[ 76 ] - The example is not quite apt. The parts of the rope are not known as the inagined ones, and it has been already said that there is nothing to warrant the presumption that the things in the world are un-- real like the rope-serpent. These are, though im . permanant, as real as Sat itself and therefore the ma-. terial cause of these must also be real . The postula- tion of imagined parts to Sat is baseless and so unacce- ptable as implied by the Upanisat. No doubt Sat must have parts since otherwise it could not be the material cause of the world. But that the parts are unreal or imagined ones there is nothing to suggest. Explaining the next passage (1-2-32 Sankara says : तत् सत् ऐक्षत ईक्षां दर्शनं कृतवत् । अतश्च न प्रधानं सांख्य- परिकल्पितं जगत्कारणम् । प्रधानस्याचेतनत्वाभ्युपगमात् । ‘That Sat saydid the seeing. Thus matter ac cepted by Sankhyas is not the cause of the world since it is accepted as insentient. The interpretation here is as it should be. But ac ording to this Sat must be accepted asone capable of seeing and acting accordingly. Such is not however Sankara's conception of Sat. For him it is one abso. lutely qualitiless, void of all attributes. This he makes. clear by his ccmments on *Sadeva62-1) ‘सदेव । सदति अस्तितामात्रं वस्तु सूक्ष्मं निर्विशेपं सर्वगतं एकं निरञ्जनं निरवयवं विज्ञानम् । ' “Sat means existence alone. an entity, subtle,
