XXIX
the primary validity of perception over inference is sought to be established. In this connection, the author makes a significant remark. " If it be contended that inference itself be the sublator of perception, when perception is not sublated by another perception of equal strength, what then alas ! is the talk of the wretch inference which lives at the feet of perception being the sublator of that ? " The conflict of the Advaitin's inference with scriptural statements like " the world is real . . . ", etc., is stated. In this connection the Advaitin's contention i.e., that the scriptural statements which have for their import the reality of the universe are restated in order to be refuted by other scriptural statements that refute the reality of the universe, is dismissed as being untenable. Further, the Dvaitin contends that there is no need for restating a view that is not valid merely for the sake of denunciation. Besides, the conflict with the scriptural statements and the conflict with the statements of sm:rtis are also pointed out. Contradiction of the Advaitin's inferences by other inferences such as " the world under disputes is real, because it is validly cognised like Brahman etc." is pointed out. The adjunct do$agamyat'Vam is urged as vitiating the inference of the Advaitin. The example in the Advaitin's inference, ' shell-silver ', is urged to be devoid of the probandum, mithyatva. There is an interesting discllssion about the epistemo· logical status of the shell-silver cognition. A counter-inference (tarka) is urged against the Advaitin's inference resulting in the acceptance of two real worlds (section 266 ff.). The validity and the tenabilhy of the countet~-inference' in rebutting the Advaitin'! inference, is discussed at some length. • From section 295, another famous inference of the Advaitin is takeq_ up for criticism. It is called the " arhS'itva anumaX:a ".
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