philosophy about the way in which uruth and error are inade out . The Sankhyas maintain that both validity and invalidity are intrinsically made out sense that it is by virtue in the of the reflection or proximity of the same cit (selfluminiou conscious. ness), that the existence of a cognitive writi and its validity or invalidity are illuminated. The Prabhakaras make no difference between uyanasaya and annoyanesaya and maintain thatin every cognition, the knower, the known object, and knowledge itself, along with its validity, are presented. They advocate the theory of intrinsicality (suatastapas), in so far as validity (ranato) is concerned; and there is no question of error (८pramazoain their theory, since they maintain that all experiences are valid (anubhatia raha. The Bhattas contend that cognition is to be inferred through its effect, called jitada or prhauty, which consists in what some of them describe as temporary luminosity (prakasa) arising in known objects and referred to in propositions like this is known (yai Hilital) and that, in such inference, the cognition which has caused jaatata and its validity are presented. The validity which is thus intrinsically made out be by a subsequent may stultified sublating cognition and thus, in the Bhatta theory, invalidity (prmatog) is extrinsically made out. The Bhattas are, therefore, to be taken to advocate swatasted in the case of validity and par:- tstoc in the case of invalidity. Murarimisra, who does not go the whole hog either as Prabhakara or as Bhatta, but who is undoubt edly a MImamsaka, recognises, like a Naiyayika, that a cognition (oyaasaya) is cognised by its cognition (), but after-ayeyaasayat maintains, unlike a Naiyayika, that the validity of yyadasya is also presented in the same anyumasaya. It will thus be see that Murarimisra is an advocate of the theory of the intrinsicality of validity (pramatoa stat€yata. The Bauddhason the other handhold that all determinate knowledge (scrikalpnac)in so far as one is conscious of it, is erroneous (aprana) and its apramoa is intrinsically made out; while, through inference, the validity promatoe) of indeterminate cognition (niruitalpaka) is extrinsically made out. Buddhists the theory The thus advocate of extrinsi. cality (parathastacupaksa) in regar to validity and intrinsicality (solatastoopso) in to invalidityto regard . According the Advaitins, the validity of a cognition made in is intrinsically out the sense that the witnessing inner spirit (sdasicaitanya) which illuminates the valid cognitive writi, also illuminates its validity pronaug) and the invalidity (apranator) of a cognitive ti is inferree extrinsically, through the resultant effort futile. becoming In order to evaluate adequately the diferent theories of braz• dua and arnatha set forth here, is necessary to note that the Naiyayikas would answer in the airmativethe question
