XXX
'Being a whole' is the probans of the famous inference. It· is criticised and refuted by pointing out defects like sublation,establishment of the established, etc. After this, it is pointed out that the probans of the Advaitin has no probative value, because it is of no service in the establishment of the probandum. Some of the famous S'rutis cited by the Advaitins. in their favour such as " Nel;la nanasti ", "ekamevadvitiyam" etc. are criticised and they are interpreted as not going against the reality of the universe. • So far, the Dvaitin established the reality of the universe as against the contention that it is illusory. He now proceeds to establish the reality of the five-fold differetzces that are eternal. They are : (1) the difference between the Lord and soul, (2) between the Lord and Matter, (3) between soul· and soul, (4) between soul and matter and, (5) between matter and matter. So, before establishing all these differences at once, he takes up the criticism of the Advaita position, " that the souls are not ultimately different from Brahman." The Advaita argument is set forth in the form of an inference, and is refuted by the Dvaitin. Similar inferences of the Advaitin attempting to establish the illusory nature of difference are refuted at great length. The various pramaQas that are adduced for the establishment of the illusory nature of difference such as perception, inference, etc. are refuted in great detail. As a pluralist Jayatirtha feels the need to establish the intelligibility of the concept of difference as against the Advaita dialectics arrayed against it. All the arguments of the monist to demostrate the obstacles in the way of a really valid definition of the concept of difference are set forth in extenso and refuted. From section 312..to the end of the book, the chief topic is the dialectics of difference. Difference according to S'ri Madhava is not cognised by ~~self but
