192
VADAVALi
question, there will be .the defect of arthantarata. The text may also mean that in establishing do§agamyatva, because of cognisability, there are as many defects as in establishing illusoriness with the same probans. XXIX (262-265). The example in the Advaitin's inference is criticised as being devoid of the probandum. The probandum " indeterminability," or " being nescience or a product thereof"' is not present in the shell-silver. The Advaitin holds that it is present there. In the inference, "shell-silver" has some cause, because it is occasional {£.e., not constant) like pot. The shellsilver is not a product of what is real or unreal; so it must be by exclusion a product of nescience. The Dvaitin examines the probans" being occasional". Does it mean " being cognised at some time ?" There is in this case the non-existence of the pervasion in respect of Atman and Akas'a which, though eternal, are only cognised for some time. If it means " being born at some time " there is the non-establishment of the probans in the subject. The probandum is " possession of a cause." This has to be proved. The probans " being born at some time " is the same as the probandum. Vhen that is not established this is also not established. Hence the non-establishment of the probans. The author concludes that all the three inferences stated by the Advaitin turn out to be invalid. XXX (266-270). As against the Advaitin the Dvaitin urges a reductio ad absurdum. The antecedent of the hypothetical inference is " If the universe is illusory, the consequent is the acceptance of two real universes." The consequent which is not desirable to the Advaitin results as follows. Delusion pre-supposes the existence of two factors, the substrate and the achetype. Vithout these two factors delusion is impossible in aw C2.Se. These two factors must be real and similar to the contents of tJle delusion. So the moment we acce~t the delusion there is the necessity to admit two real entities. The Advaitin is out to disprove the reality
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