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case. Similarly of the alternatives as to time, space etc. This is the unintelligibility of the analysis. 44-3. The quotation is from Madhva's Amwyakhyana, Chapter III, pada 3. 462. The cognition of the substrate involves also the cognition of the difference of the substrate from the counter-correlate; similarly the cognition of the counter correlate involves the cognition of the difference from the substrate ; hence there is no reciprocal dependence. 476. Samavaya is defined as a relation located in the substrate and obtaining between that and qualities etc. Now the location is not another relation between samaviiya and samavayt'n. Rather does samavaya have to explain its own relation. 486. There is no inconstance in the first alternative ; for there too is presented a difference between the real and the superimposed moons ; the reality of this too being in dispute, it cannot legitimately be claimed as an exception to the pervasion ; vyabhicara cannot be set up in respect of the subject or what is on a par with it. 498. The non-intention of the specification applies both to "relation" and non-existence". No specification is intended of the relation whether it be satizsara or literal fetters, and no particllar form of non-existence is intended either, whether absolute or that subsequent to destruction. Thus there is no inapplicability either to the param'iUman or to released prisoner. 499. What is the use of taking the words " all relations " ? The object of any qualification of the probans is to ward off inconstancy of the probans. Here " abhavadhikara1;1atva " can itself serve as the probans, the pervasion being kevalanvayin, admitting of no exceptions ; why qualify the probans further ? The reply points to other instances of kevala1wayin IJerv~sion e.g., between namability and knowability, where the latter is th" probans. Since there is pervasion ev.en between contentness and namability, why specify the former with the w.ords " in respect of knowledge'" ? I
