186
VADAVALi
what is present and inttnediate. Perception cannot comprehend the non-existence of the sublation located in the future. If it be held that perception can do so, then the reality of such a perception will be on a par with the reality of the fata morgana (the mythical city of the gandharvas). The Dvaitin admits that perception has a capacity to comprehend the non-existence of the sublation in the future. This is clear by its very capacity to cognise the non-sublatability in the present. But there is an essential difference between the two perceptions. Validity according to Madhva is intrinsic and invalidity is extrinsic. The validity present in cognition is pro· duced as well as ascertained by the very instruments which produce and ascertain the cognition. The instruments that originate the cognition originate its validity. The ·Cognition and its validity are manifested by witness-consciousness. As for invalidity it is originated by the defects associated with the instruments of knowledge. The Sakt:~in cognises the cognition aspect of the invalid cognition and invalidity in it is inferred. Invalidity is extrinsic. The perception of the mythical city of the gandharvas is invalid because in it there is the defect "nonexistence." The cognition of unsublatability is established because there is a defect undermining it. Hence the difference. XXIII (219-224). The Advaitin argues that inference sublates the knowledge derived through perception. The Siddhantin points out that inference cannot sublate perception, because inference is dependent on perception. If inference be said to have the capacity to sublate perception, then the perception of heat in fire can be sublated by the inference that establishes the cold nature of fire. Such a conclusion is abusurd on the face of it. Inference as such has no capacity to refute the content of perception. Inference is not an independent pramllQa like perception or verbal testimony. The cognition derivelli. through perception cannot be sublated by a perception of equal strength, let alone of inference. (See Advrita siddhi, p. 28.)
