterior non-existence as well as the positive nescience. To secure the intended meaning we ha·e to exclude anterior nonexistence ; so the following words " being other than anterior non-existence" are used. The probans is "being ·alid knowledge". This is in the subject i.e., Devadatta's valid cognition. l'he example is the undisputed valid cognition. Let us take one Rama's valid cognition; there is the probans, "being a valid cog· nition ". There is the presence of the probandum also there. Rama's valid cognition destroys what is beginningless and other than the anterior non-existence of Devadatta's valid cognition. The Dvaitin criticises the Advaitin's inference by erecting a counter-inference yielding conclusions that are not acceptable and desirable to the Advaitin. The commentator states the inference in detail ; Caitra's desire has for its material cause something other than that which produces it and is unsublatable, because it is a desire, like Maitra's." This inference is unacceptable to Advaita. This inference of the Advaitin is from the Advaita work, the Vivarat;a. It is urged to establish the positive nature of nescience. Jayatirtha states the inference in full and points out the significance and function of the words therein. The function of the word "removable by itself" is to make it inapplicable to adr~ta i.e., unseen potency ; unseen potency prevents the effect from coming into existence though the causes be present. So valid cognition cannot remove the unseen potency, because it prevents the rise of the said cognition itself. The words "present in its own locus " are used to avoid the applicability of the definition to cognisedness i.e., jnatata. The Bhliga school of Mlmamsa recognises that cognition of an object is inferred from the cognisedness that is found- in the objects cognised. This special quality is said to be gen!Jrated in the object by the cognition at the momemt of the cognition. The attribute " cognistdness " is found in objects, and not in cognitions. So the fords " present in its own locus " 170

VADAV ALi

are used. Non-cognisedness is not present in the locus i.e., valid cognition. Besides this, the aim of the Advaitin is to establish the positive nescience having for its substrate the atman and that is secured by the use of the words " present in its own locus ". The Dvaitin criticises the inference in detail. He points out that the said probandum is not definitely in the subjects. Valid cognition is the modification of the internal organ and as such it has for its material cause Manas. Manas is inert. According to the Advaitins of the VivaraQa school, an inert object cannot be the Gontent or locus. The inconstancy of the probans is also urged. Besides, the attribute " being other than its own anterior nonexistence" is urged to be purposeless. A positive entity does not destroy its own anterior non-existence. The coming into being of an entity alone destroys its anterior non-existence. Being other than its own anterior non-existence is said to be superfluous. The inference is further criticised by questioning the nature of the entity said to precede the valid cognition. If it is real there is the defect of the establishment of the established, because, the Dvaitin admits that nescience is real. If it is said to be indeterminable, such indeterminability is not found in the example i.e., " darkness preceding the light " ; darkness is not in the example ; there is thus the defect of the absence of the probandum. If the Advaitin defines it as that which is not specified to be indeterminable or real, such a general description is not acceptable. No such common attribute is said to exist as between a validly cognised entity and an invalidly cognised entity .. Indeterminability is not validly cognised because there is no pram3J].a securing its cognition. A common attribute is possible only as between two validly cognised objects. There cannot be any common attribute between the horns of a hare and the horns of a cow, because one of them is unreal and non-existent. •' Further the definition of the probandum is apitlicable to demerit. Demerit is admi!l:ed to be destroyed by valid cognition. The commentator cites the exaRaple of the cancellation of our s1ns NOTES

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at the sight of the holy waters of Setu• near Rames'varam. Demerit is there destroyed by cognition. The Davitin criticises the probans of the inference i.e., " being the manifestor of the non-manifested". The term manifestor is resolved to mean three alternatives. It does not mean the instrument of cognition. The sense-organ of sight is an instrument of cognition. In it there is the probans and not the probandum. Hence the inconstancy of the probans. Besides in the example i.e., the light of a lamp as it first comes into existence from darkness, the light is not considered as an instrument of cognition. It is treated as an accessory to the instrument of cognition. It only destroys the obstruction i.e., darkness. So in the example there is the defect of the absence of the probans. In the subject " valid cognitions " there is the absence of the probans i.e. being the instrument of cognition. Cognition cannot be the instrument of its own self. Hence the defect of the non-establishment of the probans in respect of the subject. If the term " manifestor " means " the accessory to an instrument of cognition", there is the inconstancy of the probans in respect of collyrium (applied to the eyes). This collyrium is said to have the power of helping the eyes to see through darkness. So it is an accessory to the instrument of cognition. In it i.e., the eye-paint, the probandum is not present. Hence the defect of the inconstancy of the probans. The term manifestor means " being cognition " ; since in the example, i.e., light, there is no jnatatvam there is the defect of the absence of the probans in respect of the example. The Advaitin urges that experience is the Prama"Qa in respect of the positive nature of nescience. He points out that therecollection " I did not know anything " is the evidence for it. This recollection i!f from the man who has just got up from his sleep. The DvaPtin urges that the recollection has for its content the non-existence of cognition and not p<'sitive nescience. It cannot be •so, says the Advaitin, because in deep sleep, as all the senses are 172

VADAVALi

at rest, there cannot be any knowledge. Further the cognition of non-existence is dependent on the cognition of the locus as well as the counter-correlate. In the absence of both the cognitions, the Dvaitin cannot hold that the content of the recollection is the nonexistence of the cognition. The Dvaitin replies that witness-consciousness cognises the locus as well as the counter-correlate and hence the content of the recollection cognition is the non-existence of cognition. According to S'ri Madhva, Sak!?in is always awake. It is of the very nature of the self (svarupa) unlike the other six sense organs (indriya), which are elemental. It is this sak~in that cognises the locus as well as the counter-correlate. The Advaitin cites another inference to prove the positive nature of nescience. The subject of the inference, nescience, is the non-existence of cognition; the probans is "being not cognised by the appropriate pramacya." There is the defect of the non-establishment of the probans. As nescience is said to be the non-existence of cognition, the probans, " being not cognised by any prama:Q.a " is not there. Nescience is not cognised by prama:Q.a, because it is destroyed by pramacya, like certain knowledge. The Dvaitin criticises his inference as being inapplicable. Once we state that nescience is not cognised by pramii:Q.a, it is con· tradictory to state an inference to establish it. Inference being a pramii.Qa cannot cognise nescience. Hence the inapplicability of the inference. The Advaitin tries to get over this contradiction by positing the presence of the pervasion by psychosis and by negating the presence of the pervasion by cognition in which consciousness is reflected (phala). Through the positing of the cognition of the subject by psychosis the cognition for the subject is secured. Through the negation of the cognition of the fruit (the cognition in which consciousness is reflected) the defect of the wn'-establishment of the probans in respect of itself is refuted. ~~ To this the Dvaitin r~plies that the Advaitin does not admit the pervasion by the psychosis oflhescience. Nescience is destro;ed NOTES

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by vrtti-jnana and it is beginningless, w"hereas the psychosis lasts only for some time ; so it cannot be pervaded by it. Further the Dvaitin points out that the Advaitin's pervasion is vitiated in respect of impressions. The impressions are located in the manas. They produce recollection or recognition and after that they die away. Recognition destroys impression; so impressions are destroyed by the pramiiiJa i.e., recognition. Impressions are cognised by pramiil}.a. " Not being cognised by pramal}.a " is the probandum. This is not present in impressions; but there is the probans i.e., "being destroyed by pramiil}.a ". Hence the inconstancy in respect of impressions. Recognition according to Dvaita Vedanta is a pramal}.a that is subsumed under perception. The Advaitin cites another pramii!}a from usage in support of the positive nature of nescience. It takes the following form " I know not the sense stated by you ". Here the content of the cognition is positive nescience and it is not the non-existence of cognition. The content of the statement cannot be the non·existence of cognition. The cognition of non-existence is dependent on the cognition of the locus and the counter-correlate. The admission contradicts the sense of the usage in question i.e., " I know not the sense stated by you". If he denies the need for cognition of the locus and counter-correlate, the absence of that prevents him from maintaining that the content of the statement is non-existence of cognition. So the Advaitin concludes that it is necessary to maintain that the content of the statement is positive nescience. The siddhantin resolves the usage " I know not the sense stated by you" to mean two things. Does it mean that every particular stated is restated and said to be not known, or does it mean that the thing in general is not known? It cannot be the first, because- the moment we admit that this is a restatement of every particular, there would be impossibility for the usage. If the Advaitin further contends that tltere is such a usage, then the D;aitin interprets the statement? " I know not the sense stated by 174

VADAVALI

you" to mean " I knov not the sense stated by you as valid." There is the cognition of the sense stated, but not the sense as valid. The content of the statement is the non·existence of the cognition as valid. The sense of a statement can be cognised as it is and at the same time be not cognised as valid. In a polemical debate the proponent first comprehends the sense stated by the opponent and refutes it after restating it. The Advaitin maintains that the position maintained by the Dvaitin is self-contradictory. The usage" I know not (validly) the sense stated by you " is valid. This statement is a qualified cognition and its immediate content is non-existence of cognition. The content of the," that " of that cognition is some object. The Advaitin contends that the object of the second cognition is also the content of the original cognition, because it is an attribute of it. Once it becomes its content it is also urged to be valid. If that be valid there is contradiction of one's own words in the statement that what is known as valid is not so known. The Dvaitin does not admit that the content of the second cognition is to be treated as the content of the original cognition. The content of the usage is what is immediately in touch with it, and not what is remotely connected with it. The Dvaitin admits that the knowledge of the locus and the counter-correlate is necessary. He holds that it is known of the particular, first in a general way; and there is non-existence of the cognition. Such a position is unacceptable to the Advaitin, because it establishes that the content of the statement tW.der discussion is non-existence of cognition. He may contend that if the particular is cognised, it is necessary for the cognition of its non-existence, because cognition of the counter-correlate is indispensable to it. Hence there is no possibility for the statement. The Dvaitin retorts that we have at times a gentWal knowledge that there is some particular. For instance we say thut there is some particular point there. We do not know the nature of that particular, but still we refer do particulars from our general NOTES

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knowledge of them. Usage with referl!nce to the particular is intelligible with the presupposition that we have some general knowledge of them. (For Advaitin's refutation of Dvaitins criticism. See Advaitasiddlzi, p. 133). XIII (131). It is pointed out that the Advaitin too has to adopt a position similar to that of the Dvaitin. The nescience which is considered to be positive must have a content. Vas that content kl)lown earlier or unknown ? If it be said that it is known, there is no possibility for usage of nescience in respect of it. We cannot be ignorant about what is known. If it be said that the content is not known earlier there is no possibility for the usage of nescience, because the cognition of nescience presupposes the knowledge of its content and locus. As against this position the Advaitin points out that all things whether as known or as unknown are contents for the witness-consciousness. The objects are cognised by witnessconsciousness in a general way prior to the vrtti·jnana and the usage "I know not the sense stated by you." If it be said and contended that though the sense is established by witness-consciousness still the desire to know the pramaJ,.la for it is sufficient reason for the usage, it is not so, says the siddhantin. For a thing that is established by witness-consciousness, the desire to make known a pramaJ,.la is fruitless. The Advaitin has to admit like the Dvaitin that what is cognised in general is restated with a desire to know the particular. There is no valid instrument of knowledge for the Advaitin to establish the positive nature of nescience. The nonestablishment of the nature of nescience leads logically to the nonestablishment of its effect. Hence the refutation of the positive nature of nescience on account of its unintelligible nature. XIV (132, 133). The seventh and the last of the Advaitin's definitions of illusoriness is, " being cognised in the same locus as its own !b~lute non-existence ". If the term " absolute noil· existence in the definition means "asat", then the definition of mithyatva applies only to asat. ~uch a position is opposed to •the Advaitin's view that the .world is neither asat nor sat. If 176

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the term " absolute nort-existence " means something other than existence i.e., being indeterminable as real or unreal, such a thing does not exist at all. Hence the non-establishment of the probandum. If it is contended that the term under discussion means " being other than real " that turns out to be unreal ; hence the adduced defect is not got over. There is no middle ground between the real and the unreal. XV (134-142). The first of the probans is taken up for criticism. The probans cognisability is resolved to mean two things: (1) the object of cognition and (2) non-self-luminosity. (See Tattt•a· pradlpiki.i, p. 34.) The first alternative again is resolved into two: (I) is the cognition of the nature of psychosis or (2) is it of the nature of consciousness? If it is the first, there is the defect of the inconstancy of the probans in respect of the Atman. The pro. bandum mithyatva is not found in the Atman and the probans cognisability is found in it. The Atman is the object of the psychosis generated by the study of Vedanta. The Advaitin further contends that in the Atman there is not that cognisability which is in the form of the fruit of cognition. There is then the discussion as to what the term, fruit, means ; is it cognisedness or empirical usage? If it is cognisedness it is not present even in objects of cognition. Cognisedness according to the Mimarhsakas is present only in the objects present, and not in the destroyed and past ones. Hence the defect of the non-establishment of the probans. There is also the defect of partial non-establishment of the probans in respect of the subject. The destroyed, future, and eternally to be inferred objects have no cognisedness, because cognisedness can only form a part of the subject ; hence the defect. If the Advaitin contends that the destroyed, future and eternally to be inferred objects have cognisedness, the Dvaitin points out that such a position is opposed to the Advaita schClOl 6f thought. In support of it, the Dvaitin quotes a passage from Citsukha who, while defining self-luminosity, points out that the definition should not include the destroyed, futtwe, and eternally to be inferred NOTES

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objects. In order to achieve their excl.usion he used the phrase "capacity to be the object of empirical usage of immediacy." Else, because there is no cognisedness in them they too would be self-luminous. Hence it follows that there is no cognisedness in them. So the defect of partial non-establishment of the probans in the subject stands. If the term " phala " means empirical usage there is again the defect of inconclusiveness of the probans in respect of the Atman, because the Atman is an object of the empirical usage arising from psychosis. If the cognition is said to be in the form of consciousness the Dvaitin does not admit it in the object like the pot etc., which form a part of the subject. Hence the defect of partial non-establishment in respect of the subject. (For a refutation of Dvaita criticism, see Advaitasiddhi, p. 10.) XVI (143-146). The second definition of cognisability is examined in detail and criticised. It is defined as the non-existence of self-luminosity. Self-luminosity is defined as "not being an object of cognition"; its non-existence, cognisability, turns out to mean "being an object of cognition". Such a position has been already criticised. The defects urged in there holds good in this case also. Self-luminosity may be defined as that cognition which does not depend on any consciousness other than itself for the empirical usage in respect of itself. The non-existence of it would be cognisability. Then there is the defect of the inconstancy of the probans in respect of the Atman. The Cognition of the Atman as non-dual, self-luminous etc., is dependent on the psyf:hosis generated by scriptural statements like " One only without the second". Thus there is cognisability in the Atman and there is the non-existence of the probandum. Hence the inconstancy of the preba:vs. The. Advaitin contends that the probans is not inconstant in respect of the indeterminate cognit~pn of the Atman. Such an il!determinate cog~ition is not de~endent on any consciousness other 12 178

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than itself. By the indeterminate usage is meant a thing which is neither real nor unreal, i.e., cognising a thing as neither real nor unreal. The Dvaitin points out that the objects like pot also can be treated likewise. The Advaitin does not accept that there is indeterminate usage in respect of objects like pot etc. To this the Dvaitin replies that similarly let there be no indeterminate. usage in respect of the Atman, too. The Advaitin instances the experience of the self in deep sleep as the evidence for indeterminate usage. The Dvaitin does not admit that in deep sleep the self is indeterminate. The individual after a good sleep recollects that he had sound and enjoyable sleep. The attributes "sound" and "ettjoyable " must have characterised it. So in deep sleep the self is not indeterminate as the Advaitin holds. XVII (147-151). There is another definition of self-luminosity by Citsukha i.e., "it is the capacity to be the object of empirical usage while not being an object of cognition." This definition is said to be contradictory, because that which is not cognised can never become an object of cognition and there will be no usage about it. The definition is impossible. Granting that the definition is somehow not contradictory, still there is the need for clearing the definition of self-luminosity which is a complex one. Its opposite is cognisability. The non-existence of a complex character can result in one of the three ways, (1) by the non-existence of the qualification i.e., the attribute (2) by the non-existence of the substrate or (3) by the non-existence of both. If it' results through the non-existence of the attribute, " not being an object of cognition " may itself be the probans. Defects of the position have already been noted. If it be the non-existence of the substrate, then there is the defect of the non-establishment of the probans in respect of the subject, The probans is not present in the subject ; '·its nonexistence alone is present. Objects like pot etc., are t>bjects of empirical usage of immediaqy. The probans is" not being objects of empirical usage of immediac:v. ". Hence the defect of partial NOTES

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non-establishment. Though the probam; be treated as present in merit and demerit which are said to be not the objects of empirical usage of immediacy, still the Dvaitin contends that even merit and demerit are objects of mind's perception which appears in the form of recollection. So they too are objects of empirical usage in the whole subject of immediacy. Hence the defect is non-establishment of the probans and not partial non-establishment of the probans in respect of the subject. The manas is accepted by the Dvaitin as a separate Karal}a. It has two functions. It cognises all external objects through the instrumentality of all other senses. Its independent function is to be the pramlil}a !n respect of recollection. It is this special function that makes the Dvaitin admit the independent nature of mind as a karal}a. If the non-existence be of the attribute, there is the defect that the substrate has no function for it. Besides the substrate is non -established. XVIII (152-179). The cognisability referred to by the Dvaitin can be neither of the valid nor of the delusive type. If it is said to he of the valid type it is opposed to Advaita. If it is said to be of the delusive type it is not accepted by the Dvaitin. The probans in a valid inference must be acceptable to both the"' disputants. Hence neither of the alternatives is established. The Advaitin finds a way out of the difficulty and contends that the probans is defined in general terms and not in a specific manner. Besides, he points out that it is not right to analyse into specific particulars a probans defined in general terms and thus refute it. Such a procedure would lead to the total non-existence of all inferences. In the ordinary inference where we establish fire with the help of the probans "smoke, if some one were to ask us as to•woot exactly is the probans, whether the smoke that is related te the present place and time or smoke that is related to some other place and time, we cannot aive any answer. If we hold tp~ smoke related to the present,place and time to be the probans, 180

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then such a probans is n~t established in the subject. Thus there would be no valid inference. The Dvaitin answers in detail. The inference which establishes fire with the help of the probans, smoke, has for its probans the smoke defined in general terms. It is by itself able to establish fire. So there is no need for the analysis of the probans, smoke into particular kinds. The particular kinds of smoke have no function in inference. It is not so in the case of the probans, cognisability. There is no common attribute between delusive cognisability and valid cognisability. A comparison is instituted to illustrate this point. There is no common attribute, lotusness, present in the sky-lotus and lake-lotus. The sky-lotus, just like the delusive cognisability, is non-existent. Then how is it that we speak of delusive cognisability? It is just like the reference to the sky-lotus and nothing better. Besides, the probans is contradictory, because it is found in places where there is no probandum i.e., illusoriness. In the Atman there is no illusoriness but there is cognisability. It is only found in the real i.e., Atman. This contradiction is sought to be refuted on the ground that cognisability is found in the shell-silver also. There the cognition is of shell only and not of the silver, says the Dvaitin. The question as to how shell can be the content of silver-cognition has to be answered. The Dvaitin resolves the term silver-cognition to mean two things: (1) the cognition that has silver, for its content, (2) the cognition that has the form of silver. It cannot be the first because there is no silver in the shell. It is the cognition that has the form of silver. The shell-silver-cognition has for its content shell; owing to defect it cognises the form of silver. Further such cognisability is not found in the subject. The probans cognisability is criticised by. the J)v"ctitin and he points out that it is inconstant, because it is presfiiJ.t in the Atman where there is no probandum i.e., illusoriness. The Advaitin contends that the Atman,is not cognised. To say that the NOTES

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Atman is not cognised is self-contradiction. Ve cannot affirm an attribute or negate an attribute, when we do not know the substrate. The statement that .luman is not cognised implies that Atman must have cognisability. 'Without such an implication the denial is of no meaning. Hence the self-contradiction of the Advaitin's statement. The Dvaitin, in support of the cognisability of the Atman, cites two inferences. The first inference has for its probandum cognisability and the probans is "being a thing". The defect of the non-establishment of the probans in respect of the subject is likely to be urged. The subject i.e., the Atman is not a thing. Hence the Dvaitin states a second inference which is not open to the said defect. The cognisability of the self is established in a round-about way by this inference. This pot is other than that cognisable which is different from that world that is other than this pot plus self. The example is any other pot, say X, this pot being" Y plus the self Z ". X is different from Y; Z is a cognisable entity which is other than the world different from thus by implication cognisability of Z is secured. Y The expression Brahman-knowledge points out that Brahman is the content of the cognition. Brahman-knowledge is not possible without Brahman being the content. The genitive case points out that Brahman is the content. The Advaitins contend that Brahman-knowledge means knowledge whose form is Brahman. That contention is dismissed after examining the several meanings of the term "form". The Dvaitin concludes that Brahman is an object of cognition and is cognised. Thus the adduced inconstancy of the probans, cognisability, in respect of Brahman is maintained. XX (188-200). The second probans "inertness" is taken up for criticism- and declared to be defective. Inertness is resolved into four- alternatives : (1) If inertness is construed as " not being the substrate of cognition ", there is.the defect of the partial non· establishment of the probans in respect of the subject. The subject

+z ; 182

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includes the empirical itmans. These Atmans are substrates of cognition. Hence the non-existence of the probans in this part of the subject. Besides there is the inconstancy of the probans also. It is found in Atman and in absolute non-existence, places where the probandum is not found. (2) If inertness means " not being self-hood ", it is not very clear. This definition means one of two things: (1) being different from Atman or (2) not being the substrate of self-hood. The former alternative is not accepted by the Advaitin. According to them there is no world apart from Brahman. In fact there is nothing apart from Brahman. Vhatever appears as apart from Brahman is only an illusory manifestation of Brahman. If it be contended that though there is no object really different from Brahman, there is the phenomenally different object, such a position is not admitted by the Dvaitin. The probans must be acceptable to both the disputants in a discussion. Besides, the probans is inconstant in respect of absolute non-existence. In absolute non-existence there is no probandum, but there is the probans" being different from the Atman ". Hence the inconstancy. (3) If "inertness " means "not being a substrate of self-hood " such a position is already criticised. In sections (16-2.3) the several alternative definitions of self-hood are.examim!d and they are found to be tainted by one of three defects, (1) non-distinction from probandum, (2) non-establishment of the probans, (3) inconstancy of the probans. (4) If inertness means "being the form of ajfiana" there is the defect of partial non-establishment in respect of the cognition m the form of psychosis. This forms a part of the subject. And in it there is non-existence of the probans i.e., the form of ajfiana. Is it the form of cognition or is it cognition itself ? Such a position is not easy to maintain. A Cognition must h!tve a content. When we refer to Atman as cognition, what is the eontent in that cognition? It cannot be Atman itseif; then there would be no difference between the content and cognition. The content o'r a. NOTES

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cognition and the cognition cannot be identical. Such a position is contradictory. The content of the cognition cannot be any other entity. (For Advaitins refutation of Dvaita criticism, See Advaita siddhi, p. -13.) XXI (201-210). The Dvaitin criticises the third and the last probans of the Advaitin, namely, "finitude". The term" finitude', is analysed to mean three things: (1) spatial finitude, (2) temporal finitude, (3) difference. If it is the first, there is the defect of partial non-establishment of the probans in respect of the subject. Time and Akiis'a form a part of the subject though they are divisible into parts. The Ams'ikala is not particularised. It does not admit of divisions. So also the non-elemental Akiis1a. In Time and in Akas1a there is the absence of the probans" spatial finitude". Hence the defect. If the probans means " temporal finitude ", even then there is the same defect, because the probans is not preseet in Akas'a and in Time. The Advaitin may contend that everything other than Brahman has spatial and temporal finitude and that there is in this way the establishment of the probans in Time and Akas'a; hence the absence of the contradiction. The Dvaitin urges that the contradiction is not removed. The term spatial finitude means " being the counter-correlate of absolute non-existence located in some place." ·when the Advaitin declares that everything has spatial finitude, in order to make intelligible the spatial finitude there must be the counter-correlate. Such a counter-correlate forms a part of the subject. Hence spatial finitude cannot be established. If another counter-correlate outside the world be admitted, there is the defect of partial non-establishment of the probans in respect of that counter-correlate. Hence the defect of contradiction. The Advaitin then contends that the Brahman is the counter-correlate, because •evfM"Ything is super-imposed on it. These objects are denied ihere. With Brahman as the counter-correlate finitude can be attributed to Kala and 4-kas'a. Hence there is no c&ntradiction. • 184

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The Dvaitin points ont that the Advaitin's definition of finitude means sublatability. If sublatability is the probans there is the defect of non-difference of the probans and the probandum. The probandum illusoriness is defined as the sublatable. Hence the defect. The Dvaitin in criticising temporal finitude which is the second alternative, points out the same defect as in the case of spatial finitude. The defect is contradiction. Then the question as to what exactly is the pramaQa that establishes temporal:finitude in Akas'a and Time is taken up. It cannot be the probans " intertness ". The probans intertness is already refuted. If according to Advaita the temporal finitude present in objects like pot are due to inertness, the Dvaitin objects to it and attributes the temporal finitude therein to an adjunct i.e. "being an effect". The pervasion is not invariable. The probans is inconstant in respect of nescience. Nescience is not an effect but is inert. Hence the inconstancy. If nescience be said to be an effect there is self-contradiction. Throughout Advaita literature nescience is spoken of as beginningless. There is no cause for it; so it cannot be an effect. The term " temporal finitude " is resolved to mean three things: (1) being non-eternal, (2) having a beginning, (3) not being in all three times. If we accept the first alternative there is the inconstancy of the probans, " inertness " in respect of mokl',!a. Mokl',!a is eternal. So there is the non-existence of the probandum " being non-eternal ". There is the probans, " inertness " there. Hence the defect. The description of mok~a as the fifth form is not without its significance. The inconstancy of the probans must be pointed out outside the subject. In order to secure the exclusion from the subject, mokeya is defined as the fifth. (1) It is not real, (2) nor is unreal, (3) nor is it real and unreal because 9Uch'a concept violates the law of contradiction (4) nor is it indete>rminable. Exclusion from the indeterm,inable results from mok~a=destruction of avidya, where avidya itself ii indeterminable. Mention of t'he NOTES

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fifth prakara VIeW IS to exclude these, according to whom mok~a is atma-svarupa; in such a case mok~a is sat or cit, not ja~a; if however it is of a fifth form, it must be ja9a. If mok~a is said to be characterised by temporal finitude, there is contradiction for the words of the Advaitin who maintains non-return. (For the Advaitin's refutation of the criticism, see Advaita siddhi, p. 15.) XXII (211-218). The term temporal finitude is interpreted as '• being the substrate of reciprocal non-existence." "Being the substrate of reciprocal non-existence" is just another name for difference. If temporal finitude is difference, the scriptural statements like "neti-neti" declare that Brahman is different from the world. Thus the probans is inconstant in respect of Brahman. The probandum, " illusoriness " is not present and the probans, "being a substrate of reciprocal non-existence" is there. Hence the defect. If the difference predicated by the scriptures be said to be phenomenal i.e., the difference resulting from nescience, the Dvaitin does not admit that. Then the probans would be " real difference ". The probans, " real difference " is not established in respect of the subject, becauese the subject is illusory. Besides, the same probans can establish the reality of the universe. The form of the inference will be as follows. " The world under dispute is not illusory, because it is the substrate of real reciprocal non-existence." For in the self which is different from the unreal there is real difference; nacre-silver, though illusory, does not possess real difference. The Dvaitin urges that perception sublates the truth of the Advaitin's inference. Perception warrants that the object of cognition is real. Then there is an examination of the term real. It is resolved to mean six different things. The acceptance of any of the first five alternatives does not lead us on to the contradiction•of the Advaitin's inference by perception. The sixth alternative i.e., being real =unsublatability, is not accepted by the Advaitin. Perception has not .the necessary capacity to apprehend what is in the futute. Perception can comprehend 186

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what is present and inttnediate. Perception cannot comprehend the non-existence of the sublation located in the future. If it be held that perception can do so, then the reality of such a perception will be on a par with the reality of the fata morgana (the mythical city of the gandharvas). The Dvaitin admits that perception has a capacity to comprehend the non-existence of the sublation in the future. This is clear by its very capacity to cognise the non-sublatability in the present. But there is an essential difference between the two perceptions. Validity according to Madhva is intrinsic and invalidity is extrinsic. The validity present in cognition is pro· duced as well as ascertained by the very instruments which produce and ascertain the cognition. The instruments that originate the cognition originate its validity. The ·Cognition and its validity are manifested by witness-consciousness. As for invalidity it is originated by the defects associated with the instruments of knowledge. The Sakt:~in cognises the cognition aspect of the invalid cognition and invalidity in it is inferred. Invalidity is extrinsic. The perception of the mythical city of the gandharvas is invalid because in it there is the defect "nonexistence." The cognition of unsublatability is established because there is a defect undermining it. Hence the difference. XXIII (219-224). The Advaitin argues that inference sublates the knowledge derived through perception. The Siddhantin points out that inference cannot sublate perception, because inference is dependent on perception. If inference be said to have the capacity to sublate perception, then the perception of heat in fire can be sublated by the inference that establishes the cold nature of fire. Such a conclusion is abusurd on the face of it. Inference as such has no capacity to refute the content of perception. Inference is not an independent pramllQa like perception or verbal testimony. The cognition derivelli. through perception cannot be sublated by a perception of equal strength, let alone of inference. (See Advrita siddhi, p. 28.) ~OTES

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The Advaitin points out an inferente, where inference subIates perception. The perception of the colour of the sky gives us the impression that it is blue. This is refuted by the inference " the sky is not blue, because it is incorporeal." The cognition of the colour of the sky is due to verbal testi· mony and not due to inference. The Advaitins frame an inference to refute the validity of the perception. " Perception '{hich is under dispute is delusive cognition, because it is a perception, like the perception of the non-existent mythical city of the gandharvas." The Dvaitin frames a counter-inference in order to occasion the undesirable. It is as follows. "The vedic statements with reference to Brahman that it is existence, knowledge etc. are invalid, because they are statements like the mean· ingless statements about an aged ox." The adduced invalidty of the vedic statements is not acceptable to the Advaitin. The term perception has to be explained. If it is interpreted to mean the semblance of perception, there is the absence of such an entity in the subject. Hence the non-establishment of the probans. If it is said to be valid perception such an entity is not present in the example. If it is defined as mere knowledge there is over-pervasion of the probans in respect of the cognition generated by Vedic statements like " knowledge, existence bliss" etc. XXIV (225-235). The Advaitin's inference establishing the illusory nature of the universe is contradicted by scriptures. The mantra in the I_{.gveda, II-24-12 is cited as an instance for it. This mantra predicates reality of the universe. The reality predicated by the scripture, the Advaitin holds, is phenomenal, The Dvaitin argues that it is futile to declare phenomenal reality because nobody disputes it. So scripture predicates absolute reality because it has to refute the position popularly held by the Advaitins, namely, the ascription• of jlhenomeual reality to the universe. The .Advaitin urges that scriptural statements like ".there are no differents whatsoever here" negaJ;e the reality explained by st~ements that " the universe is ;eal". The scriptural statements 188

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that ascribe reality to the universe are modes of restatement which are refuted by other scriptural statements that deny reality to the universe. As against this position the Dvaitin points out that the reverse of what the Advaitin holds is the truth. There is nothing to prevent us from explaining scriptural statements like " there are no differents whatsoever here " as restating the unreality of differences and that scriptural statements like " universe is real " as refuting them. It is possible at this rate to hold that scriptural statements like " there was non-existence in the beginning " refute the statements like " the Brahman is knowledge and infinitude". Before restating and refuting a position there is the need to establish it through a pramaQa other than scripture. The Dvaitin points out that the illusoriness of the universe is established by the probans, " cognisability " and the reality of Brahman has to be the substrate of delusion. Delusion is not accountable otherwise than on the assumption of Brahman as the substrate. The reality of the world cognised, is it an object of valid cognition or not? It cannot be an object of valid cognition, because what is a content of a valid cognition cannot be refuted. The Advaitin does not admit validity for what is negated. It cannot be the object of an invalid cognition, because that which is not established cannot be restated. Besides, whenever there is a restatement of a fact it takes the following form " what they say," even where such a form is absent. There is some special reason to justify the ascribed repetitiveness. Thus in "kill not a Brahmin ", Brahmanicide due to natural hatred is said to be restated for the sake of a prohibition, though the form of the test is not " what is established by lust or hate viz., braamanicide, that should be avoided ". The special ground for this treatment is that the proximity to a negation can only be of the already established; and in respect of this element there .an 'be only a restatment. • XXV (236, 237). Thr. Dvaitin points out the contradiction for the Advaitin's inference by c;9. verse in the Gita (XVI-8). 'In NOTES

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the 16th Chapter there is the classification of men into two types, the devas and the asuras (demonic tempered men). There is a detailed and eloquent description of demonic tempered men. They never reach my feet says the Lord Kp~na. The men of asuric temper hold that the universe is unreal and that is has no substrate. They say that there is no Is'vara. Hence the opposition of the sm~ti to the Advaitin's position. If the Advaitin contends that the unreality predicated with reference to the world in the Gita verse is not absolute unreality, the Dvaitin replies that there is no disputant who holds such a position. If the Advaitin seeks to point out that the Buddhist holds that the universe is absolutely unreal, it is not so says Madhva ; since even the s'unyavadin admits empirical reality called samvrta-sattva. XXVI (238-252). The Dvaitin states his inference to prove the reality of the universe. The inference is as follows. "The universe under dispute is real, because it is an object of valid knowledge, like Brahman ". A detailed examination of the formal correctness of the limbs of the inference is undertaken. The probandum of the inference is clearly stated. It is reality i.e., being unsublatable. The probans " being an object of pramaQ.a " is resolved to mean two things : (1) being an object of the prama'Q.a that makes known the real or (2) being the object of the pramaqa that makes known the phenomenal. It cannot be the first alternative, because the Advaitins do not admit that pramaqas like perception can make known what is real. Nor can it be admitted that pramiiQ.as like perception can make known the phenomenal, because it is not acceptable to the Dvaitin. To know a thing through a pramiit}a and then say that it makes known the phenomenal is contradiction in terms. Pramiil]a always makes known what is real. Further the example i.e., Brahman, is devoid of the probans l.e.,." being an object of pramaQa." (For Advaitin's refutation 11f criticism, see Advaita siddhi, p. 64.) The Dvaitin holds that there is po pramaqa to establish the fad that pramiil]as like percepti9n do not cognise the real. The 190

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Dvaitin states an inference to prove that a pramaqa like perception does make known the real, because it is a pramaQ.a, like "reality knowledge." After establishing the fact that perception makes known the real, the Dvaitin goes to prove the reality of the universe. " The universe is an object of a pramaqa that makes known the real, because it is an entity other than the content of a delusive cognition." The Dvaitin says that the inference is not vitiated by the adjunct self-hood. XXVII (253-260). The Dvaitin P,Uts forward a second probans to establish the reality of the universe. That probans is examined in detail. Practical efficiency (arthakriyakaritva) is the probans. The Advaitin urges that this probans is inconstant in respect of the enjoyment of a fair damsel in dream. The dreamdamsel is unreal ; but still the dream effects certain physiological reactions. The Dvaitin points out that the instance cited is similar to the subject and that the inconstancy of the probans should be pointed out only in places other than the subject and those similar to the subject. The Advaitin points out that the probans is inconstant in respect of the fear generated by rope which is delusively cognised as the snake. The point is that though it is unreal, it still has the probans "fruitfulness". The Dvaitin in reply points out that what generates fear is not the delusively cognised snake, but the cognition itself. It is the cognition that is responsible for the fear. Those who maintain that the delusive object is the cause of terror in men cannot account for the absence of terror in men who have no knowledge of the harmful objects near. them. From this it follows that what generates fear is the cognition of the object and not the object. (For the Advaitin's answer, see Advaita siddhi, p. 68.) If it is the cognition that gives rise to terror, does it by itself gives rise to..ter{or or with its content ? If it by itself gives rise to fear then there is the possibility that all cognitiQns could do so. If with its contents it gives rise to fear, then the Siake too is responsible for the fhar. NOTES

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The Dvaitin makes out that the rope which is cognised as the snake is the content of the cognition. It is not the snake that generates fear. Hence there is no inconstancy of the probans. The example of the inference is criticised i.e., Atman. The probans fruitful activity is said to be not present in the Atman. The Dvaitin refutes that and points out that there are many ·scriptural statements whose purport is Atman as the cause of the world. The Atman is said to be the creator, destroyer, etc., of this universe. So the example Atman is not devoid of the probans. If the Advaitin urges that the Atman which has fruitful activity is included in the subject, then there is no difference between nihilistic Buddhism and Advaita in respect of denying the self. If it is further urged by the Advaitin that he admits an Atman which is other than the one included in the subject and that hence his position is not the same as that of the Buddhists the Dvaitins reply that the attribute " being other than " is an attribute enough to secure the inClusion of the Atman in the subject. Besides, the fruitful activity present in the qualified Atman is bound to be present even in the Atman transcending the qualified cognition. The Dvaitin puts forward a third probans for the establishment of the reality of the universe. The same difiiculties that were urged in the case of the last probans can also be urged in the present case. XXVIII (261). The Dvaitin urges an adjunct to vitiate the Advaitin's inference. The adjunct is "being the content of a cognition that is generated by a defect." This adjunct is present wherever there is the probandum. Both the adjunct and the probandum are found in the shell·silver. The probans is not co-pervasive with the adjunct. The adjunct is not present in the subject and the probans is th'ere. The adduced defect satisfies the definition df ali adjunct. As a~inst this if the Advaitin urges that he would establish the presence of the adjunct in the subject, the Dvaitin holds that sue~ a position is defective. Fu~ther illusoriness alone being in 192

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question, there will be .the defect of arthantarata. The text may also mean that in establishing do§agamyatva, because of cognisability, there are as many defects as in establishing illusoriness with the same probans. XXIX (262-265). The example in the Advaitin's inference is criticised as being devoid of the probandum. The probandum " indeterminability," or " being nescience or a product thereof"' is not present in the shell-silver. The Advaitin holds that it is present there. In the inference, "shell-silver" has some cause, because it is occasional {£.e., not constant) like pot. The shellsilver is not a product of what is real or unreal; so it must be by exclusion a product of nescience. The Dvaitin examines the probans" being occasional". Does it mean " being cognised at some time ?" There is in this case the non-existence of the pervasion in respect of Atman and Akas'a which, though eternal, are only cognised for some time. If it means " being born at some time " there is the non-establishment of the probans in the subject. The probandum is " possession of a cause." This has to be proved. The probans " being born at some time " is the same as the probandum. Vhen that is not established this is also not established. Hence the non-establishment of the probans. The author concludes that all the three inferences stated by the Advaitin turn out to be invalid. XXX (266-270). As against the Advaitin the Dvaitin urges a reductio ad absurdum. The antecedent of the hypothetical inference is " If the universe is illusory, the consequent is the acceptance of two real universes." The consequent which is not desirable to the Advaitin results as follows. Delusion pre-supposes the existence of two factors, the substrate and the achetype. Vithout these two factors delusion is impossible in aw C2.Se. These two factors must be real and similar to the contents of tJle delusion. So the moment we acce~t the delusion there is the necessity to admit two real entities. The Advaitin is out to disprove the reality

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of one universe; so it is not acceptable .to him to admit the reality of two. (For the Advaitin's answer to this see Advaitasiddhi, p. 95.) The vyii.paka (pervader) is the prior existence of a substrate and archetype, and being illusory is the pervaded. The pervader is not present in the subject of the inference i.e., the universe. So the law of parsimony requires us to accept the reality of this universe than the addmission of the reality of two universes. XXXI (271-294). The Dvaitin proves the non-illusory nature of the universe with the help of two probans i.e., (1) because it has no substrate, (2) because it has no archetype. These two are necessary for delusion, and without them we cannot account for delusion. The 'Advaitin points out that the probans is inconstant in respect of dream-objects. The objects seen in dream are illusory and they have no substrate. The probandum " illusoriness" is there, but the probans " having a substrate" is not there. The Advaitin elaborately sets forth his arguments to prove the illusory nature of dream objects. The dream objects cannot be beginningless and eternal. If they be so, we must all be able to cognise them before and after the dream cognition. We are not able to do so. If they are said to be born and destroyed then and there, it is a very unsound position. There is no material and efficient cause for the production of dream objects. It cannot be inside the body, because huge objects like elephants, mountains, etc., cannot get into the body. If the objects are said to be outside, then it must be visible to all others that are next to the dreamer. It is not so. Besides there is no sense-organ which can cognise the dream objects. It cannot be the outer sense-organs; for all of them rest in sleep. It cannot be mind, because mind cannot cognise outside objects independently. It needs the help of outer sense-organs. There is no substrate for dream obje4its. The Atman cannot be the substrate of the dream objects. • For a thing to be the substrate of the object it must not be cognised as different from the illysory object. The Atman is cdgnised as different from the ,illusory object. When we see an 194

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elephant in a dream, we 'never say 11 I am the elephant." We cognise the "I" as different from the elephant. The Dvaitin states that dream-objects are real and not illusory. So in dream·objects there is the non-existence of the probandum and there is also the non-existence of the probans. Thus there is no inconstancy of the probans in respect of dream-objects. The material cause of dream objects is the impressions (vasana). The impressions of all our past experiences are deposited in the manas and not in the Atman. The bundle of impressions stored in manas {;Onstitutes the material cause of dream-objects. The efficient cause of the dream-objects is God. The authority for this is the Vedanta sutra "God creats dream objects in dream states" (III. ii. 1). If it be contended that super-sensible cause alone can produce a super-sensible effect, the Dvaitin denies it. Eor example the two primal atoms constitute a binary atom, and three binary atoms go to make up a triad. Anything less than the triad is not seen. The binary and primal atoms though super-sensible still produce the cognisable triad. In the same way dream-objects too can be cognised though they are produced by a super-sensible material cause. Thus the reality of dream-objects is established. The Advaitin criticises the probans of the Dvaitin's inference i.e., 11 not having a substrate". This is pointed out to be nonestablished. The Atman is the substrate of the world-illusion. As against this contention, the Dvaitin points out that the Atman cannot be treated as the substrate. In any illusion the substrate is cognised as non-different from the super-imposed object. If it is cognised as different, there is no possibility for delusion at all. In the shell-silver delusion, if the individual cognised the shell as distinct from silver, there would be no delusion at all. As the Atman is cognised as different from the world it cannot be its substrate. Besides, the universe and the Atman hwve 'contrary qualities. In a delusion there must be certain similar ]ualities between the super-imposed ,object and the substrate; we never mistake the shell to be a tiger. r Between two contrary objects. NOTES

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the relation of substrate and super-imposition is not possible. The super-imposition of the world on the Atman is as unimaginable as the super-imposition lof the mustard seeds on a mountain. The Advaitin criticises the second probans put forward by the Dvaitin to refute the illusory nature of the universe. The brobans is not having an archetype". The archetype of each illusory universe is its prior illusory universe. Thus the probans is shown to be nonexistent there. The Dvaitin points out that the prior illusory universes are not real. The archetype must be real. Hence the probans is established. XXXII (295-297). The Advaitin states a new inference to establish the illusory nature of the universe. This inference is from Citsukha's Tattvapradrpika, p. 40. The subject of this inference is " this cloth " and the probandum is " being the counter-correlate of the non-existence present in these threads". The probans is "being a whole." The cloth which is made out of these threads cannot be present elsewhere. If its existence is denied in the threads, it proves to be nowhere though it is seen. Its being seen and not being present in the threads leads us to the conclusion that it is illusory. Once cloth is proved to be so, in the same manner the whole world is proved to be illusory. The Dvaitin criticises the inference and points out the following defects: (1) sublation by perception, (2) establishment of the established, (3) establishment of other than the intended and (4) partial non-establishment of the probandum. The absolute non-existence present in the threads cannot have any counter• correlate ; perception points out the presence of the cloth in the thread. Hence the sublation. The probandum i.e., absolute non-existence of the cloth in the threads, is accepted by the Dvaitin. The threads and the cloth are in the relation of cause and effect. Cause anu effect are non·ttifferent. The cloth and the threads are in a relation of the support and the supported. The threads are the 5upporters and the cfoth is the supported. Both caanot be iden~ical. Hence the defect. 196

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If the probandum b& worded " not being the effect of thesethreads" it yields a meaning other than the one intended by the Advaitin. The intended meaning is that the cloth is illusory. The present probandum points out that cloth is not an effect i.e., it is eternal or that it is an effect of another set of threads. Hence the defect. Further the probans is not present in objects like Akas'a which are not wholes. Thus there is partial non-establishment of the probans. XXXIII (298-311). The probans "being a whole" (ams'itva) of the Advaitin is sublated by perception. Perception points out that the cloth is in the threads. The Dvaitin resolves the probandum " being the counter-correlate of the absolute non-existence present in the threads" to mean one of two things, (1) either the non-existence of the cloth or (2) the non-existence of relation between the cloth and the threads. The first meaning is unacceptable to the Advaitin because he does not admit that the cloth is asat ; he holds that it is indeterminable. If the Advaitin urges as against this that there is only a denial of the reality of the cloth and not the affirmation of its non-existence, the Dvaitin replies that there is no middle ground between the real and the unreal. The phrase " being in the thread" is pointed out to be futile because it does not serve any purpose. The purpose may be said to be to avoid the defect of the establishment of the established. since on the logician's view, this cloth is the counter-correlate of the absolute non-existence present in another set of threads. But this is not acceptable to us since we do not at all admit absolute non-existence of this cloth ; otherwise the cloth would be unreal (asat). Again in the example i.e., " another cloth " the probandum is non-existent. The Advaitin turns round and pointe out that if the probandum is denied its non-existence is affirmed. 'the affirmation leads to the fact of the presence of another cloth in these threads, which is a part of 'the spbject. Such a deduction is nlft NOTES

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acceptable to the Dvaitin. The prior• question is repeated i.e., what is it that it means; is the relationship with cloth deduced, or the cloth itself ? The first alternative does not hold good because there is no pervasion as a matter of fact. The pervasion should be of the form " wherever there is not the absolute non-existence of X there is relationship to X". But the Dvaitin does not affirm the latter (say relationship to cowness), even when he denies absolute non-existence (say cowness in the horse). This samsargabhava has to be admitted even by the opponent in cases like the non-existence of the non-existence of cloth ; else there would be self-dependence in the case of the non-existence of the cloth ; for in this case, the alleged pervasion would be of the form " where cloth is not, there exists relationship to non-existence of cloth " ; and that is absurd. Hence the alleged pervasion fails. In the second case there is the defect of the establishment of the established, since even another cloth may be present in those threads through sarhyoga. The probandum worded a little differently fares no better. The probandum is worded as follows ; " this cloth is not born out of these threads ". If it is so worded there is the defect of non-establishment of the probans i.e., "being a whole." That which is not an effect cannot be a whole. If that probans is said to be ultimately not real such a position is already refuted. As for the defect of sublation by perception, the Advaitin points out that inference can sublate and invalidate the truth established by perception. For example the perception of the blue colour of the sky is sublated by the inference which establishes the colourless nature of the sky with the help of the probans " grossness ". Likewise the reality of the cloth cognised through perception is sublated by inference with "being a whole " as the probans. The' D"aitin refutes this position from two points of view. The sub!.ation of the perceptive cognition of the blueness of the sky is not by inference; it is due, to scripture. So inference <does not smblate it. Besides, ihe very probans which is urged to 198

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establish the colourless n~ture of the sky may establish that Akii.s'a (sky) is not the abode of sound. If it be urged that scripture sublates such a position, the same scripture establishes the colourless nature of the sky. There is no need for inference at all. If it be contended that the sublating pramii.q.a must be accepted as valid by both the disputants, then there is nothing to deny the validity of the perception that cognises the cloth. XXXV (328-330). Difference is the very nature of the things. It is an external fact. It is not an attribute that is present between two relata. For example A and B are different. According to Madhva the difference of A from B is not the same as the difference of B from A. Both the differences are different. They have different counter-correlates. (For the Advaitins answer to this criticism, see Advaita siddhi, p. 17.) XXXVI (331-338). The negative element denies only spatial and temporal negations. The word ananta has no significative potency in respect of non-limitation by other things. Else, we ask, is there difference or not of ananta from the limited ? If there is, then even for the ananta there is limitation by the finite (vastuta paricheda). Again, the atom unlimited in time is known to be limited in space ; akas'a is unlimited in both the ways, but is different from pot etc. Do we because of this consider akii.s1a as ananta? The example is ether. Ether has parts according to Dvaita Vedanta. If a thing has parts, does it not become non-eternal? To this question the Dvaitin says that having parts is not the cause of eternality or non-eternality. is'vara has several different attributes. Their difference is explained by the help of the category of viS'e~a which effects distinction where there is no difference. Besides there is reason for believing that ether has parts because it has conjunction with objects. As for its eterna~ty "scripture warrants it. If it be said that owing to an adjunct diff.erence is effected in ether, the Dvaitin contends that it is not so. The ' adjunct merely reminds us and d9es not create difference. Let 'll.sNOTES

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examine as to whether the adjunct enters into contact with the whole of ether or with certain parts of ether ? If it enters into contact with the whole of ether then there would be no difference at all. If it enters into contact with a certain part of ether, there is the establishment of the parts in ether and the adjunct only reminds us of it and does not create it. Thus there is no way of avoiding the defect of the non-existence of the probandum in ~he example. XLII (405-412). The Dvaitin concludes that difference is of the very nature of the substrate and as such cognition of the substrate itself gives us the cognition of difference. Hence there is not the defect of reciprocal dependence etc., because there are no two separate cognitions. No doubt the cognition of the thing as different involves knowledge of all counter-correlates; but this in a general way is supplied by the witness-consciousness. What is supplied by the witness is an integral part of our present cognition, as may be shown by our apprehension of time, for which the witnessconsciousness is responsibe. S'ri Madhva is of opinion that Time and Space are pre-conditions of all cognitions. These two elements are not cognised by perception or inference but by the witnessconsciousness. The witness is the svarlipa of the soul itself. XLIII (413-426). Time is not perceptible by the senses; the eye cannot see the colourless ; the skin cannot feel the touchless ; the mind cannot cognise the external ; it is manifest even to the deaf from birth ; hence it is cognised but not by the senses. XLIV (427-437). The view that cognition and validity are both inferred in Bhatta's school. This is refuted after the Priibhiikara view, set out earlier. XLV (438-456). Validity is intrinsic to cognition and together with the congnition validity is manifested by witness-consciousn~ss.. Witness-consciousness cognises the validity in a cognitioo only when there is no defect. Defect in the cognition is the cause of invalidity. The in~alidity in cognition is known l1y inference. The witness-co~sciousness does not cognise it. In 200

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such a place the cognition aspect alone is cognised by witnessconsciousness. /herever the sakeyin cognises validity there is this necessity i.e., the prior establishment of the non-existence of defect. The sak~in cognises the validity of a cognition only after the establishment of the non-existence of defect. This establishment must be effected through other tests such as agreement with other .cognitions, non-existence of disagreement etc. The text is not very clear here and the commentators are at variance. Presumably what is need is coherence with other similar cognitions, noncoherence with dissimilar cognitions, non-existence of non-coherence with similar cognitions, and non-existence of coherence with dissimilar cognitions. What is the dissimilar (vijatiya)? According to one commentator it is non-existence of practical efficiency suitable to the cognition, the non-existence of that sarhvada (viiatiyasarhvadabhava) is required for validity. Another commentator would require vijiWyasarhvada, not its absence ; according to him " this is water " is the primary cognition. While another of the same form is sajatiya and the inference " this water-cognition is valid because of practical efficiency " is vijatiya ; coherence with the latter too is needed. The existence of a defect is the obstruction for the siik~in. The removal of obstruction is through examination. The function .of the examination is the romoval of obstruction. Dependence on the examination cannot be treated as a cause. The need for the removal of the examination is only to the extent of the re· moval of the defect. What is cognised by sak~in is indubitp.ble. Sak~in does not depend on any other cognition. Its knowledge is of a self -certifying type. Hence the defect of infinite regress cannot be urged. The dependence on examination for the establishment of the non-existence of defect does not make validity extrivsic~ because examination is not a cause for the cognition of validity. Such a position would amount tq this that the cause of the power of the elephant to walk is the remrval of the thorn in its leg. We NOTES

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ioo well know that the elephant's power to walk is not dependent -on any external factor. The removal of the thorn is the removal --of obstruction. If it be urged that invalidity too is intrinsic, it is not so, says the Dvaitin. Nowhere is invalidity cognised without the dependence on examination, whereas only in some places in respect of the establishment of validity is there dependence on examination. In respect of invalidity it is absolutely necessary ; hence it is the cause there. If it be urged that removal of obstruction is also a type of cause, then the potency of the vetra seed in respect of its giving rise to its own sprout has to be attributed to the non·existence of the forest fire. Once the forest fire burns these seeds, they give rise to a stem, not a cane. It is absurd to claim that the generation of cane has for cause non-existence ·of fire (itself a cause of the generation of plantain). Besides there would be the non-existence of general laws and exceptions. "Injure no living being," is the rule; "Kill the agni~omiya animal " is the exception ; such a relationship would have no special claim to recognition, if in every case the consequent fails merely because of a deficiency in the causal complex. ',Ye do not treat the production of an effect, say pot, when all contributory factors are present, as an instance of a general rule, and the absence of the effect when a factor is absent as an exception. XL VII I (463-4 70). The witness-consciousness cognises the substrate and the counter-correlate simultaneously. The defect adduced by the Advaitin as against the concept of difference is that difference, being a relation, pre-supposes the knowledge of the substrate and the counter-correlate. Such a position puts an ·end to the defect of reciprocal dependence. The simultaneous cognition of the substrate and the counter·correlate" ru}es out the defect. Difference according to S'ri Madhva is of the every nature of the substrate itself. As aginst such a position it is urged that the substrate and t,he attribute i.e., of difference

have different characteristics. 'ihe substrate is non-dependent and 202

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the attribute is dependent, the substrate is an object of perception and the attribute is not so. The attribute is said to inhere in the substrate. The attribute and the substrate are not referred to by synonymous terms. These facts militate against the treatment of difference as the very nature of the substrate. As against such an argument the Dvaitin points out that these difficulties are not of any consequence, because such difficulties are present in the Advaitin's concept of identity also. The concept of identity has also the abovementioned difficulties, adduced with reference to difference. Thus though jiva and Brahman as Caitanya are non-dependent, identity which is not other than jiva and Brahman is dependent on them. Caitanya is self-luminous, but not identity. Caitanya is not manifest as related to anything else; but identity is manifest as relating to Caitanya. " Identity " and "Brahman" hence have the same denotation, but they are non· synonymous terms. If it be said that the reference to identity is a verbal one, what is it that is denied ? Is Brahman denied, or is identity denied, or the relation denied, or is empirical usage denied, or the cause of empirical usage denied ? The denial of Brahman leads to the non-existence of the substrate. Vithout the substrate the concept of non-difference is unintelligible. If identity is denied difference becomes reality. A thing cannot be different as well as identical at the same time. If it be urged that such a thing is possible then let a thing be real as well as unreal. If the empirical usage is to be denied, it presupposes the denial of the object indicated by the term. If the denial is of the cause, it cannot be so. The cognition of the effect helps us to assume the cause. XLIX (471-477). In respect of the object wheEe there is nodifference still we can distinguish the non-different as~cts in it. That function is attribute~ by Madhva to the category of vis'e~a. It is a very important categQry in Dvaita metaphysics. 'l'o NOTES

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distinguish those attributes that are n{)t non-different from their respective substrates is the function of vis'e!Ja. They are infinite in number unlike the category of vis'e~a in Nyaya metaphysics which is found only in eternal substances. The vis'ef}as are selfdifferentiating (svotovyavartaka). It is the dharma of padarthas. ] ayatirtha argues that if the category of vis'e~a be not admitted the scheme of relations will lead to infinite regress. At some stage 3;t least the relation must be said to be self-explanatory. Those who accept inherence point out that inherence is not dependent on any other relation to explain itself. Instead of attributing a number of duties to relation, it is better to assume this category vis'ef}a which is only a potency of a padartha. Further, scriptural statements like " Brahman is knowledge, bliss " etc., can be interpreted soundly only when we assume vis'e~a along with abheda. The attributes " knowledge " and " bliss " are not different from their substrate, Brahman. Yet they are not non-different, since the terms are non-synonymous and there is also the contingence of a host of undesirable conclusions, such as the futility of one of the terms, the leaving over of knowledge or bliss alone by the elimination of other, knowledge not being like bliss the object of unconditional desire and so on. To avoid this we have to admit non-difference, but with a vis'e~a. (For the Advaitins refutation of the category of vis'e~a refer to Advaita siddhi, p. 570.) L (478-486). The Dvaitin's inference to establish difference is as follows. •· The bodies in dispute have souls corresponding to their number, because of the attribute of being bodies." As against this inference it was pointed out by the Advaitin that the probans is inconstant in respect of dead bodies and bodies that are to be born. Though the probans is there the probandum "having• a jOUI" is not there. Hence the inconstancy. In order to ward ,off this defect the probans is interpreted to mea? "being the locus of enjoyment not involving reciprocal recolle<:tion " • • Sl!ch a probans is not present jn dead bodies, because enjoyment 204

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in them is not possible. There is the negative instance, "the yogi's body", The yogin enjoys the fruit of his tapas through a number of bodies. In the yogin's body there is the absence of both pro·bandum and probans. ADDITIONAL NOTES 323. The reading in the Kumbakonam as well as the Belgaum text is 11a ca; but the sentence seems to be the purvapak!iin's. For, the next sentence is. an objection to the solution suggested by the siddha1ttin (Advaitin). The statement of the purvapak!;itt should be taken to have begun with the present sentence and to end with iti before maivam. Hence the text should, it seems, be corrected into namt. 383. What is not even cognised cannot be refuted. And you, who analyse the concept of difference in order to refute it, clearly cognise differences among the various senses. 387. The rejection of origination by a non·defective cause; this is the third case. A more prominent sublater is something like perception which, as not dependent on other pramli1Jas, is the clearest of all. 389. Sruti in its non-dualist utterances may be imagined to be the sublater; it is not really so, since it can be explained otherwise; and only what has no other scope in this way can be the sublater. 400. The setting out of alternatives and their refutation proceed on the basis of difference ; hence conflict with one's (Advaitin's) own activity; and the question like "Is difference different or non-different from the substrate " conflicts with one's own reasoning that there is no difference. 418. The natural colour of cloth is whiteness. •· Where it is blue and unclean, it is due to the colour of the dyeing 'i.naterial ; in regard to the cloth that is dyed (and presents the colour inherent in the dye stuff) the~e is the enrpirical usage " The cloth is bl!~ck 205-

NOTES

or blue " ; of this usage the cause is the rlilation between the colour and the cloth, an indirect relation of inherence in that (stuff) which is in conjunction (with the cloth). 419. The relation here is not as simple a.~ that between cloth and blueness ; for though the movements are inherent in the sun, there is no direct conjunction between the sun and the things on earth; hence there is not the relation of smilyuktasamavaya. The four elements, ether etc., belong to the earth and establish no contact with the sun; Akas•a cannot fulfil this function since that too has a special quality, sound, and is in this respect on a par with the other elements ; further, being one and indivisible, it could equally link the sun with all things without distinction. Hence some other substance has to be postulated linking the objects of this earth to the sun in which movements are inherent ; hence the description of the relation as satityuktasamavaya. 420. Non-existences are not cognised with anything directly or indirectly; hence there would be no empirical usage of contemporaneity etc.; but there is. 424. This explanation follows the Advaitin's view of a single Akas•a, being defined by objects and having the properties of the latter superimposed thereon. The position really acceptable to the Advaitin is the next one, where it is claimed that imperceptibility attaches only to Aths•i11 (Mahakas•a), not to particular localities which are parts thereof. 425. The syllogism about sound establishes the defect of counter-probans (satpratipak~jatva) in respect of the original syllogism. The argument by elimination is shown similarly to be unsound by the second syllogism about touch etc. 431. The alternatives are: does the absence of sublating cognition relllte ,to the cogniser himself or to other persons ? On the first, ther~ is the possibility of sublation arising later. Another person's ignorance of sublation cannot validate my cognition. That • no tOne is aware of a sublater terrp is impossible to establish in any

• 206

VADAVALi

case. Similarly of the alternatives as to time, space etc. This is the unintelligibility of the analysis. 44-3. The quotation is from Madhva's Amwyakhyana, Chapter III, pada 3. 462. The cognition of the substrate involves also the cognition of the difference of the substrate from the counter-correlate; similarly the cognition of the counter correlate involves the cognition of the difference from the substrate ; hence there is no reciprocal dependence. 476. Samavaya is defined as a relation located in the substrate and obtaining between that and qualities etc. Now the location is not another relation between samaviiya and samavayt'n. Rather does samavaya have to explain its own relation. 486. There is no inconstance in the first alternative ; for there too is presented a difference between the real and the superimposed moons ; the reality of this too being in dispute, it cannot legitimately be claimed as an exception to the pervasion ; vyabhicara cannot be set up in respect of the subject or what is on a par with it. 498. The non-intention of the specification applies both to "relation" and non-existence". No specification is intended of the relation whether it be satizsara or literal fetters, and no particllar form of non-existence is intended either, whether absolute or that subsequent to destruction. Thus there is no inapplicability either to the param'iUman or to released prisoner. 499. What is the use of taking the words " all relations " ? The object of any qualification of the probans is to ward off inconstancy of the probans. Here " abhavadhikara1;1atva " can itself serve as the probans, the pervasion being kevalanvayin, admitting of no exceptions ; why qualify the probans further ? The reply points to other instances of kevala1wayin IJerv~sion e.g., between namability and knowability, where the latter is th" probans. Since there is pervasion ev.en between contentness and namability, why specify the former with the w.ords " in respect of knowledge'" ? I NOTFS 2007 The truth is that such ०iऽ४५० ५८21s are a“part of the probans itself and reguire 10 independent fruit to justify their mention. {verse 5 and chapter 10, verse 4. 524. Those which enter 2s organs into a single orgumiss11 1.re supposed to be thus conjoined; others are disjoined despite physical proxim2ity, as of the clill in the womb. पृष्ठम्:वादावली.pdf/२४० |This index is prepared by Dr. C. Kunhan Raja. It is not a. (complete word index . [t contains only important w५ords ; and their chief occurances are अशा ५४, ५२० ; अंशित्त्र ३०४; अंशिन् ५२०, ५२१ ; अकारणजन्यता ३८३ ; अकारणत्वापति ३८५; अकार्य २९७ ; अक्षिप्रत्व ४१७; अखण्डवाद ३३२ ; अगणित १ ; अगन्धत्व ३१० ; अगुण ३७४ ; अग्निसाधकत्व १५५ ; अग्र २२९ ; अघटत्व ३१ ; अङ्कुरजननशक्ति ९५६ ; अङ्गुलित्रय ३६५ ; अचेतनत्व १९९ ; अजन्यता ३८३ ; अजात ३८१ ; अज्ञातता १२५: अज्ञातत्वविशेषित १२५ ; अज्ञान ११२, १ १३, ११४, ११५ ; अज्ञानकृत ५०९, ५१० ; अक्षानरूप १८८ ; अज्ञान सद्भावाभाव ५१२ ; अज्ञानसापेक्ष ५०६ ; अज्ञानसिद्धि ९९ ; अज्ञानानभ्युपगम ९९; अज्ञानाभाव ५१० ; अशानिन् ५०९ ; अज्ञायमान ११७ ; अञ्जनादि १०८ ; अतत्कारण जन्य ३८३; अतत्वाभिप्राय १३२; अतत्वावेदक ६५, ६७, ६८, २४३, ४६९; अतात्विकप्रमाणदृष्ट २४० ; अतात्विक्रावयविन् ३०५: अतिप्रसङ्ग ५८, २२९, ३१२ , ३७३, ४७२ ; अतिप्रसञ्जक १७७ ; अतिव्याप्ति ७२, ८०, १३९: अतीन्द्रिय २८१ ; अतीन्द्रियकार्य २८२ ; अतीतादि ३२४, ३२५, ३२६; अतीतानागत १३८, १३९ ; अतीतानागतशरीर ३७८; अत्यन्तसादृश्य १७७; अत्यन्तसुप्त ११७ ; अन्लयन्ताभाव १३२, २९५ ; अत्यन्ताभावप्रतीयोगिन् २८, ३१ ; अत्यन्तासत् ६०, ७७, १८५ ; अत्यन्तासत्पर ३३७ ; अदुष्टकरणजन्य ४२७ ; अष्ट ९७, २८१ ; अद्राक्षम् ८८ ; अद्वितीय ३३२, ३३४; अद्वितीयपद ३३४; अद्वितीयव्यवहार १४३; अद्वैतवाक्य ६८; अधिकरण ४९९; अधिकरणत्वमात्र ४९९; अधिकापात २६७; अधिगमानधिगम १२३ ; अधिष्ठान २०४, २३०, २६६, २६९, २७०; अधि , २७७, २८३, २९३ 14 210 छानबोधाधीनबोध २०४; अधिष्ठानाध्यस्तत्वसंबन्ध ३१३; अधिष्ठानाभ्युपगति २०५ ; अध्यस्त १६४, १८४, २०५, ३१९ ; अध्यासप६ ३१९ ; अध्यासङ्गीकार २८६ ; अनधिकरण ९; अनन्तक्षणवृत्तित्व ३७०; अनन्तपद ३३७; अनन्तभेद ३५५, ३६८ ३७२ ; अनन्तभेदसंबन्ध ३७० ; अनन्तभेदाभ्युपगम ३६७ ; अनभ्युपगम ७, १२: अन्यथसिद्ध ३४६ ; अनन्वय १६३, २२४, ३४६ ; अनवधारितबाधितत्वाबाधितत्वादि विशेष ३४८ ; अनवस्था ४१, ३२९, ३५५, ३५८, ३९६, ४३०, ४४०, ४७५ ; अन्नात्मत्व १८८ ; अनात्मत्वपद १९० ; अनात्मरूप ४३२ ; अनात्माकार २९० , २९१ ; अनादि ७१, ७६, ९० ९१, ९३, ४४८; अनादित्व ७३, ७४, ९२ ; अनादित्व परिभाषा २०८ ; अनादिनिल्य २७१, ३७०, ४८७ ; अनादिभावत्व ७५; अनादि भावरूप ७१, ७४; अनाद्यविद्या १९२; अनिल्यता २०६ ; अनित्यत्वादि ५५, ४८४; अनिरुक्ति ३ ; अनिरूपण ६० ; अनिर्वचनीय ३, ४, ९, १३, १४, ३२. ३९, ४१ , ५२, ६९, ८५, १०२, १०४, १८५७ , २६१ ; अनिर्वचनीयरूप २९० ; अनिर्वाच्य ६ ७, १०, ७१, ७२, ३२९ ; अनिवत्र्यत्वानुमान् ७५, ७६ ; अनिवृतेि २८६ अनीश्वर २३६ ; अनुत्पादक ३८६ ; अनुगतविषयत्व ३२६; अनुगतसत्ता १७५; अनुप जीव्य ३८३ ; अनुपसंजातबाधभ्रम ४३१ ; अनुपादानत्च ४१ ; अनुपाधित्व १७ ; अनुभव ८४; अनुमान २८; अनुमानतकोच्छेद ४१०; अनुमानप्रवृत्ति ३०६ ; अनु मानबाधित ५२७ ; अनुमानविरोध ३०९, ३४० ; अनुमानाभास ५२९; अनुमेयत्व ४३५; अनुमेयत्वाध्यवसाय ४५३; अनुवाद २२८ ; अनुवादगोचर १२५; अनुवादपुर सर ११९; अनुसंधान ८५, ८७, ८८, ५२४; अनुसंधानान्तर ८८; अनेकतद्विशिष्ट ४१७; अनेकप्रतीत्यभाव ४१३; अनेकानुमानप्रतिहत २९४; अनेकोद्देशकालसंलम १५४ अनैकान्तिक २९, ९९, १४६, अनैकान्त्य १३६, १३७, १४०, १८५, १७३, ४८८, ४९१ ; अन्तः २७४; अन्त:करण ८० ; अन्त:करणपरिणामवृति १६९ ; अन्त:करण वृतिलक्षण ९९: अन्त:करणसंसर्गाभावाभाव ५११; अन्तःकरणादिसापेक्ष ५०६: अन्तः करणाद्यभाव ५११; अन्तर्मनस् २८२; अन्तशब्द ३३८; अन्धकार ९४; अन्यकार्य २९७: अन्यतरचन्द्र ४८८ ; अन्यतरासिद्धि १५२; अन्यथाज्ञात ५१, ५२; अन्यथा भाव ४४६, ४५० ; , १६२ ; अन्यात्मा अन्यसंबन्धिता ४६८; अन्याकार ३९, ४० ३९; अन्यrधार ३८१ ; अन्यायविरुद्ध ४०० ; अन्योन्यानुसंधान ५२० ; अन्योन्यापेक्षा ४६२ ; अन्योन्याभावाधिकरण २०१; अन्योन्याश्रय ४०१, ४१३, ४६१ ; अन्यो त्पादक ५८६; अन्वयव्यतिरेक ४५३; अपदर्शन ४३; अपरत्व ४१७; अपरोक्षव्य हारयोग्य १३९; अपरोक्षव्यवहारविषय १४७; अपरोक्षानुभवविरोध ४३५; अपर्याय शब्दान्तर ४७४ ; अपर्यायशब्दवाच्यत्व ४६४; अपवाद २१७ ; अपवादनिरास ४३७; अपसिद्धान्त ४८, १३२, ३२९, ३९९ ; अपहास्य ५२९; अपह्नव ४२४; अपहवायोग ४०४; अपास्त ९ ; अपौरुषेयत्वादियुक्ति ४३४ : अप्रकाशत्व १३४; अप्रकाशितार्थ प्रकाश ९४; अप्रतिष्ठ २३६ ; अप्रमाणगम्यत्व ५४९; अप्रमाणविषय ३, ६९ ; अप्रमित १०४ ; अप्रयोजकत्व २३५ ; अप्रसिद्ध १३२ ; अप्रसिद्धकालकल्पना ४२१; अप्रसिद्धविशेषण २७, ७२, १०३, २३९, ४९३, ४९४; अप्राप्त २२७; अप्रामाणिक १०४; अप्रामाण्यज्ञप्ति ४५३; अबाध्य १६, ३४, ३५, २ १३ , २१६, २३९ अबाध्यत्वादि २४४: अबाध्येतरत्व ४५, ५० ; अब्रह्मत्व ४५ ; अभय ५१३ ; अभात् ८४; अभा १०१, ११३, ३३६, ५१३; अभावग्रहण ४९९ ; अभावप्रतीति १११ ; अभावमानगम्य ११२ ; अभावविलक्षण ७५, ७६, ८५: अभाववेदन ५९ ; अभावाधि करणमात्र ४९९ ; अभिज्ञाभिवदन २६६; अभिधेयत्व २९ ; अभिन्न ३२८ ; अभेदानुभव प्रत्याशा ५१३; अभ्युपगम ८; अभ्रान्तत्व ५१६; अमूर्तानुमान २२०; अयौगपद्य ४१७ ; अरूपित्व ३११ ; अरूपित्वानुमान ३०६; अरूपिद्रव्य ४२२ ; अर्थ ७८; अर्थक्रिया २५९; अर्थक्रियाकारित्व २१३, २५३, २५७ ; अर्थबाध ४६९ ; अर्थवत २२७; अर्थविशेषित २५५ ; अर्थान्तर ४९३, ४९६ , ४९७: अथन्तरनिवृत्ति ९८: अथपति ३२ ; अर्थित्व ४३९; अल्पप्रदेश २७४ ; अल्पतरसूर्यसञ्चारान्तरितजनिमत्व ४१७ ; अवधूय ३४७; अवयवित्वादि २९५ अवर्जनीयत्व ५२६ ; अविगीतप्रमा ९०; अविद्या ३, ७१, ७५, ८९, १३०, २००८ ; अविद्याकार्य ३: अविद्यातत्कार्य २६२: अविद्यात्व १३९; अविद्यानिवृत्ति १६७, १६९, १७२ ; अविद्यानिवृत्तिरूप ४८७ ; अविद्याविलसित २११ ; अविद्योपादानकता ८० ; अविमर्शसुन्दर २७८ ; अविरुद्धत्व ३०, १६२: अविरोध ३९३; अविवक्षितप्रतियोगिविशेष ४९५ ; अविवक्षितविशेषसंसर्गाभाव ४९८; अविशेष ६८ ; अविश्वसनीयता ३८८ ; अविषयत्व २८४, ३२४ ; अवेदिषम् ११ १० ; अवेद्यत्व १३९ , १४२. १४७ ; अवेद्यत्वाभाव १४९; अव्यभिचरित ४५३ ; अव्यावृत्ति २०; अव्याहत १४८ ; अव्युत्पन्नत्व ३३८ ; अशब्दत्वप्रसङ्ग ३१० ; अशेष १; असङ्गश्रुति ३१७ ; असत ६, १९, ३२, ३७, ३९, ४१, २२९, ३१३ ; असत्च ३, ११, १४, १९. ३७, ४५, ६६, ७०, ७९, १३३, २९९ ; असत्वविरह ६, ११, १५, २५; असत्त्वातिरिक्त २१३; असत्य २३६; असल्यशब्द २३७; असदात्मन् १८९; असह्म वैलक्षण्य ८ ; असद्विलक्षण १८६ ; असद्वयतिरिक्तत्व ५२७; असंप्रतिपति २२० असंबद्ध ३१५; असंभव ७३; असंभावित २७३; असाधारण २४९; असिद्ध १८९ १९२, १९५, २३३, २६५, २८५, २९४ , ४८९ ;'असिद्धि १०७, १०८, १३८, 212 १४४, १५४, १८२, १९१, १९३; १९७, २०२, २१२, २४१, २४२, ३००, ३०४ , ३०५, ४०४, ४९८ ; अस्मत्प्रतिबन्दिन् २००; अस्वातन्त्र्य २७५ . आकाश ५६, ३४३, ४२४; आकाशकालदिगात्ममनस् ४२६; आकाशप्रतियोगिक ३४३; आकाशादि ७२, २०७, २९७ ; आगमविरोध २२५, ३११; आगमसिद्ध ३११; आगमाद्यवगम्य ३०९ ; आचार्य ४७४; आचार्यसिद्धान्त ४२६; आत्मज्ञान १७२ ; आत्मत्व १६, ३३९ ; आत्मत्वादि ७७ ; आत्मत्वानाधारत्व १९०; आत्मपद वाच्य १६ ; आत्मप्रतियोगिकभेद ३७७; आत्मभेद ३७६ ; आत्मविरुद्ध २९१; आत्मांश २५९; आत्माकार १७३, १७६ ; आत्माकारज्ञान १७२ ; आत्मातिरिक्तत्व १९०; अत्माभाव २९१ ; आत्माभावारोप २९३; आत्माश्रितज्ञान ९८ ; आत्मैक्य ४६९ ; आदर्श ८७; आधाराधेयभाव १७८, २९६; आनन्द ४७७, ४८४; आनुमानिक ४१५; आपात ६ ; आपादनक्रम ४०१ ; आपाद्यापादक ५०५ ; आप्तवाक्य २२० : आभासत्व ३१, ९१, ३९६ ; आरोपाधिष्ठान २८४ ; आरोपितत्व २८८, ४८८; आरोपितज्ञान प्रामाण्यग्रहण ४३८; आरोपितानारोपितभेद ४८८; आरोप्यसदृश २६९, २७०; आवरणाभाव ४२४; आवरणाभावविषयता ४२३; आविद्यक ८३, ४८९, ४२३; आविद्यकभेदवत्व १८१; आश्रयासिद्धि ४१५; आश्रितत्वादिव्यवहार ४७६; आसीत. ८६, ८७, २२९. इतरेतराश्रय ३६५; इन्द्रियलिङ्गागमगम्य ४२६ ; इष्टापादन ५०५, ५०८; इह ३३१ . ईश्वर २८१, ५१०, ५१४, ५१५, ५१६, ५१७, ५१८, ५२२, ५२६; ईश्वर वचन ५१३. उत्तर ६ : उत्तरकालीनबाध २१५, २१६ ; उतरोत्तरप्रपन्नारोप २५ ; उत्तरोत्तर भेदाप्रतीति ३५८ ; उत्पतिविनाश २७९ ; उत्पतिविनाशावत् २७१ ; उत्पन्नतां २६४; उत्सर्गतः २१७ ; उत्सर्गापवाद् ४५६; उद्न्याभावनिमित्त ४४५ ; उन्मत्तवाद २१० ; उपचार ७५ ; उपजीव्यविरोध ४८० ; उपनायकताकल्पन ४२१ : उपरत २७५ ; अप दान २७३; उपादानक ९२ ; उपादानता ७९ ; उमादानादि २८१ ; उपाधि ३०, ७७ , २४४; उपाधिकृत ५१७ ; उपाधिकृतमेद् ५२२ ; उपाधिनाश ५१८ ; उपाधिसंश्लेष ५२४ ; उभयधार्मिक ४०७ ; उभयवादिसंप्रतिपन्नप्रामाण्य ३०८ ; उभयविधपरापरत्व व्यवहारनिर्वाहक ४२१; उभयविरहित्व ११, २५; उभयवैलक्षण्य ८; उभयात्मकवस्तु ४६७ ; उभयाभाव १४८ ; उभयोदासीन ४६७; उष्णतावगाहिप्रत्यक्ष २१९. ऊध्र्व २७२, २८०. एक ३३२, ३३४, ३३६ ; एकतपनप्रचारविशिष्ट ४१७ ; एकत्व १७ ; एकत्व विशेषण ३३५; एकत्वसंख्याविधान ३३५; एकत्वानुभव ५२३ ; एकवेशकालप्रतिपन्न ५३; एकधर्मनिष्ट ३१ ; एकवस्तुनिष्ठ २८ ; एकाकार १७४, १७६ ; एकैकभेदसंबन्ध ३७० ; एतत्तन्तु २९६ ; एततन्तुकायं २९७; एतत्तन्तुजन्य ३०४; एतत्सन्तुनिष्ठपद २९९; एततन्तुनिष्ठाल्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगिन् २९५; एतत्पटात्यन्ताभाव ३०० ; एतद्धटा त्मान्यान्यदृश्यान्य १६६; एतद्देशकालसंसर्ग १५४; एतद्वयतिरिक्तत्वासिद्धि ४९३. ऐक्यानुभव ५१ 213 श्रौ औदासीन्य ४६०; औपाधिकत्व ५१८, ५२६; औपाधिकभेद ५२०. कतिपयक्रियाविशिष्ट ४१७; कदाचित् २६४; करण २७५; करणसामथ्र्य ३१८; कर्तृकर्मभावविरोध ४४१; कलत्र ५२९; कलह ३७२; कल्पना २६९; कल्पनावैयथ्यं ३७४; कल्पितात्मन् १७ ; कल्प्यमान ३९० ; कल्प्यमानजगत्सदृश २६६ ; कल्याण १; कादाचित्क २६३, २६४ ; कारक २५१, ४९९; कारणजन्य ३८२; कारणविशेष ४९; कार्यकारणबुद्धि ३५४; कार्यताप्रयुक्त २००७ ; कार्यान्वय ५०६ ; काल ५६; कालतः १०१, ३३८ ; कालपरिच्छिन्न २१० ; कालपरिच्छेद २०६, २००७ ; कालवृत्ति ४१६ ; कालसिद्धयसिद्धि ४१५ ; कालाकाशादि २०२ ; कालातीततादोष ३११ ; कालात्ययापदिष्ट २१२ ; कालान्तरादि'५३ ; काशी-६७६ ; कित्सिादृश्य १७७ ; 214 कुम्भ ३६३, ४०६ ; कुम्भभेद ३६३ ; कूप ४२३ ; क्लप्तविषयत्व ३९६ ; केवल व्यतिरेकिन् २४९ ; केवलान्वयिन् ५०० ; क्रमभाव ४६३ ; क्रमेण ३६९ ; कचिन्निष्ठा भावप्रतियोगिन् २०४; कचित्प्रतीताप्रतीतत्व ४६४; क्षणिक ६९ ; क्षिप्रत्व ४१७ ; क्षीरनीर ३६०. खारीतेलप्रदान २६७. गगनादि ३२४ ; गगनानिश्चय ४२२ ; गगनानुमान ४२२ ; गाज २७७, ४५२ ; गमनशक्ति ४५२; गन्धर्वनगर २१५, २१७ ; गन्धर्वनगरप्रत्यक्ष २२२ ; गन्धादि ६२; गर्भस्थ ५२५ ; गुणपूर्ण १; गोक्षुरकापसारणापेक्ष ४५२ ; गोविषाण १०४. घट ९१ ; घटत्व ३१, ९१ ; घटप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्त ९१ ; घटाकाश ३४४ ; घटान्तर ९१. धटाकार १७६ ; चक्षुरादि १०७ ; चक्षुव्यर्यापार ४२२, ४२३; चन्दनसौरभ ४१७ ; चन्द्रभेद ३४५, ४८५ ; चन्द्रभेदमात्राभाव ४८५; चन्द्रभेदाभाव ४८५ ; चित्प्रकाशारोपित ३१३ ; चित्सुख १३९ ; चिप १३५; चित्रपदृग्विषयत्व १४१ ; चिन्तामय १६९ ; चेतनाचेतनात्मन् ३३८; चैतन्य ३१५ ; चैतन्याविषयत्व ३१६ ; चैतन्यैक्य ५१९. जगत् १, २ , ७, १४, ४६ ; जगदंश ३४४ ; जगदन्योन्याभावाधिकरण २११; जगदाख्य ३४३ ; जाल १६८ ; जड ९९, २००८ ; जडत्व २, १८८, १९९, २००, ३१२ ; जडत्वहेतु १८८, , २००९ ; जडप्रतियोगिक ४९० ; जडात्मन् ३८१ ; २००७ जनकाबाध्यातिरिक्त ९२; जन्मपूर्वकर्तृ १; जयतीर्थमुनीन्द्र ५३०; तरदूर्वादिवाक्य २२२ ; जलनभोनलिन १५७ ; जाति १०, १७, ४६ ; जातिबधिरमूक ४२२ ; जानामि ११७ ; जीवगतसुखदुःखादि ५२२, ५२६ ; जीवप्रतियोगिक ४९० ; जीवब्रहुः ५१७ ; जीवब्रहोक्य ४६४; जीवेश्वर ५२२; जीवेश्वरभेद ५२६ ; ज्ञातता १२५० 215 १३७, ३२३, ३२५, ४३६ ; ज्ञातताभाव १३८ ;• झातरज्जु २५६ ; ज्ञातृत्वानाधारत्व २०० ; ज्ञान ७८, १०७ ; शानकरणत्वाभाव १०७ ; ज्ञानग्राहक ४३७ ; ज्ञानग्राहक मात्रग्राह्य ४३७ ; ज्ञानजन्थफल ३२७ ; ज्ञानजन्यफलाधारत्व ३२३ ; ज्ञानज्ञेय १७४ ; ज्ञानतत्प्रामाण्य ४३५ ; ज्ञानत्व १६, १०६ ; ज्ञानत्वमात्र २२४ ; ज्ञाननिवत्र्यत्व १०५ ; इज्ञानप्रतिबन्धक १०५ ; ज्ञानमात्र २५५ ; ज्ञानमात्रसंवाद ४३० ; शानया थाध्य ४२८ ; ज्ञानरूपता १९५ ; शानसाध्य ४८७ ; शानाधारत्व १६, १८८ ; ज्ञानान्तरसंवाद ४२७ ; ज्ञानापेक्षा १८४ ; ज्ञानाभाव ११२, १९६ ; ज्ञानाभावविषयत्व ११० ; ज्ञापकत्व १०६ ; ज्ञापकाप्यायक १०६. तत् ४६९; तत्कारणता ३८६ ; तत्कालीनाबाध्यता २१७ ; तत्तत्प्रतीति योग्यत्व ३२३: तत्तत्प्रत्ययापृथग्भाव ४६२ ; तसत्खरूपप्राहकप्रमाण ४६३; तत्तद्वेद ३५५; तत्व १६९ ; तत्वावेदक ८३, २४१, २४३, २४५; तत्त्वावेदकप्रमाणगम्य ४८३: तत्वावेदकप्रमाणदृष्ट २४३: तत्त्वावेदकप्रमाणविषय ४८२ ; तत्पादोपजीविन् ३७५; तत्प्रतिनिधि ४७१; तत्प्रागभावनिवर्तिका १०१ ; तदतिरिक्त २५८ ; तदन्य ३९१ ; तदभाव ३९१ ; तदभिन्नमोक्ष ४८७; तदुत्पादक ३८६ ; तद्वेदसिद्धि ३८६; तद्विरुद्ध २८४, २८५; तद्विरोधिन् ३९१ ; तन्तुपटसंसर्गाभाव ३०३; तन् (धर्म) निषेध १६५ ; तन्मात्रान्तरगत ५०१ ; तपनपरिस्पन्द ४१० ; तरणिपरिस्पन्द ४१७; तर्क २११, ३८७; तर्कपराहत २६८; तात्कालिक २८० ; तात्विक १२ , ३४० ; तात्विकप्रमाणदृष्ट २४० ; तानि ५१३: तुच्छद्वैत ४६६ : त्रिकालखिल देशनिषेधप्रतियोगिन् ५३, ५८ ; त्रिकालाबाध्यता २१८ ; त्रिविध ३३८ ; ऋयणुक २८२ ; त्वम् ४६९ ; त्वदुक्त ११७. दर्शनविरोध २९८ ; दहनशैत्यानुमान २१९, ३०७, ३०९ ; दाहाभावप्रयुक्त ४५६ ; दुःख ५१३ ; दुःखाभाव ४४५ ; दुःखी ५१० ; दुरवधारण ४२८ ; दुरात्मन् २०६; दुर्निरूप १३, १४, ३७९; दुष्टकरणाजन्य ४२७; दूरस्थवनस्पति ३६०; दूषणम्रणलन १८८; दृक् १३५; दृग्दृश्य ३२१; दृग्विषयत्व १३४, १८० ; दृश्यत्व १३४, १४२, १४३, १४८, १५१, १५९, १६३, १६४, १६६, १७०, १७१, १८०, २६१, ३२१ ; दृश्यत्वादिहेतु २३०; ‘दृश्यत्वसामान्य १५७ ; दृश्यत्वानुमान २६८, २९४ ; दृश्यत्वाभाव १६७ ; दृष्टपदार्थ ४०८ ;'दृष्टान्त १०२, १०७, १०९, 216 २२४, २४२, २४९, ३००, ३१९, ३४५, ५०२ ; दृष्टान्तालाभ ४७८ ; दृष्टान्ता लाभदुष्ट ३७७ ; देवदत्त ९०, २९३, ५२८, ५२९ ; देवदत्तगत ९३ ; देवदत प्रमा ९३ ; देशकाल २०३; देशकालान्तवत्वाभाव ३३७; देशतः २०१, २०४, ३३८ ; दोष ८ ; दोषगम्य २६१ ; दोषग्रास १४; दोषशङ्कानिरसन ४५१ ; दोषाभाव ४४९ ; दोषाभावनिश्चय ; दोषाभावान्वयव्यतिरेक ४५५ ; दोषाभा ४४८ वाभाव ४५५ ; द्रव्यजन्यत्च ३७४ ; द्रव्यान्तर ४२५ . ध धर्मत्व २८, ३१ ; धर्मभेद ३७९, ३८१ ; धर्मविधान १६५ ; धर्माभाव ४८४; धर्मिन् १११; धर्मित्वहेतु ४८३, ४८५, ४८६ ; धर्मिप्रतियोगिप्रतीति ३५२ ; धर्मिप्रतियोगिभाव ४६१ ; धर्मिप्रतियोगिभेदप्रत्यय ४६३ ; धर्मिभेदाभाव ३८० ; धर्मोत्पत्ति ३७४ ; धम्र्यादिसापेक्ष ४०१ ; धारावाहिकविभ्रम ४३० ; धूम ध्वज १५४ ; धूमबाष्प ३४८ ; धूममात्र १५५ ; धूमवत्वमात्र ३४८ ; ध्वंसिका ९०. नञ्जर्थ ३९१; नञ्समास ३३८; नभस् ३०६, ३१०; नभोनलिन १५८; नभोनीलिमप्रतीतिभ्रम ता ३०९ ; नभोमलिनता २२० ; नलिनत्वसामान्य १५८ ; नाना २२८, ३३१ ; नानात्व ३३२ ; नानात्वनिषेध ३३१ ; नानाशब्द ३३३ ; निखिलप्रपञ्चसकारण २५७ ; निगडादिदृष्टान्त ४९८ ; नित्यत्व ४८४; नित्यत्वाद्यभाव ४८४; नित्यसर्वगत ५६; नित्यानुगेय १३८ , १३५ ; निदर्शन १५४, २६२ ; निमित्त २७३, ४७१ ; निमित्तकल्पना ४७० ; निमितादि २८१ ; नियतत्व ११ ; निरधिष्ठान २७०, २७८, २८३; निरपवाद २१८ ; निरपेक्ष ४५४ ; निरवकाश ३८९ ; निरवकाशस्मृतिविरोध २३६ ; निरसन ११९ ; निराकार १७६ ; नेिरा लम्बन ३९० ; निराश्रय ४६६ ; निरास ८ ; निरूपणगोचर १३० ; निर्णय ४४३ ; निर्णयदर्शन ४२; निर्दोषकरणजन्यता ३८२; निबीजत्व २२५; निर्भद ४७३ ; निर्वचनविरह ४; निर्वाच्यविरह ४; निर्वाहकल्पन ४०४; निर्वात्यनिर्वाहकनिर्वह पणादि ४७५ ; निर्विकल्पक १४४, १४६; निर्विकल्पकव्यवहार १४५; निर्विकल्पक संवित् ३६५ ; निर्विशेष ४७३, ५११ ; निर्विशेषत्वविशेष ४७३; बिर्विषय १९५; निवर्तक ९१, ९३ ; निवृत्ताज्ञान ५०९ ; निवृताविव ५०६ ; निश्चितवैर ४५४ ; निषिध्यते ३७ ; निषेध ५९ ; गिषेधक ३३८ ; निषेधप्रतियोगिन् ५१, ५३ ; निषेधसमुचय १२ : निषेध्यv२३२ ; निष्प्रतियोगिक २९५; निष्प्रतियोगिकमेदग्रहण N)x 217 ३६६ ; निष्प्रधान २७० , २९४ ; नीरूपेन्द्रियग्राह्य ४२५ ; नीलिमा ३०६, ४१८ ; नेति २११ ; नैमित्तिकदर्शन ४७० ; न्याय २२७. पक्ष २७, १६३, २२३, २५३, ३४६ ; पक्षक्षति ३७१ ; पक्षत्रय ३९२ ; पक्ष निक्षिप्त १७, २५७ ; प क्षनिक्षेप २१, २५८ ; पक्षसचटश २५३ ; पक्षसम २५३, ४८६; पक्षाव्यावृति २३ ; पक्षीकरण ६४, ६५ ; पक्षीकार ४१६ ; पक्षीकृत्य ४१५; पक्षेकदेश २० ; पञ्चमप्रकार २००९ ; पट २९५ ; पटविशेष ४१८ ; पटसंसर्ग ३०१ ; पटान्तर ३०१ ; पदार्थ ७९ ; पदार्थशक्ति ४७१ ; पदार्थसमुदाय ३४३ ; पदार्थ सार्थ ४१७ ; परजातिविरह ४५ ; परतः ३१२ ; परतस्त्वापत्ति ४५१ ; परत्व ४१७; परन्तप ५१३ ; परत्रसिद्धि ४०० ; परबोधन ४०० ; परमात्मतदितर ४६३ ; पर मात्मन् ३३९ ; परमात्मप्रतियोगिक ४९०, ५०२ ; परमार्थतः ३३९, ३४६, ४८४; परमार्थभेदभिन्न २१२ ; परमेश्वर ३ १७, ५२१ ; परम्परा ४१८: परविषय १९६ ; परस्परभेदप्रतीति ४६२ ; परस्परसुखदुःखासुसंधानप्रसङ्गपराहत ५२८ ; परस्पराननु संहेित ४७८ ; परस्पराश्रय ३६३, ३८०, ४२८; परापरव्यवहार ४२१ ; परामर्श सिद्ध ११० ; परिक्षीण ४५१ ; परिच्छिन्न २, २० ५, २०३, २०४, २०५, २०७ , ३३८ ; परिच्छिन्नत्वहेतु २०१; परिच्छेदायोग्य २०६ : परिपन्थिभाव ३९५ ; परि शेष १७९ ; परीक्षा ४३९, ४४०, ४५१ ; परीक्षाकांक्षा ४४२ ; परीक्षानवस्था ४४३, ४५० ; परीक्षान्तरापेक्षा ४४० ; परीक्षापेक्षा ४४०, ४५४ ; परीक्षासहकृत ४४९ ; पर्यवसान ४४९ ; पर्याय २८ ; पर्वत २८४, २८५; पादोपजीविन् २१९ ; पानीय ४४४ ; पाप १०५ ; पापादिसंबन्धाभाव ३१७ ; पारमार्थिक ४८४, ५१७, ५१८ , ५२७ ; पारमार्थिकभेद ३९७ ; पारमार्थिकभेदवत्व १८१ ; पारमार्थिकसत्व २२७ ; पार्श्वस्थ २७४ ; पिण्थाकयाचन २६७ ; पुनरावृत्ति २१० ; पुरुषदेशकालविकल्पना ४३१ ; पूर्वपूर्वप्रपञ्च २९४; पूर्वपूर्वभेदप्रतीति ३५८ ; पृथग्व्युत्पत्ति ३३८ ; पृथि व्यादिगुण ४२५ ; प्रकारान्तर ४०४ ; प्रकाशकत्व १०६; प्रकाशविषय ३१४; प्रकाशशब्द ३१५ ; प्रकाशान्तर ३१२, ४०४ ; प्रकाशाश्रय ३१४ ; प्रकाशेत ३१२ ; प्रतिज्ञा २७ ; प्रतिज्ञावाक्यार्थ ३०४; प्रतिर्कपराहत ४०२ ; प्रतिनियत ३२६ ; प्रतिपन्नता'५७ ; प्रतिपक्षोपाधि ५१ ; प्रतिबन्धक ४५१ ; प्रतिबन्धकनिवर्तक ४५४ ; प्रतिभास ३९; प्रतियोगिघटित ३६६ ; प्रतियोगिन् १३, १११ ; प्रतियोगिविलक्षण ३९२ ; प्रतिवादिवाक्य ११९ ; प्रतिसंधान ८६; प्रतीतता २६४; प्रतीति ३७; 218 प्रतीतिनियम ३५७ प्रतीयेत ३ ३७ प्रत्यक्ष ११३ ; प्रत्यक्षगोचर २१३ प्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्यानभ्युपगम ३ त्यक्षबाधित ५२८ प्रत्यक्षविरुद्ध ३०५ क्षविरोध २१९ प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाण २४१ प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणसिद्ध ३५ प्रत्यक्षादि विषय ४८२ प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्ध ६५; प्रत्यक्षाद्याकठित ३९७ ; प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षमेद ३७६ प्रत्यक्षाभास २२३ प्रत्यक्षाविरोध २१४ प्रत्यभिज्ञा ११६ ८, १ ३४१ ; प्रथमोत्पन्न ९४ प्रदीपप्रभा ९४ प्रदेशनिष्ठता ४२४ प्रद्वेष ३ प्रधान २६६, २६५, २७० २९४ प्रप ३४, ६४, २२६ प्रमाण ६७, ६८, १०४ प्रमाणग्रहण प्रमाणगन्ध ३७६ प्रमाणगम्य ११६ न ८२, ९४, ९५, ९९, १२ १२१ प्रमाणज्ञानोदय १२५ त्रमाणतः १५२ प्रमाणदृष्ट २३८, २४० माणनिवत्र्य ११६ प्रमाण प्रतिपन्न ७, ५८ प्रमाणप्रसर ३६६ १२७ प्रमाणभ्रान्तिदृश्य १५७ प्रमाणमात्रदृष्ट २४५ प्रमाणमात्रविषय ६१ प्रमाणविरुद्ध ५२६ ; प्रमाण विरोध २३२, २६९ माणविषय २३२ प्रमाणवृति २४८ प्रमाणसिद्ध २३३ प्रमाणाभाव १८७ प्रमाणाभावविषय १२१ प्रमाणाविषय ६१, ६४, २४७ ९३ ; प्रमानिवत्यै ९ प्रमाप्रागभावातिरिक्त ९३ प्रमाप्रागभावातिः रेकिन् ५ प्रमाविषय प्रमेयत्व ९, ११६ प्रमेयत्वादि ५०० प्रयोज कत्व ५२४, ५२५ योजनान्तर ५०१ प्रयासवैयथ्यं १८६; प्रयन्नायोग ३८५ प्रवृत्तिसामथ्र्य ४२७ प्रस्तुत ८ प्रागुरुः विकल्पदोष १४२ प्रातिभासिक ३४९, ३९९ प्रतिभासिकेतर २१३ प्राप्तमरण १०४, १२१, २३१ माणिकत्वातिरिक्त २४६, २४८ प्र २४९ प्रामाण्यनिर्वाहक ४२७ प्रामाण्यनिश्चय ४३१, ४५४ प्रामाण्याध्यवसाय ४३७ प्रामाण्यनुिमान ४३७ प्रामाण्यभ्युपगम ४३० प्रामाण्याः विनाभाविन् ४३६ ; प्रीति ५३ ०८ १० पकलव्याप्य ११५, १३१, १ ६४, १७१ बन्धप्रध्वंसाधिकरण ५०२ घलवत्प्रत्यक्षगृहीतव्याप्तिक २२१ ; बहिः २७४ बहुजीवपक्ष ३२ बहुतपनक्रियाविशिष्ट ४१७ ; बहुतरणिपरिस्पन्दान्तरितजन्म ४१७

४४

Ple ६ ॐ93}}६ ०५

०६५

३०४

8५21

'५०४ ) { '४ ६ । '००४ }५ beals '>३४ ४५६

३७५

‘३४४ 2bj4५॥६ : ०१६ 6) . 215x14५७18hale ५ ५)

५०४

*** '************४ '०४ bel= ' ' +18581 : १०४ 1blt४b

-al : ३५४ but५ ॥al : ६४ ॥५lex tal : ९५ ? !=॥४५॥al : ५५५ ‘०४ • ५ ०

1. 12:०४५ ॥३:112 :३४, 12 : ।

1babe! ३॥

०५४

• ४> ५afal48 : ००५ =tEl2५ : १४ ५ ६५Af : ४ ३४ alt५७!=125;
• ४ ५ ६ ३॥५॥४॥८५७ : ! ३४ ‘०६४ btal l at : ४2४ 1895blta}] : *४

blbab4 1bl21

१. ७५

81 = lelhlt 3

१५ ५

a =1bl=ll

३ . 221 वस्तुपूर्व ३५३ : वस्तुपूर्वकत्व ९९ ; वस्तुशब्द २८ ; वस्त्वन्तरपूर्वक ९४, ९५ : वाक्यत्व २२२ ; वाक्यनिषेध्य २२९ ; वाङ्कख ५३० ; वाच्यवाचकादि ४२० ; वादिप्रसिद्ध २२७ ; वायुवनस्पतिसंयोग ३७६ ; वायुविशेष ४४४ ; वासना २८१ ; वासनोपादानक २८१ ; वास्तव ४०१, ५०९ ; विकल्प २४ : विकल्पसाधुत्वाप्रसिद्धिः ४०० ; विकल्पासह ४ ; विकल्पनिराकरण ३९७ ; विगीत ९२ ; विचारपदवी १० ; विचारागोचर ४४, ६१, १७३, ३१३, ३४० ; विचित्रशक्ति ४७५ ; विज्ञान ४७७ ; विज्ञानविलापन ७४; विज्ञानविलाप्य ७१ : विद्यमानभेद ३५९, ३६०, ३६१ ; विद्यु दादि २८० ; विधिगम्य २१३ ; विनष्ट २७३ ; विपक्ष २४५, २७०, ५१५; विपक्षभूत १८९ ; विप्रतिपन्न २२२, २३८, ३७८ ; विभुगुण ४२५ ; विभ्रम ९२ . : विमत २, २९३, ३३९, ३४०, ५१४, ५२७, ५२८, ५२९ ; विरम्यव्यापार ३५४ ; विरुद्ध १५९, २१२, ३७९ : विरुद्धाकार २८६ ; विरोध ५, ८४, ९२, १६०, १६२ , ३३९, ३७३ ; विरोधाभाव ३२५ ; विलक्षण १३ ; विवक्षित ८ ; विवाद ८८ विवादपद २७ ; विशिष्ट २५९ ; विशिष्टत्व ३५७ ; विशिष्टप्रतीतेि ४२० ; विशिष्ट प्रत्यहेतुता ४१७ ; विशिष्टभ्रम १ २१ ; विशिष्टविषयज्ञान १२० ; विशिष्टव्यवहार जनक ४१७ ; विशिष्टात्मन् १८९ ; विशेष १२३, ४७१ , ४७४ : विशेषग्रहण ४९९ ; विशेषज्ञान १२८ ; विशेषज्ञानापेक्षा ४११ ; विशेषणत्व २५६ : विशेषणप्रक्षेप ५२५ विशेषणविशेष्यभावग्रहण ३६५ ; विशेषणविशेष्यभावग्रहणस्थल ३६१ ; विशेषणाभाव १४८ ; विशेषप्रमाणबुभुत्सा १२९ ; विशेषयुक्ति २३५ ; विशेषविकल्प १५३ ; विशेष व्यवहार १२२ ; विशेष्य १४९ ; विशेष्याभाव १४८ ; विशेष्यासिद्धि १५० ; विश्व २२५, २२८ ; विश्वमिथ्यात्व २३०, ३२७, ३३१ ; विश्वसल्यता २२८ ; विश्वसल्यत्व २३१, २६० ; विषय ६६ ; विषयतानतिरेक १६८ ; विषयत्व ५०० ; विषयविष . यिभाव ३१८, ३२२ ; विषयानुभव ४८४ ; ि विषयापहार ८२ ; विषयावरण ९४ ; विषाणत्यसामान्य १०४ ; विसंवादानुसन्धानवान् ४५३ ; विसंवादाभाव ४२७ ; वृत्ति ३१५ ; वृत्तिजनितफलासंबन्ध १३७ ; धृत्तिजन्यव्थवहारविषय १४० ; वृत्तिज्ञानभाग १९५ ; धृत्तिरूप १३५ ; वृत्तिविषय ३१६ ; घृत्तिव्याप्य ११५, १६४, १७१, २४५ ; वेत्रबीज ४५६ ; वेदवाक्य ४३३ ; वेदान्तजनितवृत्तिविषय १३६ ; वेदान्तवाक्य १७६ ; वेदान्तवक्यिति ३८८ ; वेदान्तवेदिनः १० ; वेद्यत्व १३९, १४२, १४९ ; वैचित्र्य ४६४ ; वैदिक २२६ ; वैलक्षण्य ७ ; वैषम्य ; व्यतिरेक २७० ; ४५४ व्यतिरेकिवृष्टान्त ४७८; व्यपदेशमात्र ४६५; व्यभिचार १५ , ७७, १०७, १०८ १४३, १७०, १९२, २०८, २०५, २२४, २५३, २५४, २७१, ३७८, ४८५, ४८६, 222 ४८७, ५०२; व्यभिधाराभाच २५६ ; व्यभिचारिन् ४४३; व्यर्थविशेषण ४८८, १५०, १८३ ; व्यवस्था ४५७, ४७९ ; व्यवस्थानिरुक्ति ४७९ ; व्यवस्थानुपपत्ति ३७९ ; व्यवस्थापद ३७९ ; व्यवहारनिर्वाहक ३५०, ४८१ ; व्यवहारबाध ४६९ ; व्यवहारविषय ५ ; व्याघात १२, २८, ५६, ६७, १२०, २०३, २०४, २०५, २००६ , ३२९, ३८५ ; व्यापक २६९ ; व्याप्ति १५, ११६ ; व्याप्तिवैकल्य ४०३ ; व्याप्ति सिद्धि २५ ; व्याप्यकल्पना २६९ ; व्याप्यभाव २६५; व्याप्यसिद्धि १५, ३४, ८३, ३०२ ; व्यावर्तक १७९ ; व्यावहारिक २२५, २६०, ३९७ ; व्यावहारिकसस्य २२६ , २३५; व्यावृत्तिविशेषग्रहण ४१२ ; व्यावृत्यनुभव ४०९ ; व्याहत ११, २५, १४७, १६५, ४६७, ४७३ ; व्युत्पन्न ३३७ ; व्युत्पन्नत्व ३३८ ; व्योमन् ३४४ . शब्दाश्रय ४२२ ; शरीर ५२८ ; शरीरत्वहेतु ४७८ ; शशविषाण १०४, २४८ ; शास्त्र २२७, २४९, २५१, २८९ ; शुक्ति ४८९ ; शुक्तिका १५९, १६० , २८७ ; शुक्तिभात्रविषय २६० ; शुक्तिरजत २, ६८, १५९ ; शुक्तिरूप्यादि ४३६ ; श्रद्धजड ३७२ ; श्रुतमय १६९ ; श्रुति २३० ; श्रुतिनिषेध्य २२८ ; श्रुतिविरोध २३५ ; श्रुतिशतसमधिगम्य २५७ ; श्रोत्राद्यविषय ६२. संयुक्तसंयोगिसमवाय ४१९ ; संयोगासंभव ३२२; संयोगित्व ३४४; संविदन्त. रापेक्षा १४३, १४४; संविदपेक्षानियत १८३; संशयानपगम ४४७ ; संशयाभाव ४१२; संश्लिष्टोपाधि ५२४ ; संसर्गनिषेध २९.८ ; संसर्गनिरूपण ३२१ ; संसर्गाभाव ४९४ ; संसारप्रध्वंस ४९४ ; संसारसंसर्गाभाव ५०२: संसाराधिकरणस्वरूप ५०४, ५०७; संसा रानुभव ५०४, ५११; संसारानुभवलक्षणयुक्त ४९१ ; संसारिन् ५०३, ५०७, ५०८, ५०९, ५१७; संसारिभेदानुभव ५१३; संस्कार ११६; सकलजनसुखदुःखानुसन्धान ५२१; सकलजीवप्रतियोगिक ४९२ ; सकलजीवप्रतियोगिकभेद ४९३ ; सकलप्रतियोगिक ४९.०; सकलव्यवहारविधुर ४०२; सकारणकत्व २६३ ; संख्या ३३६ ; सच्छब्द २८ ; सजातीय ३३५; सजातीयवस्त्वन्तरनिषेध ३३४; स जातीयविजातीयसंवादविसंवादभावा भाव ४३९; सत् ७, ३२, ३३, ३४ ; सताज्ञानहेय १७५; ससायुक्त ३३, ३४ ; सत्त्वनिषेध २९५ ; सत्वमात्र २९९; सत्त्वविरह ६, ११ ; सत्त्वासत्व २८; सत्प्रतिपक्ष ५३ ; सत्य १, १०२ ; सत्यैजगद्य २६७, २६९, २७० ; सत्यझनादिवचन २२४ ; 223 सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्य २२२, २२९, २४३ ; सत्यता २, २१३ ; सत्यत्व ८१, २३०, ३३८ ; सत्त्व ११, १४, १५, १६, २५, २८, ३७, ३९, ४१; सदसत्व ९, १० ; सदसदूप ७; सदसद्वपत्वासंभव २६३; सदसद्विलक्षण २६, २७ ; सदहनता ३४८ ; सदोषत्वाध्यवसाय ३८७; सद्विविक्त ३; सद्विविक्तत्व ४४; सद्विविक्तत्ववेदन ५९; सत्यवहार ३८; सन्दि हान ४४४; सन्निकर्षाभाव १६४; सन्निष्ठ २८; सन्मात्रवृत्ति १५९; समबलप्रत्यक्षान्तर २१९; समवाय ४७६ ; समानन्याय ३११ ; समानयोगक्षेम ३१, ९१, ४७७, ५२९; समानाधिकरण ३; समानाभिघातदोष ३६१; संप्रतिपन्न ९२, ९३, ११२, ११३, ३६१ ५२८, ५२९ ; संप्रतिपन्नभ्रान्तेतरत्व २४३; संबन्धमात्रग्रहण ४९९; संबन्धाभाव ३१२; संबन्धमात्राभावाधिकरण ४९९; सम्यग्ज्ञान ५१; सर्प २५६; सर्पता २५६; सपजन्य २५६; सर्व ५१३; सर्वकोठ्यवलम्बिन् ४१२; सर्वजगन्मिथ्यात्वसिद्धि २९७; सर्वमि थ्यात्वप्रतिज्ञा २९०; सर्वव्यवहारलोप ४४९; सर्वात्मना ४०८ ; सर्वाधार ४६०; सर्वा नुमानाभाव १५३ ; सर्वानुवाद ११८ ; सर्षप २८५ ; सर्षपारोप २८४; सलिलपाना नन्तर ४४५ ; सविकल्पकधी ३६५ ; सविशेषता ४७३; सविषय १९५ ; सहस्राक्ष २१० ; सहावस्थानविरोध १०१ : सहावस्थानापेक्षण ३८१ ; साक्षिगोचर ४२६ ; साक्षि चैतन्यविषय १२५; साक्षिदर्शन ४४३; साक्षिन् ११, १२७, ४१३, ४२७, ४३७ , ४४ १, ४४५, ४४८, ४५४, ४५७, ४५८; साक्षिसिद्ध १२५, १२६, १२७, १२९, ४०९, ४१४, ४४३, ४४६ ; सादिता २०६ ; साधक ३९१ ; साधनचिकल १०७, १०९, २४२, २४९, ३४५ ; साधनवैकल्य ४९८; साधनशून्य १५४ ; साधनाङ्गता नियमाभाव ४८४ ; साधनावृत्ति २४५; साधारणधर्म १०४; साधिष्ठान २७१ ; साध्य १०२, १०३, ४९५ , ५०२ ; साध्यता १३० ; साध्यविकल १०२, २६२, ३००, ३४२, ३४४; साध्यसाधक २०११ ; साध्यानिरुक्ति २३९, ३४५; साध्याविशिष्ट १८, ३५, २०५, २४६, १९३; सापेक्षतामात्र ४०३; सापेक्षत्व ४५७ ; सापेक्ष निरपेक्ष ४६४ ; सामान्यतः ११८ ; सामान्यतःसिद्ध १२८ ; सामान्यानुवाद १२२ ; सार्वज्ञापति ४०९; सार्वत्रिकव्याप्ति ४१० ; सावयवत्व ३४४ ; साहचर्यस्मरण ४१६ । सिद्ध १२६, २५० ; सिद्धता १०५ ; सिद्धसाधन ७, ३६, ४७, ४९, ५२, ५४, ६२ ६९, ९५, ९६, ९७, १०२, १०५ , २९६; ३०२, ३४२, ३४३, ४१५, ४९३ ; सिद्धसाधनतापल्हिार ३०० ; सिद्धान्नविरोध ७०, १३१ ; सिद्धयुपायान्तर २५२ ; सुख ५१३ ; सुखदुःखाद्यनुसन्धान ५१९; सुखदुःखाद्यनुसन्धानभावाभाव ४७९ ; सुखदुःखेच्छा तदभाव ४४६ ; सुखदुःखेच्छादि ४२० ; सुखादिज्ञान ४३० ; सुखानुभव ४५८ ; सुदृढ ४४३; सुषुप्ति १४६, ४५८; सौषुप्तिकार्नुभव ११०; स्तम्भ ३६३, ४०६; स्तम्भभेद 224 ३६३; स्पर्शरहित ३१० ; स्फटिक्त ८७; स्फुटतरबाधक ३८७; स्मृतिगोचर ४१४ ; स्वकर्मकप्रकाशत्व १९८ ; खकर्मकसंवित् १९८ ; खगत ३४३; खगतनानात्वनिषेध ३३२; खगतभेदराहित्य ३४१; स्वजनकसामग्री ९६; स्वतः २५०, ३१२; स्वतः प्रामाण्य ४५७; स्वतस्त्वापत्ति ४५३; स्वतःसिद्धत्व २५२; स्ववेश ९८; स्वदेशगत ९४ : स्वनिक्त्यै ५४, ९७, १००, १० ०१: स्वपरीक्षापेक्षा ४४० ; स्वप्रकाशता २२ ; स्वप्रकाशत्व १६, १ ३९, १४२, १४३, १४७, २५२ ; स्वप्रकाशत्मस्वरूप ४४० ; स्व प्रकाशान्तर १९८ ; स्वप्रतिबद्धव्यवहार १८० ; स्वप्रत्यासत्ति ४१७ ; स्वप्रागभाव ९५; स्वप्रागभावनिवर्तक १०१ ; स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्त ९४, ९५, ९६, १००, १०१ ; स्व प्रागभावव्यावृत्ति १०१ ; स्वप्रातिकूल्याचरण ३८४ ; स्वभाव ५२२ ; स्वभावप्रत्यासत्ति ४२० ; स्वयंप्रकाशत्व ४३२: स्वरूपव्यतिरिक्त ४७५ ; स्वरूप ५१४ ; स्वरूपत्व ३२९; स्वरूपभेद ४७५ ; स्वरूपसत्तू ८६ ; स्वरूपासिद्धि १५० ; स्वरूपैक्य ५२४; स्वरूपै क्यमात्र ५२५ ; स्वविषय १९६; स्वविषयशुक्तिका १६२ ; स्वविषयावरण ९६ ; स्व वृत्तिविरोध १९६; स्वव्यतिरिक्तजीचप्रतियोगिक ४९२ ; स्वसंख्यासंख्येय ३७८ ; स्वातिरिक्तसंवित् १८० ; स्वातिरिक्तसंवेिदनपेक्ष १४३ ; स्वात्यन्ताभाव ३: स्वानुभूत ४४२ ; स्वान्तभेदहीन ३४० ; 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(The the Adyar Library. Theosophical Society, Adyar, Madras, S. India) Library Library. Edited Sastri, [3.A. By 6f Brahrma Yogin. C4141.0cu! (Sarpskrt-Devanagar) Prof. (C, 1dited F. O. Schrader, Ph.D) , 1910 unler t1le supervision of F. (0. Schrader, Ph.D., 2 Wols Cloth ... by 1912 Kullh2.1 1916 1920 4- 1923 Pa१it 1925 Edited 6y Pandit 4. SA[vA U /*:[SAIDS-15- with the Commentary of Sri [;panisad 13ral m1a. Yoit1. [टdited by A. Mahadeta Sastri, 1).). Vol. with 1926 Cloth [.- Sargumysa Cloth ... the Coाrmentary of 4. Mahadeva Sastri, 1.4. oF SA}{587 MSS. in the Adyar Library {revised). Malbad०५a Sastri, 1).A. ... Raja, 1.4., D. Phil.(0x01.), 2 Wols . Each 10 10 3 5 4 2 0) 0 []] 0 0) s Hs.• ..

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4

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1936 15. TEN MAJOR UPANI~ADS with the Commentary of S'ri Upani~ad Brahma Yogin. Edited by the Patt9its of the Adyar Library under the direction of Prof. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon.) h-'a to Aitareya, Vol. I Chlindogya and BthadaraHaka, Vol. II Vol. I Boards}... Vol. II .. 1937 16.

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35. A DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGUE o£ the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Asyar Library by K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, M.O.L., under tire direction o£ Prof. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D. Phil. {Oxon.) Vol. I-Vedic 36.

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1943 VIS'E~AM~TA

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As'vALAYANAG~HYA-SOTRA-With

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