Is error possible in realism'--and would explain the possibi- lity of error by showing how a real substantive () and a 25€sya real attribute (prakara) may be erroneously correlated when they are presented in cognition and thus save realisrn itself from being ruined by conceding the possibility of error. The Prabhakara realists think that any concession of the possibj lity of error (brama) would spell the ruin of realism and insist that all experiences are valid (a+bh?tih praka) and that the so called bramas involve an element of non-discrimination (aviola). The Bhatta realists adopt the Kanyathakhyati of Nyaya with suitable modifications; and in order to effectively preserve realism, they would make the knowledge of cognition thanna) dependent upon the knownness (watata) of the object (jiya) and thus provide an effective counterblast to idealism which seeks to merge all j%ya in ama. The Buddhist idealist rules out truth and considers all determinate knowledge (sanikalpaaerroneous. The advocates of the theory of intrinsicality of validity (primaryasatastpaudhinab) more especially the Bhattas and the Advaitinswould generally emphasise the ideas thatin a valid cognition, the object is not stultified by a subsequent sublating cognition and is not merely re-exhibited through a reminiscent impression, the former of these two features being stressed in particular; and this of looking way at pranatha would be quite in accord with the view that up butua is made out extrinsically and pranata intrinsically. It may also be noted, with advantagethat, in the Nyaya theory, anoyana saya (the subject-centred after-cognition) is regarded as self luminous (suaprakasa) in the sense that it reveals itself along with the gyaasatya (the object-centred cognition in which the knower and knowledge are not presented); and that, in this respect, the Nyaya realist seeks to combine in a way his objectivism with an aspect of subjectivistic thought which is not incompatible with his realism. In this kind of compromisea danger is lurking, as students of Advaita may easily see, and this danger consists in the manner in which the Nyaya view Mends itself to auyanasya being treated as a fragmentary appearance of the absolute reality represented by the absolute self-luminous consciousness called cy
An intelligent attempt to review synthetically all the theories of bhrama known to Indian philosophy will bring to light the fact that, in some manner or other, a negative element is involved in every one of the five Alhydtiudas (theories explaining the nature of bhrana. In the asathyati doctrine, the negative element is obvious ; and in atnahyati doctrine, it is obvious in so far as objective externality is concerned. In the amyathayati viewthe negative element is to be found in the satisarga part or in the
