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of Truth, it is not absolQ.tely real also. vVe determine things as either what is or what is not. Difference is neither. In this way it is indeterminable. The problem is whether difference is sublated at the time of the realisation of the Truth. Vedic passages simply state what that Truth is. The interpretation of such passages depend on the realisation of Truth. Thus intil Truth is realised, one cannot say whether difference is sublated at all. If it is not sublated, it is absolutely real. In the Advaita system, sublatability is no~ the factor which militates against the absolute reality of difference. The writers on Advaita attempt to show that the congition of difference is a psychological impossibility. Such a cognition, according to them cannot result in a valid knowledge, because cognition of one difference depends on the cognition of another difference and this latter depends on the former. Thus there cannot be a really valid cognition of difference. The great contribution of S'ankara is in establishing the positive nature of the world as against the nihilistic view of the Buddhists, taking his stand on the very platform of the Buddhists, namely, pure logic. Buddhists defined everything .i.n terms of difference ; difference from other things is the real nature of a thing, according to the Buddhists. This is what is called the apohavada. S'ankara shows that the pure positive existence is the ~nly real factor in a thing:
BuJ the doctrine of S'ankara did not continue in its , purity. The emphasis was slightly shifted. lhe illuso•y nature of the world ~nd not the illusory nature of
