The commentator now makes plain the implication of syat८ It is thus :- (tatudhi) If one were to say there is no perception and the like. One cannot say that it is illusion, because of the absence of contradicting evi dence. Surely there can be no illusion in the absence of a (real) substrate, 10r is contradiction endless [When one mistakes a rope for a smake, the rope is the substrate. The Sublating experie1ce is of the form this is not a smake, it is a rope'. In the end there must be the recognition of some tat0, in this case, the rope, which is not sublated. To take another instance, a person sees at a distance a fairly tal object and takes it for a man. On going mearer to the object he thinks it is not a man but a w00den p0st. On coming quite close to the object and feeling it, he realises that it is an irregular tapering rock. When illusion disappears there must remain something in the field of awareness which was the basis of the illusion and of which in the end the percipient can say this is not a man 10r a. wooden p0st but an irregular tapering rock. Without this subsisting tatu0 at the end, there can be neither illusion nor disappearance of illusion . The concept of illusion implies the existence of tatul05. (vide R. T.) Even by one wh0 believes in illusion and sublation some tatu0 must be accepted as the basis of illusion successive judgements are of the form “This is silver during illusion and “This is not silver but conch-shell after sublation. Tr. ]
