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the 16th Chapter there is the classification of men into two types, the devas and the asuras (demonic tempered men). There is a detailed and eloquent description of demonic tempered men. They never reach my feet says the Lord Kp~na. The men of asuric temper hold that the universe is unreal and that is has no substrate. They say that there is no Is'vara. Hence the opposition of the sm~ti to the Advaitin's position. If the Advaitin contends that the unreality predicated with reference to the world in the Gita verse is not absolute unreality, the Dvaitin replies that there is no disputant who holds such a position. If the Advaitin seeks to point out that the Buddhist holds that the universe is absolutely unreal, it is not so says Madhva ; since even the s'unyavadin admits empirical reality called samvrta-sattva. XXVI (238-252). The Dvaitin states his inference to prove the reality of the universe. The inference is as follows. "The universe under dispute is real, because it is an object of valid knowledge, like Brahman ". A detailed examination of the formal correctness of the limbs of the inference is undertaken. The probandum of the inference is clearly stated. It is reality i.e., being unsublatable. The probans " being an object of pramaQ.a " is resolved to mean two things : (1) being an object of the prama'Q.a that makes known the real or (2) being the object of the pramaqa that makes known the phenomenal. It cannot be the first alternative, because the Advaitins do not admit that pramaqas like perception can make known what is real. Nor can it be admitted that pramiiQ.as like perception can make known the phenomenal, because it is not acceptable to the Dvaitin. To know a thing through a pramiit}a and then say that it makes known the phenomenal is contradiction in terms. Pramiil]a always makes known what is real. Further the example i.e., Brahman, is devoid of the probans l.e.,." being an object of pramaQa." (For Advaitin's refutation 11f criticism, see Advaita siddhi, p. 64.) The Dvaitin holds that there is po pramaqa to establish the fad that pramiil]as like percepti9n do not cognise the real. The
